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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study examines the transportation performance of modern-era streetcars operated
in five U.S. cities: Little Rock, Memphis, Portland, Seattle, and Tampa. The objective
of the study is to examine streetcar performance, test hypotheses about variation
in performance through a combination of empirical analysis and insights derived from
key informant interviews, and to identify lessons for other cities that operate or are
contemplating operating streetcars. The particular cities were selected to represent all
modern-era streetcar services operating in year-round revenue service in the U.S. at the
time of the study for which the authors could obtain relevant data. Services for which data
were incomplete, such as Tacoma and historic legacy systems such as New Orleans and
Philadelphia, are excluded from the investigation.
The streetcar lines in the five case-study cities were first opened between 1993 and 2007,
with the most recent line opened in Portland in late 2012. Two cities (Seattle and Tampa)
feature only a single line, two cities (Little Rock and Portland) operate two lines, and one
city (Memphis) has three lines. The streetcar systems in Memphis and Portland are much
more extensive and feature many more stops or stations than those in the other three
cities, where the streetcars function as very short circulator services.
Streetcar service is operated by the local transit agency, either directly or under contract
from another entity. However, the streetcar has a distinctive branding that differentiates it
as a special service: River Rail (Little Rock), The Trolley (Memphis), Portland Streetcar
(Portland), South Lake Union Streetcar (Seattle), and TECO Line Streetcar (Tampa).
Streetcar services in these cities operate primarily in mixed-traffic environments, with
Tampa being the only city that operates its streetcar entirely within an exclusive right-ofway. Service hours and service frequencies vary across the cities, with Tampa and Little
Rock noteworthy for not operating streetcar service during the morning commuter period.

Streetcar Ridership and Transportation Performance
The authors examined streetcar ridership and other transportation performance measures
for each city for 2012, as well as trends over time for the years immediately preceding 2012.
Annual streetcar ridership was much higher in Portland than elsewhere, with patronage
more than 2.5 times that of Memphis (the next-highest ridership city), and more than
30 times that of Little Rock (the lowest-ridership city). Little Rock, Memphis, and Tampa
have a much more seasonal pattern to streetcar ridership than Portland or Seattle, which
points to the importance of seasonal visitors as a key riding market in each of these three
systems. The seasonal ridership pattern observable for the streetcar in the three cities is
not apparent in its bus ridership. Average weekday streetcar ridership ranges from a low of
about 400 riders per day in Little Rock to about 12,000 riders per day in Portland. In Little
Rock and Tampa, ridership declined in the years leading to 2012, while in the other cities
ridership was either stable or increased.
The authors also examined basic performance measures. Streetcar operating expenses
range from a low of $2.61 per trip in Memphis, the most cost effective case, to a high of
$9.61 per trip in Little Rock, the least cost effective case. Between 2008 and 2012, cost
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effectiveness improved in Memphis and Seattle, and it deteriorated in the other three
cities. In 2012, the streetcar system in Portland was by far the most productive (carried
the most riders per unit of service), followed by that of Seattle. Little Rock, Memphis, and
Tampa were much less productive. Between 2008 and 2012, service productivity declined
in Little Rock and Tampa, and it improved in Memphis and Seattle. Data are incomplete
for Portland due to the mingling of streetcar and LRT statistics in the original NTD data
prior to 2011.
The authors finally identified a set of factors that might be related to streetcar performance
in the study communities. The factors included: alignment (streetcar line length, and
location with respect to population covered, employment covered, and special generators
served), network coordination (streetcar accessibility to connecting transit services), fare
policy (streetcar fare level, streetcar transfer policy), service policy (streetcar service
frequency, streetcar service duration), and rider market (seasonality of streetcar ridership).
The authors assigned each city a score between 1 (worst, or lowest ranked) and 5 (best,
or highest ranked) for each factor, save for two factors that were scored on a binary basis
(1= meets the ideal; 0= does not meet the ideal). The authors then compiled the rankings
and related the results back to the ridership and performance measures noted earlier.
Portland emerged as the city whose streetcar system was planned and operates closest to
the ideal suggested by the literature (total of 39 points out of 47 points possible), followed by
Memphis (36 points) and Seattle (31 points). Tampa and Little Rock emerge with the lowest
scores (16 points and 20 points, respectively). The two sets of cities ranked similarly on
the factor assessment, as they do on the ridership and performance measures. Portland,
Memphis, and Seattle were the better performers and Little Rock and Tampa the weaker
performers on the ridership and transit performance measures. Portland’s emergence at
the top of the point scale echoed its performance as the highest ridership, most productive,
and second-most cost effective streetcar system. A critical difference between Portland
and the other cities appears to be that planners and policymakers explicitly thought about
the streetcar as transit and as a development tool when they made crucial decisions about
the service, as the authors learned during interviews with key local informants.

Goals and Assessment of Streetcars by Key Informants
Given that the streetcars in most of the cities do not seem to be very effective transit
services when assessed on standard transportation criteria, the authors conducted 21
interviews with 23 key informants to better understand how local planners, developers,
businesspeople, advocates, and other important local actors viewed the purpose and
performance of the streetcars in their cities. The interviews identified several important
themes about streetcar planning and operation in the five cities.
First, in most cities the private sector emerged as the key set of actors promoting
streetcar development. Private sector actors from the local development and downtown
business communities as well streetcar advocacy groups, whose members often included
development and business community representatives, played critical roles in placing the
idea of a streetcar on the local policy agenda. In several cities, the private sector then led
the drive to implement the streetcar.
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Second, the primary objective of streetcar implementation has been development and
urban revitalization of underused or declining urban cores. In most cities, the streetcar was
seen as a development “catalyst.” The streetcar also stood as a symbol of a “permanent”
public commitment to a particular area within the community. The streetcar’s symbolic role
appeared to be particularly important as its presence, and status as a public investment,
reassured developers and business owners that it was now “safe” for them to make their
own private economic investments in the same area.
Third, the streetcars in many cities have now taken on an iconic role completely separate
from any transportation function they possess. In three cities (Little Rock, Memphis,
Tampa) they are widely regarded as icons of the city, and they play a role in promoting the
city to others outside the community.
Fourth, strong support remains for the streetcar among key actors even in what appear
to be the most troubled streetcar cities. However, even the most supportive actors do
recognize the challenges facing their streetcar, whether due to financial difficulties,
declining ridership, or some other factor.
Fifth, and finally, there does seem to be a real disconnect between enthusiasm for the
streetcar and its transportation performance. In most cities, streetcar ridership is very low
and compares quite unfavorably with the ridership on a local bus route operating in the
same general area. A strict transportation assessment would tend to regard a streetcar that
had lower ridership than a typical bus route as a misuse of scarce transportation resources.
But few of the informants tended to think in such terms. Instead, poor transportation
performance tended to be downplayed because the streetcar was not seen as primarily a
transportation investment but instead as something else.

Lessons for Other Communities
First, the authors urge planners and policymakers to think very carefully about the fundamental
purpose of any proposed streetcar in their community and to proceed in all their decision
making with that fundamental purpose clearly in mind. The authors strongly believe that a
transportation investment should be primarily about providing transportation service, and
they would thus suggest first evaluating the streetcar versus other transportation services
on transportation criteria. However, even if the planners and policymakers have another
approach in mind, they should proceed carefully, clearly, and cautiously.
Second, the authors urge planners and policymakers in other cities to approach the
model of Portland with much more caution. Many streetcar advocates point to Portland’s
experience and proceed as if it could be easily replicated elsewhere. But the authors
suggest that Portland’s experience is the result of a unique combination of external factors
(local population and employment patterns, the health of the real estate market) and local
decisions (land development policy decisions, financial decisions, other public investments,
streetcar alignment location and length, streetcar operations decisions, streetcar fare
policy decisions) that may or may not be applicable elsewhere.
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Third, the authors urge planners and policymakers in other cities to beware of unintended
consequences. Communities must think much more carefully about the wisdom of a
streetcar investment given the state of their local transit finances. In some cases, the
opening of a streetcar might necessitate later cuts in bus services, for example, when
budgets tighten. Such an outcome would seem to defeat any transportation rationale for
making a streetcar investment. Additionally, the decisions made early on about seemingly
trivial things such as the type of vehicle to operate (modern, replica, or vintage) can have
significant consequences for operations and finances later on.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The streetcar, an urban transportation technology whose golden age was thought to have
been the period from roughly the 1890s to the 1910s, has made a remarkable resurgence
in the United States in recent years. As of September 2012, transit agencies in eight cities
reported to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) that they are operating streetcars in
regular, year-round revenue service: Little Rock, Memphis, New Orleans, Philadelphia,
Portland, Seattle, Tacoma, and Tampa.1 Boston and San Francisco also operate streetcars
on their Ashmont-Mattapan and F lines, respectively, although their streetcar statistics are
folded into those for their light rail transit (LRT) services in the National Transit Database
(NTD) statistics.2 Several other cities, from Kenosha, Wisconsin to San Pedro, California,
operate seasonal or weekend-only streetcar lines. Several cities report streetcar projects
under construction, while more than forty other cities have streetcar projects in various
stages of planning. The streetcar’s apparent rebirth after decades of what had appeared
to have been technological obsolescence is truly remarkable.
There are many reasons for the streetcar’s return to the urban transportation scene,
although the promotion of local economic development and the availability of federal capital
funding under the new-starts/small-starts program are the most frequently cited rationales
for its reemergence.3 Both streetcar supporters and critics point to Portland, Oregon to
support their assertions about the streetcar’s purported economic development effects
(Figure 1). Supporters point to hundreds of millions of dollars in commercial development
activity, particularly in the city’s Pearl District, which they argue can be traced directly to
Portland’s decision to build a streetcar line.4 Skeptics assert that local real estate market
conditions, public financial incentives, and local regulatory inducements were far more
important than the streetcar in attracting development to these locations.5
The relative abundance of federal capital funding under the small starts program for
streetcar development, and the relative lack of such funding for more expensive LRT
development, has also encouraged cities to look to streetcars instead of other rail modes
when they consider making fixed transit investments. Officials in the Obama Administration
have been especially strong promoters of streetcar development. The American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) has also promoted streetcar development as a lower
capital cost alternative to LRT, and this cost differential versus LRT accounts for the
increased popularity of streetcar projects in recent years.6
Despite the proliferation of streetcar projects in recent years, there is remarkably little
work on the streetcar’s role as a transportation service. The streetcar is a transit service
designed to move riders; even its potential land use and economic development effects
derive principally from its potential ability to provide rider access to the destinations
it is designed to serve.7 Thus, planners and policymakers would benefit from a better
understanding of the streetcar’s capabilities, and its limitations, as a transit mode. This
study fills in existing knowledge gaps by examining the experiences of people involved
with or affected by streetcars in five U.S. cities.
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The objective of the study is to examine streetcar performance, test hypotheses about
variation in performance through a combination of empirical analysis and insights derived
from key informant interviews, and to identify lessons for other cities that operate or are
contemplating operating streetcars. The particular cities were selected to represent all
modern-era streetcar services operating in year-round revenue service in the U.S. at the
time of the study for which the investigators could obtain relevant data. Services for which
data were incomplete, such as Tacoma and historic legacy systems such as New Orleans
and Philadelphia, are excluded from the investigation.
The streetcar systems of interest are all modern-era systems built and opened in
either the 1990s or 2000s. The systems include those located in Little Rock, Arkansas;
Memphis, Tennessee; Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington; and Tampa, Florida. The
systems in Seattle and Tampa consist of one streetcar line, while Little Rock has two lines.
Portland opened its second line during the year of the study (2012), and Memphis operates
three lines.

Figure 1. A Streetcar in Portland, Oregon8
These streetcar lines operate in different ways, feature different levels of coordination
with other transit services, and exhibit different levels of ridership and performance. Most
streetcars were developed with a primary objective of promoting development activity in
the areas they serve. This report investigates these five cases in order to develop lessons
that might assist policymakers and planners in other cities that are operating, constructing,
or considering the implementation of streetcar transit in their city.
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STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
The report is divided into a set of sections that represent the body of the report and a series of
appendices that provide more detail on each of the five cities included in the study. This first
section of the report introduces the focus of the research. The second section is a literature
review presenting the state of knowledge on the performance of streetcars as transit and as
development tools. The third section discusses the rationale for the case selection in more
detail and introduces the research methodology for the study, which employs a combination
of quantitative analyses of transit, census, land use, and other relevant data, with qualitative
analyses derived from documents and key informant interviews.
The heart of the report consists of the next two sections, which collectively present the
results of the five-city investigation. The first section offers an examination of the streetcar
as a means of transportation. Drawing on a combination of agency and national data, and
insights gleaned from key informant interviews, the section discusses the transportation
performance of the streetcars in each city and identifies factors that account for variation
in performance across the streetcar cities.
The second section draws primarily on key informant interviews to consider the views
of key local actors representing transit agencies, city planning offices, development
interests, and the business and tourism communities about the purpose and performance
of the streetcar in each city. The section identifies common themes across the cities with
a view toward understanding how streetcars are viewed, why they are selected, and how
their performance is measured by these different sets of stakeholders. The section also
discusses possible strategies identified by the informants to improve streetcar performance.
The main body of the report then concludes with a short summary of the key findings and
lessons from each of these two study sections.
The appendices conclude the report materials. Each case-study city has a detailed
appendix that provides additional descriptive information about the streetcars, the local
settings in which they operate, their performance, an historical narrative about streetcar
development in the city, and more in-depth discussion of the key informant interviews. The
key informant interview questions and the interview consent form follow toward the end of
the report materials.
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II. LITERATURE ON STREETCARS IN U.S. CITIES
The authors reviewed a wide-ranging set of academic and professional sources to better
understand the issues around streetcar development, the goals and objectives of streetcar
implementation, and the actual performance of the streetcars as part of the background for
this study. The most striking result of this literature search is that, despite the increasing
popularity of streetcars as urban transit investments in U.S. cities, there is remarkably little
scholarly literature on the U.S. streetcar, particularly with respect to its role as an element
of the local transportation system. Indeed, most literature instead focuses on the role of
streetcars as urban redevelopment tools or as important contributors to enhancing the
quality of life in cities and neglects its passenger-carrying performance.
Over the pages that follow, the authors provide a brief overview of key literature sources in
two areas that provide important framing and background information for this study. First,
the authors review the literature on streetcars as modes of transportation by focusing on
works that discuss streetcar ridership and streetcar service productivity. These works are
very few in number, but they speak specifically to the transportation-related objectives that
are central to this study of five streetcar cities. Second, the authors provide a brief overview
of the literature on streetcars as urban redevelopment tools and/or enhancements to the
quality of life in local communities. This literature provides some insight into the factors
that have tended to influence local decision-making around streetcar projects and, thus,
should not be neglected due to their practical relevance to this work.

STREETCARS AS TRANSPORTATION
The limited literature on streetcars as modes of public transportation focuses on ridership,
and its determinants, as well as on service productivity and cost effectiveness measures.
Brown provides a descriptive snapshot of streetcar patronage (unlinked passenger trips
and/or passenger miles), service productivity (passenger miles per revenue mile, or
load factor), and cost effectiveness (operating expense per unlinked passenger trip and/
or operating expense per passenger mile) in seven U.S. cities that reported operating
streetcar service to the National Transit Database in 2011.9 All five cities included in this
Mineta-sponsored study (Little Rock, Memphis, Portland, Seattle, and Tampa) are included
in the paper, as are two additional cities (Tacoma and New Orleans).
Study findings highlighted the much higher ridership and service productivity (load factor)
in the older, legacy New Orleans system compared with the modern-era systems. Among
the modern-era systems, Portland emerged as a much stronger performer than its
counterparts, with annual ridership more than three times higher than Memphis, its closest
peer. With respect to cost effectiveness, Portland emerged as the strongest performer,
with Little Rock and Tampa the poorest performers. The author pointed to the slower
speeds of streetcars compared with buses and the relative lack of service integration of
the streetcar with other transit modes in the studied cities as key contributing factors to
their performance. The author noted what appeared to be much more integration of the
streetcars with other transit services in the legacy system of New Orleans as compared
with the modern-era systems, particularly those in Tampa and Little Rock, which appeared
somewhat disconnected from the rest of the transit system. Combined, these two factors
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mean that modern-era streetcars appear to be more dependent on casual and discretionary
riders, such as visitors, and are likely not an attractive modal option for more utilitarian
transit riders.
The author concluded that: “There is significant variation in performance, with some of
this variation a function of the built environment within which the systems operate and/
or of the degree of integration with the rest of the transit system, captured in the transfer
rates.”10 This current research further explores ideas first discussed in this paper, which
is the only published examination of both ridership and performance across multiple
U.S. streetcar cases.
Two other recent works examine determinants of streetcar ridership. First, Foletta, et al.
focused on 67 streetcar stops in Portland, Seattle, and Tacoma. Using a multivariate statistical
model, they found positive relationships between ridership (average weekday boardings)
and population and employment accessibility within one-quarter mile (400 meters) of the
stop, the number of transfer connections to nearby transit routes, the stop’s status as a
terminal or fare-free (in the cases of Portland and Tacoma) stop, and the presence of special
generators such as hotels, activity centers, colleges, and hospitals within one-quarter mile
(400 meters) of the stop.11 The presence of special generators appeared to be particularly
important, and this finding pointed to the important role of streetcars as transport services
catering to visitors and other non-commute riders.
Second, a working paper by Ramos and Brown examined a much larger set of streetcar
cases than was included by Foletta et al. and also directly contrasted the determinants of
streetcar ridership versus the determinants of light rail ridership, the streetcar’s closest rail
competitor.12 The authors found significant differences between streetcars and light rail in the
study of seven streetcar systems (475 stops) and 15 light rail systems (405 stations) in the
U.S. They also found significant differences between modern-era streetcars and the legacy
streetcar systems in Philadelphia and New Orleans. Using multivariate statistical analysis,
results indicate that streetcar ridership (average weekday boardings) was positively related
to the size of the population residing within one-quarter mile (400 meters) of a stop, the
amount of employment located within one-quarter mile (400 meters) of a stop, and a stop’s
status as either a terminal stop or bi-directional serving stop (i.e. service in two directions).
Ridership was negatively associated with fares, vehicle ownership within one-quarter mile
(400 meters) of a stop, and average block size within one-quarter mile (400 meters) of
a stop, with the latter two variables highlighting the primarily downtown and traditional
development areas within which many streetcars are operated. But by far the strongest
determinant of streetcar ridership was the presence of a special activity generator within
one-quarter mile (400 meters) of a stop. The presence of these developments increased
ridership more than five-fold over what would be expected in their absence. By contrast,
the presence of special activity generators had only a 1.85 multiplier effect in the case of
light rail ridership. The importance of special activity generators was particularly important
for the modern-era systems, which had a much higher multiplier (7.76) than the legacy
systems (4.17).
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The authors found that streetcar ridership was not related to many of the variables
that were related to light rail boardings, including service frequency, the number of bus
connections, and the presence of park-and-ride facilities, all of which are variables that are
more likely to be important to regular transit users, including commuters, than for casual
riders or visitors.13 They hypothesized that the differences between the streetcar and light
rail results were a function of two very different rider markets using these services, with
streetcars tending to serve more of a visitor and special activity centers related ridership
and light rail serving more utilitarian transit trips. The consistency of these results with the
other studies would seem to support this hypothesis, although the present study proposes
to examine this issue in more detail.
Taken as a whole, the literature on streetcars as transportation highlights the important
differences between streetcars and the other public transit modes, particularly light rail.
Streetcars are slower, have lower ridership, lower service productivity, and lower cost
effectiveness than light rail, although they also have significantly lower capital costs
associated with their construction. Streetcars would seem to be serving a particular set
of travel markets that includes large numbers of visitors and special activity center-bound
riders, while light rail serves a more traditional commuter market. The literature also points
to important differences between legacy streetcar systems in places like New Orleans and
Philadelphia, where the streetcars appear to be better integrated with the rest of the transit
system, and the modern-era systems in which some services, particularly the streetcars in
Tampa and Little Rock, appear to be almost stand-alone public transportation modes. The
latter issues will be considered in the research presented later in the report. But before
examining the cases of interest in this study, the key works on the role of streetcars as
urban development tools and/or quality of life investments, most of which derive from the
exemplary case of Portland, Oregon, are briefly considered.

STREETCARS AS DEVELOPMENT TOOLS AND ENHANCEMENTS TO
QUALITY OF LIFE
The primary focus of this study is the role of streetcars as transportation, but given the
importance of potential development and quality-of-life effects to many policymakers who
have decided to build and operate streetcars, it is important to the study to consider the
key evidence and controversies in the literature in this area. Most of the evidence, and
many of the controversies, surround the streetcar in Portland, Oregon, which is by far the
most studied system and the system that many observers point to as a model system for
other cities to emulate.
Hovee and Gustafson’s work is perhaps the most cited recent work that attributes significant
development effects to streetcar implementation in Portland.14 They point to hundreds of
millions of dollars in development in the downtown areas around the original streetcar
line, and their work has often been interpreted to imply a causal relationship between
the streetcar and this development activity. This implication is not, however, supported
by detailed empirical study that controls for other potential causal factors. Nevertheless,
the study and its claims have been cited by many streetcar proponents, and they have
been criticized by streetcar opponents, including O’Toole, who asserts that sizeable public
subsidies and other regulatory and financial incentives, as well as the state of the local

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Literature on Streetcars in U.S. Cities

11

real estate market, are collectively responsible for the development activity that would
presumably have occurred even were the streetcar not in place.15
Despite these criticisms, much of the practice-oriented literature promotes streetcars for
their perceived development effects. A Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP)
Report presented results of a survey of streetcar properties in which nearly all the
interviewees believed their streetcar had positive effects on development, although there
was a lack of empirical support for these assertions.16 Similar results were reported in
a recent survey sponsored by the American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
of streetcar operators.17 Respondents reported $3.5 billion in development effects in
Portland, presumably referring to the work done by Hovee and Gustafson,18 while other
respondents, representing proposed or then under construction streetcars in Salt Lake
City, Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Seattle, emphasized that developers had approached
them with proposals for new developments near the streetcar lines. Left unexplored in
this literature is the nature of the other incentives that cities also have either used or
are considering using to promote development in the areas near streetcar lines, or their
costs. In short, the economic development effects of the streetcars are still the subject of
much debate, although they appear to be the major determinants of the decision to build
streetcars in most cities, including in the cities that are part of this study, as the authors
discuss later in the report.
To determine whether the streetcar actually has an effect on urban development, one must
understand how land values are affected by transportation. Indeed, the primary means
of tracking any potential development effects of the streetcar, or any other transportation
investment, is through changes in land values. The basic logic is that a transportation
investment will have an effect only on land values, and hence on development, to the extent
that it provides accessibility to the location that users of the transportation investment
then take advantage of.19 Measuring accessibility is often a very complicated task, and
extensive literature exists on different approaches to measuring accessibility. However,
it is easy to measure use of the transportation investment, which presumably reflects
the value that people place on the particular service. Hence, this study’s primary focus is
on ridership and directly measurable transportation effects, which the authors argue are
necessary preconditions for the streetcar, or for any other transportation investment, to
exercise any development effects.

LESSONS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW
Assessing the literature as a whole, one is struck by the relative lack of knowledge on
U.S. streetcars, despite the many millions of dollars being spent by each of the dozens
of cities that are operating, building, or considering a streetcar in their communities. The
literature notes that streetcars function differently from light rail, and thus it suggests
that they are potential complements to light rail as opposed to substitutes for this other
rail mode. The modern-era streetcars in particular seem geared toward non-commute
and visitor travel markets, while light rail is more commuter-focused. Speeds are lower
on streetcars than light rail, which is not surprising given the different rights-of-way and
operating environments of the two modes, and streetcars also tend to be slower than
buses. Ridership is relatively low, and so are service productivity and cost effectiveness.
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The evidence for the streetcar’s development effects is limited, controversial, and yet
widely believed among many streetcar proponents. All of these observations are based
on a limited literature that would benefit from much more empirical study of how streetcars
actually perform in practice, which is the subject of this report and the focus of the remaining
sections and appendices.
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III. CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY
This research employs a comparative case study approach, which allows the authors to
better understand: 1) the purpose of streetcar development in the case-study cities; 2)
the function the streetcar serves in the local transit system; 3) its ridership and service
productivity as a transit mode; and 4) how planners, elected officials, and other key
local actors assess the overall performance of the streetcar in each city. By employing
multiple case studies, the authors can compare these issues across the different cities to
understand whether and why streetcar performance might be different in one place versus
another, with an eye toward identifying useful policy- and practice-oriented lessons.
Five case-study streetcar systems were selected to represent all the modern-era streetcars
in the U.S. that now operate in year-round, everyday revenue service; thus, the study
excludes systems that operate weekend-only, seasonal, or special event services. The
study research design includes a combination of methods, including literature review,
document analysis, quantitative analyses, and structured interviews, which collectively
provide a deep, multifaceted understanding of the context for streetcar development in
each case, the objectives of streetcar implementation, and the actual performance of
streetcar service. The primary research emphasis is on the transportation role and transit
performance of the streetcar, as opposed to its possible redevelopment effects, although
some of these issues are considered due to their importance for streetcar decision-making
in many communities. A more detailed explanation of the rationale for case selection and
a discussion of methodology follow.

CASE SELECTION
The authors identified five cases for examination in the study: Little Rock, Memphis, Portland,
Seattle, and Tampa. These five cases represent all the cities with modern-era streetcars
that operate full-time, year-round revenue service that reported streetcar ridership and
operational data to the National Transit Database (NTD) under the streetcar mode code
(SR) in 2011, the most recent year for which a full set of data were available using the NTD
database access tool developed by the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) at
the time this study began.20 The study omits systems that: 1) report their streetcar data as
part of their light rail (LR) data; 2) classify their streetcar as a different rail mode for NTD
reporting purposes; or 3) operate weekend, seasonal, and/or special event service, as
opposed to regular, all-year service.
The authors focused solely on modern-era streetcar systems rather than the legacy
systems in place in cities such as New Orleans and Philadelphia because modern-era
streetcars are more typical of the kinds of projects now being considered in other cities
around the country. They are new transportation investments inserted into an existing urban
environment rather than long-established services that have had their urban environments
evolve over time with the transportation service already in place. They are shorter in length
than the older systems that serve many longer distance trips and function, in a marketservice sense, more like light-rail service than modern-era streetcars. They tend to have
had the same kinds of project goals and objectives with respect to transportation and
urban development as proponents presently voice about new streetcar development in
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other U.S. cities. Their performance thus offers more useful lessons to policy and practice
than could be provided by examining systems that do not resemble the kinds of projects
contemplated now in most other U.S. cities that are considering streetcars.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research design incorporates a variety of qualitative and quantitative techniques,
representing several project phases. The first phase of the study involved collecting
documentary evidence, including reports, scholarly articles, and popular press accounts,
to develop an understanding of the current issues in the literature on streetcars, more
generally, and the history of streetcar development in each specific case. The general
literature review began with the use of traditional search sites such as LexisNexis and
the publications index hosted by the Transportation Research Board (TRB). The general
literature search allowed the authors to frame the study, identify potential data needs, and
develop a general research plan. The case-specific literature search allowed the authors
to better understand the local context for each case, which proved especially useful for
the key informant interviews discussed later. The results of the general literature search
are located in the literature review section, while the case-specific search results are
incorporated in the individual profile narratives in the appendix sections of this report.
The second phase of the study involved collecting transit agency data and local non-transit
data to be used in the analysis in the third project phase. The transit agency data, most of
which were obtained from the National Transit Database and/or agency contacts, included
the basic physical characteristics of each streetcar line (length, number of stops, alignment
type, and capital cost), operational characteristics (headways, hours of service, fares),
and performance characteristics (ridership, service, operating costs) for the streetcar
lines, the local bus system, and the transit system as a whole. The authors also obtained
Geographic Information System (GIS) files for the transit network in each city from their
agency contacts. The non-transit data include U.S. Census population, employment, and
demographic information (on a block group level), local land use, property assessor and
development activity data obtained from local agency contacts, and other locally-relevant
data identified through discussion with agency contacts or the case-specific literature
search. These non-transit data provide an understanding of the local urban environment
within which each streetcar line operates in its community.
The third phase of the study involved analysis of the phase two data to identify lessons
about the service performance of each streetcar, to test hypotheses about the reasons
for variation in performance, and to develop questions for the key informant interviews
in phase four of the study. This data analysis focused primarily on an assessment of
the transportation-related streetcar data, although some data on local land use patterns,
economic development, and the socioeconomic context for the streetcars were also
included as part of the assessment.
The fourth and final phase of the study involved interviews with key informants. These
interviews allowed the authors to understand the informants’ perspectives on the purpose
of streetcar development in their communities, including their identification of specific
goals and objectives and their assessments of the streetcars’ performances in meeting
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these goals. The interviewees consisted of transit agency planners, local elected officials,
and representatives of the development community and other key local place-based
constituencies. The authors conducted a total of 21 interviews, with an average of four
interviews in each city. The authors interviewed a total of 23 key informants through these
interviews. The interviews occurred via telephone and lasted approximately an hour each.
The authors used the results of the interviews to provide important context for the quantitative
assessment and to examine the relative importance that planners, policymakers, and other
important stakeholders place on transportation versus economic development or quality
of life factors in their approaches to streetcar planning and operation. A set of interview
questions and the interview consent form may be found in Appendix F.
The authors then combined the results of the qualitative inquiry, quantitative analyses, and
the key informant interviews to develop lessons about the overall performance of streetcars
in modern US cities, the reasons for variation in their performance, and recommendations
to cities currently operating streetcars and contemplating making these investments.
These lessons are highlighted at the conclusion of the report.
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IV. TRANSPORTATION PERFORMANCE OF STREETCARS
IN FIVE U.S. CITIES
The study considers the transportation performance of the modern-era streetcars in five
U.S. cities, with 2012 serving as the year of primary interest for the study. This section of
the report provides a basic overview of the streetcars’ physical and service characteristics,
an accounting of streetcar ridership and other performance measures, and an assessment
of factors that the authors believe help to explain streetcar performance in each city, as
well as variation in performance across the cities.

STREETCAR PHYSICAL AND SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS
The streetcar lines in each of the five cities were first opened between 1993 and 2007,
with the most recent line opened in Portland in late 2012 (Table 1). Two cities (Seattle and
Tampa) feature only a single line, two cities (Little Rock and Portland) have two lines, and
one city (Memphis) has three lines. The streetcar systems in Memphis and Portland are
much more extensive and feature many more stops or stations than those in the other three
cities, where the streetcars function as very short circulator services (Figure 2). Streetcar
services in these cities operate primarily in mixed-traffic environments, with Tampa being
the only city that operates its streetcar entirely within an exclusive right-of-way.

Figure 2. Streetcars in Five U.S. Cities (2012)21
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Physical Characteristics of Streetcar Systems in Five Cities22

Characteristic
Year Open
Capital Cost
(unadjusted dollars)
Number of Lines

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

2004

1993

2001, 2012

2007

2002

$28,800,000

$104, 000,000

$251,420,000

2 (Blue, Green)

3 (Main Street,
Riverfront,
Madison Avenue)

2 (North-South,
Center Loop)

1

1

3*

$53,100,000 $32,000,000

Number of Vehicles

3

10

11*

3

Number of Stations

15

25

76

11

11

3.4 miles
(5.47 km)

7 miles
(11.27 km)

7.35 miles**
(11.83 km)

2.6 miles*
(4.18 km)

2.7 miles
(4.35 km)

Exclusive

0.4 miles

2.8 miles

0.15 miles

0.6 miles

2.7 miles

Mixed Traffic

3.0 miles

4.2 miles

7.20 miles**

2 miles

0

Length
Alignment Type

Notes:
* Alignment length is for round trip. (Email communication from Rob Coughlin and Ethan Melone on February 4, 2014.)
** The alignment is 7.35 miles of double track, or 14.7 miles of single track. (Email communication with Rick Gustafson
on February 5, 2014.)

Streetcar service is operated by the local transit agency in each city, either directly or
under contract from another entity. However, the streetcar has a distinctive branding
that differentiates it as a special service: River Rail (Little Rock), The Trolley (Memphis),
Portland Streetcar (Portland), South Lake Union Streetcar (Seattle), and TECO Line
Streetcar (Tampa). Local transit agency operation permits potential integration of streetcar
fares and schedules with those of other transit modes. In each city, transfers between
streetcars and local bus services are permitted without additional fare payment, although
in Portland these transfer privileges are time-limited to a two-hour window, and in Little
Rock, transfers are free only from bus to streetcar and not from streetcar to bus. (See
individual Appendices for more details on fare and transfer policies).
The streetcars have somewhat different service characteristics, which point to differences
in the ways they are utilized in each of the cities (Table 2). In Memphis, Seattle, and
Portland, service is reasonably frequent during the peak and off-peak, with somewhat
more frequent service during the peak period. Daily service hours are also longer in each
of these cities, both during weekdays and weekends. These characteristics make the
streetcar service similar in many respects to local bus services. In Little Rock and Tampa,
service is much less frequent and there is little, if any, difference in service frequencies
between peak and off-peak periods. In Tampa, service hours are also noticeably shorter
than in the other cities, with the added difference that Tampa’s streetcar does not begin
operations until late morning (11 a.m.) or noon each weekday. Little Rock also begins
its streetcar service after the morning commute, with service starting at 8:30 a.m. These
service characteristics point to the importance of the tourist and visitor riding market as a
focus of streetcar service in these two cities in particular.
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Service Characteristics of Streetcar Systems in Five Cities23

Characteristic
Headways
Weekday Peak

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

25 minutes

10 minutes

14-17 minutes

Seattle
10 minutes

Tampa
20 minutes

Weekday Off-Peak

25 minutes

16 minutes

15-22 minutes

15 minutes

20 minutes

Weekend Average

25 minutes

13 minutes

17 minutes

12.5 minutes

30 minutes

Monday

14 hours

17 hours

18 hours

15 hours

10 hours

Tuesday

14 hours

17 hours

18 hours

15 hours

10 hours

Wednesday

14 hours

17 hours

18 hours

15 hours

10 hours

Thursday

16 hours

17 hours

18 hours

15 hours

10 hours

Friday

17 hours

18 hours

18 hours

17 hours

15 hours

Saturday

18 hours

15 hours

16 hours

17 hours

15 hours

7 hours

8 hours

15 hours

9 hours

8 hours

Hours of Service

Sunday

STREETCAR RIDERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE
Ridership is the primary indicator of performance used in this study. The authors obtained
from the National Transit Database annual ridership data (when available) extending
from the time of streetcar opening to 2012 and monthly ridership for each month during
2012. They obtained average weekday boardings for 2012 on a stop-level basis from
the individual transit agencies. The full complement of ridership data is reported in the
individual case-study appendices.
Annual ridership is reported in Table 3 for the period from 2008 to 2012, a period during which
streetcar service operated in each of the five cities. The results are reported as unlinked
passenger trips (UPT, or boardings) in the top panel of the table and as passenger miles
(PM; with kilometer mile equivalents in parentheses, PKM) in the lower panel of the table.
Prior to 2011, streetcar statistics were reported as part of LRT data in the National Transit
Database, so Portland’s streetcar passenger mile statistics are unavailable prior to 2011.
Annual ridership is much higher in Portland than elsewhere, with patronage more than 2.5
times that of Memphis (the next-highest ridership city) and more than 30 times that of Little
Rock (the lowest ridership city). In Seattle and Memphis, ridership was higher in 2012 than it
had been in 2008, while ridership declined during that time in the other three cities.

Table 3.

Annual Ridership by Streetcar in Five Cities (2008-2012)24
Unlinked Passenger Trips (UPT)

Year

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

2008

134,204

1,014,777

3,880,079

413,253

439,555

2009

119,758

1,113,809

3,785,553

451,203

446,743

2010

107,088

1,154,848

3,950,860

520,933

399,637

2011

136,380

1,086,125

3,788,400

714,461

358,737

2012

104,868

1,491,841

3,664,538

750,866

301,516
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Passenger Miles (PM) (passenger kilometers, PKM)
Year
2008

Little Rock
206,572
(332,445)

2009

183,751
(295,718)

2010

165,718
(266,697)

2011
2012

240,083

Memphis
820,185

Portland
not available
not available
not available

(1,477,076)
718,468

414,617
(667,260)

(1,512,825)
917,815

378,221
(608,686)

(1,319,957)
940,028

Seattle

471,587
(758,944)

3,652,854

(386,375)

(1,156,259)

(5,878,674)

162,616

1,672,193

3,732,743

(261,704)

(2,691,127)

(6,007,253)

631,655
(1,016,548)
650,023
(1,046,108)

Tampa
728,890
(1,173,032)
776,734
(1,250,029)
789,244
(1,270,162)
685,934
(1,103,901)
523,031
(841,735)

Monthly ridership data (unlinked passenger trips or boardings) are reported for 2012 for
each of the cities in Table 4. T he dramatic differences in ridership between the cases already
noted for annual ridership are also apparent in the monthly data, of course, with ridership
in Portland significantly higher than that of any other city. One can also detect seasonal
patterns to ridership in some cities and not in others. Little Rock, Memphis, and Tampa
have a more seasonal pattern for streetcar ridership than is apparent in either Portland or
Seattle, which points to the importance of seasonal visitors as a key riding market in each
of these systems. The seasonal ridership pattern observable for the streetcar in the former
three cities is not apparent in its monthly bus ridership, as the authors discuss in each of
the case-study profiles in the report appendices.

Table 4.

Monthly Unlinked Passenger Trips (UPT) by Streetcar in Five Cities (2012)25

Month

Little Rock

January

5,236

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

74,306

275,340

52,257

33,378

5,049

83,680

264,540

53,828

26,895

March

13,650

140,217

334,810

59,118

39,205

April

11,506

136,711

318,980

59,778

25,213

May

16,536

182,956

330,530

64,337

22,071

June

10,420

154,976

308,650

66,623

22,546

July

10,221

157,432

312,300

73,888

23,583

August

7,310

150,602

320,100

72,004

17,328

September

5,915

114,425

315,680

64,966

18,238

October

5,855

118,069

338,040

66,392

28,220

November

5,589

93,205

322,000

60,077

19,373

December

7,531

85,262

294,750

57,620

25,466

February

Average weekday boardings for 2012 are reported in Table 5, except for Little Rock, where
these data (and their stop-level counterparts) were unavailable from the transit agency,
except as a very rough estimate of around 400 riders per day. Reported average weekday
boardings range from a low of about 880 per day in Tampa to a high of more than 11,700
per day in Portland. These data are shown spatially on a stop-level basis in the maps that
follow the table (Figure 2).
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Average Weekday Boardings by Streetcar in Five Cities (2012)
City

Average Weekday Boardings

Little Rock

not available

Memphis

3,240

Portland

11,729

Seattle

2,560

Tampa

880

Source: Agency contacts as noted in profiles sections of the report.

Figure 3. Average Weekday Boardings on Streetcars in Five U.S. Cities (2012)26
Figure 3 shows the average weekday boardings at the stop-level for each streetcar line
in 2012. Stop-level data are unavailable for Little Rock. Examining the map panels, one
can see variation in boardings levels by location. For Memphis, higher boardings numbers
are found on the north-south Main Street Line than on either the Riverfront Line along the
Mississippi River or the east-west Madison Avenue Lines. Portland’s map panel notes the
much higher boarding numbers on the downtown-serving North South Line, on the west
side of the Willamette River, than on the newer Central Loop Line that primarily serves
the east side of the river. Seattle’s streetcar has higher boarding levels at its southern
terminus and at a couple of stops in the middle of the alignment near established activity
centers. Tampa’s streetcar line registers its highest boarding numbers at its northeastern
end in the Ybor City entertainment/tourism district.
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Annual service statistics are reported in Table 6. Service is reported for vehicle revenue
hours (RH; top panel of the table) and vehicle revenue miles (RM; with vehicle revenue
kilometers, VKM, in parentheses) (lower panel of the table). Between 2008 and 2012,
the amount of streetcar service declined in three cities (Memphis, Portland, and Tampa)
while it increased in two cities (Little Rock and Seattle). Monthly service statistics for 2012
are reported in Table 7, which indicates that although ridership is seasonal in three cities
service is operated at consistent year-round levels in all cities. Thus, the seasonal ridership
pattern found for Little Rock, Memphis, and Tampa is a function of seasonal differences in
demand and not a function of differences in service supply. Table 8 reports annual operating
expenses for 2008-2012 in the cases where these expenses are available for streetcar
as a separate public transit mode; operating expenses are reported both in unadjusted
dollars and inflation-adjusted 2012 dollars. Generally speaking, the operating expenses
tend to fluctuate in parallel with changes in service levels shown earlier in Table 6.

Table 6.

Annual Service by Streetcar in Five Cities (2008-2012)27
Vehicle Revenue Hours (RH)

Year

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

2008

11,992

57,742

38,047

11,399

16,090

2009

12,087

54,561

37,001

11,207

14,564

2010

11,848

57,742

30,555

11,178

13,845

2011

12,535

40,448

35,241

11,509

14,423

2012

12,436

43,211

36,739

11,736

12,561

Vehicle Revenue Miles (VRM) (vehicle revenue kilometers, VKM)
Year

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

2008

53,000

374,280

216,308

56,613

81,856

(85,295)

(602,344)

(348,114)

(91,110)

(131,734)

2009
2010
2011
2012

Table 7.

53,903

345,416

210,362

60,150

74,603

(86,748)

(555,892)

(338,543)

(96,802)

(120,062)

52,702

374,280

173,714

59,964

71,395

(84,815)

(602,344)

(279,565)

(96,502)

(114,899)

54,901

259,867

199,075

61,727

76,806

(88,354)

(418,214)

(320,379)

(99,340)

(123,607)

54,668

332,469

209,283

62,522

67,599

(87,979)

(535,056)

(336,808)

(100,619)

(108,790)

Monthly Service by Streetcar in Five Cities (2012)28
Vehicle Revenue Hours (RH)

Month

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

January

1,050

3,593

3,086

960

Tampa
1,087

938

3,505

2,923

894

986

March

1,098

3,829

3,124

965

1,070

April

1,028

3,553

3,005

961

1,008

May

1,054

4,081

3,110

1,008

1,043

June

1,042

3,575

3,019

989

1,039

February
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Vehicle Revenue Hours (RH)
Month

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

July

1,028

3,575

3,100

995

1,049

August

1,094

3,705

3,135

975

1,160

996

3,400

3,793

962

1,021

October

1,086

3,692

4,894

1,035

1,054

November

1,018

3,480

4,679

998

994

December

996

3,452

4,774

994

1,040

September

Seattle

Tampa

Vehicle Revenue Miles (RM)
Month

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

January

4,618

28,183

17,268

5,117

5,805

(7,432)

(45,356)

(28,375)

(8,235)

(9,342)

February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

4,122

26,992

16,605

4,462

5,305

(6,634)

(43,439)

(26,728)

(7,181)

(8,538)

4,832

29,691

17,748

5,140

5,757

(7,776)

(47,783)

(28,568)

(8,272)

(9,265)

4,438

27,495

17,067

5,120

5,425

(7,776)

(44,249)

(27,472)

(8,240)

(8,731)

4,636

29,389

17,666

5,370

5,616

(7,461)

(47,297)

(28,436)

(5,642)

(9,038)

4,569

26,221

17,149

5,271

5,590

(7,353)

(42,199)

(27,604)

(8,483)

(8,996)

4,524

26,326

17,611

5,303

5,650

(7,281)

(42,367)

(28,348)

(8,534)

(9,093)

4,814

27,223

17,804

5,193

6,245

(7,747)

(43,811)

(28,658)

(8,357)

(10,050)

4,383

25,019

22,489

5,126

5,494

(7,054)

(40,264)

(36,200)

(8,249)

(8,842)

4,777

26,998

29,620

5,508

5,675

(7,688)

(43,449)

(47,678)

(8,864)

(9,133)

4,477

25,579

28,378

5,317

5,349

(7,205)

(41,165)

(45,679)

(8,557)

(8,608)

4,383

25,395

29,007

5,295

5,596

(7,054)

(40,869)

(46,691)

(8,521)

(9,006)

Source: Federal Transit Administration. 2013. “National Transit Database: Monthly Module Adjusted Data Release for
May 2013.” http://www.ntdprogram.gov/ntdprogram/pubs/MonthlyData/May_2013_Adjusted_Database.xls
(Accessed July 29, 2013).
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Annual Operating Expense by Streetcar in Five Cities (2008-2012)29
Little Rock

Year
2008

23

Unadjusted $

2012 $

$818,119

Memphis

Portland

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

$872,445

$4,253,541

$4,535,994

not available

not available

2009

$898,802

$961,908

$4,271,523

$4,571,434

not available

not available

2010

$1,007,510

$1,060,848

$4,340,918

$4,570,728

not available

not available

2011

$942,933

$962,472

$4,796,905

$4,896,302

$7,695,125

$7,854,577

2012

$1,007,601

$1,007,601

$3,887,983

$3,887,983

$11,868,085

$11,868,085

Seattle

Tampa

Year

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

2008

$2,459,635

$2,622,965

$2,078,695

$2,216,729

2009

$2,366,620

$2,532,784

$2,383,666

$2,551,027

2010

$2,318,808

$2,441,567

$2,542,168

$2,676,752

2011

$2,396,642

$2,446,303

$2,209,652

$2,255,439

2012

$2,794,211

$2,794,211

$1,775,507

$1,775,507

The authors constructed a set of annual performance indicators by combining the ridership,
service, and operating expense data just discussed. Two performance indicators are
cost effectiveness and service productivity, both of which are reported in Table 9. Cost
effectiveness is defined as operating expense per unlinked passenger trip, reported in
inflation-adjusted 2012 dollars. Here, a lower-cost value means the service is more cost
effective. In 2012, operating expenses range from a low of $2.61 per trip in Memphis, the
most cost effective case, to a high of $9.61 per trip in Little Rock, the least cost effective
case. Between 2008 and 2012, cost effectiveness improved in Memphis and Seattle, and
it deteriorated in the other three cities.
Service productivity is the average number of passengers on a vehicle at a given point
in time (ridership measured in either passenger miles or passenger kilometers divided
by service measured in either revenue miles or revenue kilometers). A higher number
means that each unit of service is carrying a larger number of riders. In 2012, the streetcar
system in Portland was by far the most productive, followed by that of Seattle. Little Rock,
Memphis, and Tampa were much less productive. Low numbers generally indicate less
productive service, although they might also be a function of shorter trip lengths for the
average transit rider, which the authors consider in Table 9. Between 2008 and 2012,
service productivity declined in Little Rock and Tampa and improved in Memphis and
Seattle. Data are incomplete for the entire time period for Portland due to the mingling of
streetcar and LRT statistics in the original NTD data prior to 2011.
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Annual Cost Effectiveness and Service Productivity by Streetcar in Five
Cities (2008-2012)30
Cost Effectiveness (2012$)

Year

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

2008

$6.10

$4.19

$5.95

$5.04

2009

$7.51

$3.84

$5.25

$5.71

2010

$9.41

$3.76

$4.45

$6.70

2011

$6.91

$4.42

$2.03

$3.35

$6.29

2012

$9.61

$2.61

$3.24

$3.72

$5.89

Year

Little Rock

Memphis

Seattle

Tampa

2008

3.90

2.19

6.68

8.90

2009

3.41

2.72

6.89

10.41

2010

3.14

2.45

7.86

11.05

2011

4.37

2.76

18.35

10.23

8.93

2012

2.97

5.03

17.84

10.40

7.74

Service Productivity
Portland

A final set of performance statistics are shown in Table 10. Here, the authors report average
trip lengths and average operating speeds. These values are reported in miles and miles
per hour, respectively. Average trip lengths are much longer in Little Rock and Tampa,
reflecting the peculiarities of these systems’ rather long linear downtown alignments, while
they are shortest in Seattle, reflecting the very short one-way alignment of the South Lake
Union line in that city. Average operating speeds range from a low of 4.4 miles per hour
(7.1 kilometers per hour) in Little Rock to a high of 7.7 miles per hour (12.4 kilometers per
hour) in Memphis, with the other three systems operating between 5.4 and 5.7 miles per
hour (8.6 and 9.1 kilometers per hour). In each of the cities, the average streetcar operating
speed is much lower than that of the average bus operated in the same community, as
noted in Table 11.

Table 10. Average Trip Length and Operating Speed of Streetcars in Five Cities
(2008-2012)31
Average Trip Length (miles, kilometers)
Year

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

2008

1.54 (2.48)

0.81 (1.30)

0.92 (1.47)

1.66 (2.67)

2009

1.53 (2.47)

0.84 (1.36)

0.92 (1.47)

1.74 (2.80)

2010

1.55 (2.49)

0.79 (1.28)

0.91 (1.46)

1.97 (3.17)

2011

1.76 (2.83)

0.66 (1.06)

0.96 (1.55)

0.88 (1.42)

1.91 (3.07)

2012

1.55 (2.50)

1.12 (1.80)

1.02 (1.64)

0.87 (1.39)

1.73 (2.78)

Service Productivity
Year

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

2008

4.42 (7.11)

6.48 (10.43)

5.69 (9.15)

4.97 (7.99)

5.09 (8.18)

2009

4.46 (7.18)

6.33 (10.19)

5.69 (9.15)

5.37 (8.64)

5.12 (8.24)

2010

4.45 (7.16)

6.48 (10.43)

5.69 (9.15)

5.36 (8.63)

5.16 (8.30)

2011

4.38 (7.05)

6.42 (10.34)

5.65 (9.09)

5.36 (8.63)

5.33 (8.57)

2012

4.40 (7.07)

7.69 (12.38)

5.70 (9.17)

5.33 (8.57)

5.38 (8.66)
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The streetcar’s closest transit modal counterpart is local bus service, which also features
close stop spacing and typically operates in a right-of-way shared with automobile traffic.
The authors thus contrasted streetcar performance with that of local bus service in
each city. The authors selected ridership (trips or boardings), service productivity (load
factor), cost effectiveness (operating expense per trip), and operating speed (revenue
kilometers, RKM, per revenue hour, RH) as the comparison performance measures. Table
11 reports the results for 2012 for streetcar and bus services in each city. For each mode,
these statistics refer to the modal total for ridership and the modal average for the other
performance indicators.
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Table 11. The Performance of Streetcars versus Local Bus Service (2012)32
Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

Streetcar

Bus

Streetcar

Bus

Streetcar

Bus

Streetcar

Bus

Streetcar

Bus

104,868

2,823,614

1,491,841

8,562,828

3,664,538

59,509,235

750,866

95,592,084

301,516

14,314,610

Service Productivity
(load factor)

2.97

6.84

5.03

8.22

17.84

12.19

10.40

13.75

7.74

9.76

Cost Effectiveness
($ per trip)

$9.61

$4.45

$2.61

$5.14

$3.24

$3.88

$3.72

$4.50

$5.89

$3.84

Speed (RKM/RH)

7.07

22.90

12.38

23.72

9.17

18.98

5.57

19.37

5.66

20.53
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It is not surprising that, due to differences in network scale, bus ridership dwarfs streetcar
ridership in each city. Bus ridership is about six times the level of streetcar in Memphis,
where streetcar riders make up the largest share of combined bus and streetcar riders
(nearly 15 percent), and bus ridership is more than 120 times the level of streetcar
ridership in Seattle, where streetcar riders make up the smallest share of combined bus
and streetcar riders (less than 1 percent).
Bus service productivity (passenger miles, or kilometers, per vehicle mile, or kilometer;
load factor) also exceeds that of the streetcar in every city with the exception of Portland.
In Portland, streetcar service productivity is more than 40 percent higher than that of the
average bus. In the other cities, streetcar service productivity ranges between 44 percent
(Little Rock) and 80 percent (Tampa) that of local bus service.
Streetcar operating costs per rider are lower than bus operating costs per rider in three
cities (Memphis, Portland, and Seattle), while in the other two cities, streetcar operating
costs are about 50 percent higher (Tampa) or more than double (Little Rock) that of bus
service. Streetcar speeds are about half those of the average bus in each of the cities.
The ratio of streetcar speed to bus speed ranges from a low of 31 percent in Little Rock to
a high of 52 percent in Memphis. Obviously, streetcars do not operate as rapid transit, but
instead operate as slower-speed local services.
Given that these ridership and performance statistics relate to modal averages, a variety
of bus services (downtown, suburban, and commuter) are combined in the bus values. It
is likely that local bus services operating in the same downtown (and adjacent) areas as
the streetcar probably operate at slower speeds than the bus modal average. However,
they also likely carry more riders than the average bus route, and thus would have higher
productivity and better cost effectiveness than the bus modal average. So, in very few
instances one could safely assert that streetcars provide operating efficiencies, either
with respect to productivity or cost effectiveness, compared with buses. This result is due
principally to the relatively low ridership on most streetcar systems.
Taking stock of the five cities, Portland emerges as the clear standout performer with
respect to ridership as well as the service performance measures, with Seattle and
Memphis in the next tier, and Little Rock and Tampa at the bottom. Portland has by far the
highest ridership and the best service productivity, and it ranks second to Memphis with
respect to cost effectiveness measures. Portland is also the only city in which streetcar
performance on service productivity and cost effectiveness bests that of the average bus.
So why is it that Portland’s streetcar is so much stronger a performer than the other four
cases? And what might other cities learn from Portland’s streetcar experience that might
be transferrable to their own?

FACTORS RELATED TO RIDERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE
Using the literature discussed in the prior section, the authors identified a set of factors
that might be related to streetcar performance in the study communities. These factors
include those over which planners and policymakers exercise some control either during
initial planning or ongoing operation of the streetcar, and other factors that are external
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to decisions made by transit planners and policymakers. The factors include: alignment
(streetcar line length, and location with respect to population covered, employment covered,
and special generators served), network coordination (streetcar accessibility to connecting
transit services), fare policy (streetcar fare level, streetcar transfer policy), service policy
(streetcar service frequency, streetcar service duration), and rider market (seasonality of
streetcar ridership). The first sets of factors are related to decisions made by planners and
policymakers, while the last factor is an outcome related to use of streetcar service. The
authors suspect that Portland’s streetcar is closest to the ideal for each of these factors
and that variation in streetcar performance among the other cities might be explained by
variation in their own ranks on these factors.
The authors first defined an ideal condition as suggested by literature, and then ranked
each city’s streetcar from best to worst against this ideal (Table 12). The authors assigned
each city a score between 1 (worst, or lowest ranked) and 5 (best, or highest ranked)
for each factor, save for two factors that were scored on a binary basis (1= meets the
ideal; 0= does not meet the ideal). The authors then compiled the rankings and related
the results back to the ridership and performance measures noted earlier. Each factor is
discussed in turn below.

Table 12. Streetcar Performance Factor Matrix (2012)
Factors
Alignment Length
(in kilometers)
Population Covered
(number of persons within 400 meters
of stop)

Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

5.47 km

11.27 km

11.83 km

4.18 km

4.35 km

3

4

5

1

2

3,606

57,518

117,060

16,758

5,651

1

4

5

3

2

1,859

24,847

64,899

10,821

3,503

(number of jobs within 400 meters to
stop)

1

4

5

3

2

Transit Connections

62

296

687

120

75

(number of connecting services at
stops)

1

4

5

3

2

Special Generators Served*

66

11

40

140

22

(number located within 400 meters of
stop)

4

1

3

5

2

$1 ride; $2
day pass

$1 ride; $3,50
day pass

$1 ride;
$5 day pass

$2.50 ride;
$5 day pass

$2.50 ride;
no day pass

Employment Covered

Fare Level
(per ride and per day pass if available)
Transfer Policy
(availability of free transfers to other
modes)
Headways
(average weekday peak period)
Service Hours
(average weekday)
Day-long Service

5

4

3

1

2

restrictive

free transfer

free within
2 hours

free transfer

no free
transfer

2

5

3

5

1

25 min.

10 min.

14-17 min.

10 min.

20 min,

1

5

3

5

2

14 hours

17 hours

18 hours

15 hours

10 hours

2

4

5

3

1

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
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Little Rock

Memphis

Portland

Seattle

Tampa

0

1

1

1

0

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

(monthly ridership variation by time of
year)

0

0

1

1

0

Total

20

36

39

31

16

(serves both peak periods)
Seasonality

*Note: Special generators include hotels, convention centers, museums, university campuses, and other major activity
centers.

Alignment Length
All else being equal, a longer streetcar alignment would seem to be the most desirable, as
it would permit riders to reach a wider array of destinations.33 Significant differences exist
among the case cities in alignment length reported in Table 12.34 Portland and Memphis
have longer streetcar alignments (11.8 kilometers and 11.3 kilometers, respectively
[7.35 miles and 7.00 miles]) than the other cases. It should be noted, of course, that
Portland and Memphis also operate multiple streetcar lines, as does Little Rock, while
Seattle and Tampa operate only single streetcar lines. The difference in the number of
lines operated in each city is undoubtedly related to differences in alignment lengths.
However, Seattle is in the process of building a new streetcar line at the time of this
study, as is discussed in Appendix D. Based on its longer alignment length, Portland thus
receives the highest score for this factor, and Seattle receives the lowest score.

Population Covered
Most transportation analysts use population to represent potential trip origins,35 and
there is indeed a relationship between population and streetcar ridership as noted in the
literature review section.36 Thus, one would expect streetcars that serve more people to
enjoy higher ridership than those that serve fewer people. The authors used GIS analysis
to identify the size of the population residing within 400 meters of a streetcar stop. The city
with the highest population located near a stop receives the highest score, while the city
with the lowest population near a stop receives the lowest score. The size of the population
covered by streetcar service ranges from a low of 3,600 people (Little Rock) to a high of
more than 117,000 people (Portland). Portland receives the highest score for this factor,
as it registers the highest population covered among all five cases. Its count of population
covered represents a two-fold difference compared with Memphis and more than 30-fold
difference compared with Little Rock. Figure 4 displays the population coverage results in
density map form.
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Figure 4. Population Density near Streetcar Lines in Five U.S. Cities (2012)37

Employment Covered
Most transportation analysts use employment to represent trip destinations,38 and indeed a
relationship exists between employment and streetcar ridership, as noted in the literature
review discussed earlier.39 This is because employment not only represents a destination
for commute trips, but it also serves as a proxy for many other trip destinations that are
co-located with employment. Given the downtown contexts in which most modern-era
streetcars operate and the significance of employment levels within a 400-meter radius
for stop-level streetcar ridership, it is plausible to think that employment levels might also
represent trip generators for many non-home-based trips. For all these reasons, one
would expect streetcars that serve more jobs to enjoy higher ridership than those that
serve fewer jobs.
The authors used GIS analysis to identify the number of jobs located within 400 meters
of a streetcar stop. Scores are assigned in the same manner as for population. The city
with the highest number of jobs located near a stop receives the highest score, while the
city with the lowest number of jobs near a stop receives the lowest score. The amount of
employment covered by streetcar service ranged from a low of about 1,860 jobs (Little
Rock) to nearly 65,000 jobs (Portland) (Table 12). Portland’s employment coverage stands
out for being more than double that for Memphis and more than six times that of Seattle,
the second- and third-ranked cities. The streetcars in Tampa and Little Rock serve very
few jobs. Figure 5 displays the employment coverage results in density map form.
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Interestingly, the cities rank in exactly the same positions on population covered and
employment covered by their streetcar lines. Portland ranks as the top performer on both
factors, followed by Memphis and Seattle, whose numbers of covered residents and jobs
are far fewer than those for Portland. Little Rock and Tampa rank at the bottom, with far
fewer residents or jobs covered by streetcar service, a function of the peculiarities of
their streetcar lines’ locations in their communities. Given the importance of population
and employment as ridership determinants cited in the transit literature, it is perhaps not
surprising that there is a remarkable consistency between the cities’ ranks on ridership
and the other performance measures and their ranks on the population and employment
coverage factors. It would appear that certainly Portland, and to a lesser extent both
Memphis and Seattle, made the decision to locate their streetcar service in areas with
large existing population and/or employment or significant population and/or employment
growth potential. This is not the case, at least thus far, in the other two cities.

Figure 5. Employment Density near Streetcar Lines in Five U.S. Cities (2012)40

Special Generators Served
The literature discussed earlier noted the importance of special generators such as hotels,
convention centers, museums, and university campuses as explanatory factors for stop-level
streetcar ridership, particularly on modern-era streetcars such as those considered in this
study.41 Ramos and Brown pointed to the existence of special generators as being associated
with a several-fold increase in ridership than would otherwise be expected at a particular stop.42
Given these results, a streetcar that provides access to more special generators should thus
expect to enjoy higher ridership than those that serve fewer such locations.
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The authors used GIS analysis to calculate the number of special generators located within
400 meters of a streetcar stop. This count-based approach to accounting for these special
activity locations is not as ideal an approach as one that might measure the actual intensity
of activity at each special generator site, which could vary considerably from one location
to another. However, given data availability constraints, the authors believe it provides
a reasonable approximation to gauging such activity. Figure 6 displays the locations of
special generators near the streetcar lines. The number of special generators served by
streetcar lines ranges from a low of 11 in Memphis to a high of 140 in Seattle (Table 12).
The city whose streetcars serve the most special generators receives the highest score.

Figure 6. Special Generators Served by Streetcars in Five U.S. Cities (2012)43

Transit Connections
Previous research has suggested the importance of networks for ridership and performance,
as well-designed networks with plenty of service connections allow riders to reach a
wider array of destinations than less connected networks.44 The authors assessed the
connectedness of streetcars to other transit services by tabulating the number of transit
connections available at streetcar stops. The city that has the highest number of transit
connections at its streetcar stops receives the highest score. Figure 1, shown earlier, gives
an indication of the connectedness of the different streetcar lines shown in map form.
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Table 12 reports that Portland, Memphis, and Seattle have the most transit connections at
streetcar stops, and Tampa and Little Rock have the fewest connections. The number of
connections ranges from a low of 62 in Little Rock to 687 in Portland. Note that connections
are counted on a stop basis and summed across the streetcar stops, so a connecting
bus route serving multiple stops would be counted at each streetcar stop it serves. The
high level of connectedness for Portland’s streetcar is a function of its location within
a downtown area served by a large number of bus routes. Transit planners in Portland
clearly made sure that these routes are easily accessible, spatially, to streetcar riders.

Fare Level
Transit riders are sensitive to the fare charged, so one would expect ridership to be higher
in cases with lower fares.45 The authors considered fares for individual rides and day
passes where available.46 Little Rock’s low per-ride fare ($1) stands out amongst the
cities, as do the much higher fares on the relatively short Tampa and Seattle lines ($2.50
per ride on each line). Four of the five cities offer day passes to streetcar riders, with pass
rates ranging from $2 per day (Little Rock) to $5 per day (Portland and Seattle). The higher
day-pass rates in Portland and Seattle are perhaps not surprising given the wider array
of services and greater geographic reach of the transit systems that day pass purchasers
can access. The cities are ranked on their fare levels in Table 12, with Little Rock and
Memphis ranked at the top solely due to the low cost of riding their streetcar services.

Transfer Arrangements
An optimal transfer policy would permit free transfers between services to facilitate easy
rider movement.47 This would remove one of the important barriers to transit use, which
is the necessity to pay an additional fare for completing a single trip. The authors thus
assessed whether streetcar riders could inexpensively move between different modal
services in each city.48 Seattle and Memphis permit unrestricted free transfers across
their transit services, with a single ride fare, thus earning these cities a shared top score
(Table 12). Portland permits free transfers within a two-hour time window with a single
fare, earning it a middle score. Little Rock and Tampa have much more restrictive transfer
policies. Little Rock permits free transfers from bus to streetcar but not from streetcar to
bus, as streetcar fares are lower than bus fares. Tampa permits free transfers only with the
purchase of a day pass and not with a single-ride fare.

Headways
Transit users are sensitive to the time spent waiting for a bus or train to arrive, and one
would expect streetcar users to behave similarly.49 Thus, an optimal condition would be
for a streetcar to operate more frequent service to reduce rider wait time. The authors
examined the weekday peak period headways as the indicator of streetcar service
frequencies.50 Streetcar service is most frequent in Memphis and Seattle, and it is least
frequent in Little Rock. The cities are scored according to the frequency of their weekday
peak service, as indicated in Table 12.
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Service Duration
From a rider’s perspective, the optimal streetcar service would have long service hours
that would allow a wider array of potential trips to be served.51 At a minimum, a service
should operate during peak riding hours when most transit trips are taken. The authors
considered the typical weekday service hours for each city and ranked the cities from the
cases that operate the longest number of hours to those that operate the fewest.52 Portland,
Memphis, and Seattle rank in the top three positions (Table 12). These three cities are also
noteworthy for offering streetcar service during both commute periods, which is not the
case with the Little Rock and Tampa streetcars, which ignore the morning peak period.
Little Rock’s service begins at 8:30 a.m. on weekday mornings, while Tampa’s service does
not begin until 11 a.m. or noon. Because these cities do not serve the morning commute,
these services become irrelevant for trips made during these hours of the day. The authors
scored the cases separately with respect to the number of service hours (ranked from 5
to 1 [with 5 being best and 1 being worst]) and whether or not the two weekday commute
periods were served (1 = Yes, 0 =No).

Seasonality of Ridership
The sets of factors just discussed are related to decisions that planners and policymakers
make about streetcar service. The last factor is related to how the streetcar is used by
riders, and it can be seen as at least partially an outcome of the decisions made with
respect to the previously noted factors. The authors suspect that the streetcars with the
highest ridership and strongest performance are those that serve a diversity of trip types
and are not dominated by tourist trips, which are highly seasonal in nature. Because of
inconsistency in rider surveys across the cases, as reported in the individual case-study
profiles in the appendices, the authors use the seasonality of ridership to denote more
tourist-oriented streetcar services (Table 4). It should be noted that the authors found no
seasonal pattern to bus ridership in any of the cities (see individual appendices for details).
Streetcar service levels are not seasonal in any city, so any seasonal ridership should be
attributable to differences in rider demand and not supply (Table 7).
The authors scored Portland and Seattle as the optimal condition (score = 1) because they
do not have a clear seasonal streetcar ridership pattern; the other cases exhibit the less
optimal condition due to their seasonal ridership pattern (score = 0) (Table 12). Little Rock,
Memphis, and Tampa have a much more seasonal pattern to their streetcar ridership than
either Portland or Seattle. In these three cities, the transit operators provide a great deal
of service that is quite underutilized for many months of the year, which leads to lower
productivity and higher operating costs per rider. By contrast, a more balanced ridership
permits more efficient use of streetcar service, which should result in higher productivity and
lower operating costs per rider. These results certainly appear in Portland’s performance
statistics noted earlier.
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Other Potential Factors
The authors conducted key informant interviews in each of the cities with planners and
other streetcar observers, which are discussed in greater detail in the next section of
the report. These interviews identified several other factors that might also be related to
ridership and performance on the streetcars in each city. These factors are much harder to
measure and assess than the previously discussed factors, but they are worth noting due
to their mention by these informants.
One factor is the health of the local economy. This has implications both for the use of
the streetcar as a development tool and the use of the streetcar in tourism and visitor
promotion, and it certainly can be seen in ridership and other performance statistics. For
example, the informants in Portland and Seattle stressed their communities’ healthy local
economies and vibrant real estate markets at the time of streetcar implementation. This
allowed them to take advantage of these larger economic conditions in using the streetcars
as “catalysts” to support additional development activity while also ensuring that there was
some existing ridership already in place, or soon to be in place, to use the streetcar service
because of preexisting development activity.
In the case of the two weaker performing cities, Tampa and Little Rock, larger economic
forces affecting the tourism parts of the local economies hurt streetcar performance. With
the onset of the economic recession in 2008, visitor and convention activity declined
significantly in both cities, and it has not yet rebounded. Streetcar ridership began to
decline as a result of the decline in visitors. Thus, these two cities’ experiences emphasize
that modern-era streetcar systems that specialize in tourist travel markets are much more
vulnerable to economic conditions than those that focus on a wider array of potential users.
The key informant interviews also pointed to local parking policies and local streetscape
improvements as important factors related to encouraging more people to use the streetcar
instead of motor vehicles to make their trips. In Portland, the key informants suggested that
the presence of these supportive policies aided transit ridership in general and streetcar
ridership in particular, and one would suspect that their presence (or absence) might have
similar effects elsewhere. Finally, in the cities that operate vintage vehicles (Memphis,
Tampa), informants noted difficulties with maintenance and the high expense of obtaining
parts for these vehicles. Some cities selected vintage vehicles in order to promote a sense
of nostalgia that fit with the image they were developing for the area served by the streetcar.
Little attention was paid to the practical implications of these decisions on service reliability
or maintenance expenditures, which have proven to be significant.

DISCUSSION
The final scores on all the factors are shown at the bottom of Table 12. Portland emerges as
the city whose streetcar system was planned and operates closest to the ideal suggested
by the literature (total of 39 points out of 47 possible), followed by Memphis (36 points)
and Seattle (31 points). Tampa and Little Rock emerge with the lowest scores (16 points
and 20 points, respectively). The two sets of cities rank similarly on the factor assessment,
as they do on the ridership and performance measures noted earlier in Table 3. Portland,
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Memphis, and Seattle are the better performers, and Little Rock and Tampa the weaker
performers on the ridership and transit performance measures. Portland’s emergence at
the top of the point scale echoes its performance as the highest ridership, most productive,
and second-most cost effective streetcar.
A critical difference between Portland and the other cities is that planners and policymakers
explicitly thought about the streetcar as transit and as a development tool when they
made crucial decisions about the service. Key informant interviews with transit planners
and other streetcar observers in all five cities revealed that the emphasis placed on both
transportation and other objectives sets Portland noticeably apart from Little Rock and
Tampa, where key informants viewed the streetcars entirely as tourism and development
tools, and to a lesser degree from Memphis and Seattle, where informants considered
the streetcars as primarily development tools and attributed a much lesser status to their
transportation role. According to the key informants, conceiving of the streetcar as both
transportation and development tool meant that Portland’s streetcar planners paid attention
to the issues that mattered for ridership, as well as to those that mattered for development,
when they made decisions about the alignment location, the service levels, and how well
the streetcar connects to other transit services in the community. They attempted to make
the streetcar attractive to more than merely tourist riders.
Portland isn’t perfect in how it planned or operates its streetcars, but it is much closer
to the ideal than the other cities. Portland now receives significant attention for its
streetcar system’s purported role in economic development, but this study suggests that
more might be learned from how Portland approaches decisions related to its streetcar
system’s role as transportation. Other cities that now operate streetcar services and
communities contemplating their own streetcar investments might learn a great deal by
better understanding the lessons learned from Portland’s experience.
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V. KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS IN FIVE STREETCAR CITIES
Given that the streetcars in most of the cities do not seem to be very effective transit
services when assessed on standard transportation criteria, questions arise about their
“true” purpose(s) and their ability to serve this purpose(s). In this section, the authors
use the results of interviews with key informants to consider a set of questions about the
streetcars in the five cities. First, which groups were the key actors for leading streetcar
development in each city? Second, what are their goals for the streetcar in their city? And
third, how do the key informants assess the streetcar’s performance in meeting these
goals? The authors close the section with their own assessment of streetcar performance,
as well as their assessment of changes that would be required to improve streetcar
performance.

INTERVIEWS
The authors conducted 21 interviews with 23 key informants; three interviews featured two
informants on the same telephone call (Table 13). The authors provided the informants a set
of between 12 and 25 questions prior to the interview (see Appendix F for a questionnaire).
These questions related to the individual’s professional background, their duties in their
present position, and the nature and duration of their involvement in streetcar issues. The
authors also asked informants about the goals and objectives of the streetcar and their
assessment of its performance in attaining these goals. The number and nature of other
additional questions varied according to the informant’s role and expertise, as well as the
history of streetcar planning, construction, and operation in the city. The authors granted
the informants anonymity and identify them merely by their cities and their roles.

Table 13. Roster for Key Informant Interviews
Informant Role
Local Transit Planner

Little Rock

Memphis

1

Regional Transit Planner

1

Streetcar Specialist

1

Portland

Seattle

1

1

1

1
1

Streetcar Advocate

1

Local Land Planner

1

Regional Planner

Tampa

1
1

1

1

Redevelopment Agency

1

Business Leader

1

1

Developer

1

2

2

Tourism Promoter

1

Total

3

4

5

5

6

The authors took detailed notes of each interview. Subsequent to the interviews, the authors
identified key themes. These key themes were largely consistent across the interviews,
despite the diversity of individuals who participated in the interviews, and across the cities,
despite differences in their performance, their financing, their institutional arrangements,
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or the extent of the streetcar service. The convergence of the interviews around these key
themes provides the structure to the heart of this section of the report.

THE KEY ACTORS LEADING STREETCAR DEVELOPMENT IN FIVE U.S.
CITIES
In most cities, the private sector looms large as a principal force pushing for streetcar
development, with representatives of the development community, property owners, and
local business leaders playing particularly important roles. Even in the one case in which
the public sector drove streetcar implementation (Memphis), the private sector played
an important supportive role. The importance of very active private sector involvement is
perhaps not surprising given the primary stated objectives of streetcar implementation that
are discussed in the following sections.
Little Rock. Key informants emphasized the presence of a diverse coalition of interests,
including representatives of the business, tourism, and development communities as well
as key political leaders in, as the transit planning informant noted, “creating the momentum”
for River Rail’s implementation. The regional planning informant emphasized the “existence
of a streetcar working group early on that included business and development interests,
the metropolitan planning organization, the local transit agency, and important local
political figures (including the mayors of Little Rock and North Little Rock and a county
judge).” This working group commissioned a downtown redevelopment plan prepared by
the Urban Land Institute that proved critical for streetcar implementation, as it emphasized
a streetcar’s potential development effects. A River Rail streetcar can be seen in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Riders Leave a River Rail Streetcar53
Memphis. Key informants emphasized the leading role played by the public sector behind
implementation of The Trolley, while noting that the private sector was more passively
supportive than actively engaged in streetcar advocacy. The transit planning informant
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noted that the city of Memphis was the key force and there was little active role played by the
private sector, which tended to be “supportive but not advocates.” A local business leader
agreed that the private sector played more of a supporting role, particularly with respect
to aiding the city in promoting the streetcar as a device that might aid the redevelopment
of downtown and help to give an identity to local neighborhoods that lacked one. A third
informant noted the importance of private sector development interests in supporting the
city, after streetcar implementation, by making key real estate investments in properties
located near the streetcar lines. Thus, while the public sector took the lead in streetcar
advocacy and promotion, the private sector, particularly local development and business
interests, served as key allies.
Portland. In contrast to the Memphis experience, the key informants emphasized the
leading role of the private sector in initiating and driving the push for the streetcar lines
in Portland. A local business leader recalled that “six people, all from the private sector,
constituted the (key streetcar advocacy) organization.” Land owners, developers, and
business owners were key figures in this organization, with most participants motivated
by downtown revitalization goals. A local land use planner placed particular emphasis on
the key roles played by major property owners who led the push for a local improvement
district to help finance the first phase of streetcar implementation. The business leader
characterized the local improvement district as a “financial and political strategy” that
demonstrated strong private sector commitment to the idea of a streetcar. An important local
streetcar advocate emphasized the important roles played by “six to eight key developers”
in the initial push for the streetcar. According to this informant, the “property owners put
(the) money together to build the streetcar.” The local land use planner concurred that the
property owners played an important role by contributing about $12.5 million in property
tax revenues, through the local improvement district, toward streetcar finance. Thus, in
Portland, the private sector looms large as a strong force particularly early in the story
of streetcar implementation due to its advocacy and its willingness to make a financial
commitment to the streetcar, as it pursued a particular vision for the redevelopment of the
downtown areas through which the streetcar operated.
Seattle. In Seattle, the role of the private sector is especially important with major land
owners such as Vulcan, Inc. (owned by billionaire former Microsoft executive Paul
Allen) and major companies such as Amazon (owned by billionaire Jeff Bezos) looming
particularly large in the story of the South Lake Union line. According to the development
informants, Vulcan executives participated in the Build the Streetcar committee that led
the push for the construction of the streetcar, and they helped to promote the creation of
the local improvement district to help finance it. The development informants recalled that
Build the Streetcar ran its promotional efforts “like a political campaign” that utilized doorto-door advocacy with local business owners, targeted marketing and outreach to property
owners, created a website, and implemented a public advertising campaign. Vulcan also
participated in a formalized “community” advocacy group called South Lake Union Friends
and Neighbors (SLUFAN) that includes representation from the business community and
other developers. The transit planning informant noted the subsequent involvement of
Amazon, which moved its operations into the neighborhood, and institutional actors such
as the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center as promoters and partial funders of
streetcar service improvements. The informants also noted the importance of Portland’s
streetcar experience as an inspiration and model for Seattle’s streetcar activities.
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Tampa. Key informants emphasized the joint public-private role in promoting the creation
of the TECO Line streetcar. One business leader noted the role of the local business
community, and particularly the downtown business improvement district (Tampa Downtown
Partnership), as a key advocate for the streetcar. Another business leader commented on
the role of that entity’s Ybor City counterpart (Ybor City Development Corporation) as a
key advocacy group. This latter informant characterized the group as “cheerleaders for the
streetcar.” A local streetcar advocate emphasized the important early role played by the
privately run Tampa and Ybor City Streetcar Society, the predecessor of today’s non-profit
Tampa Historic Streetcar, Inc., which manages the TECO Line, as an advocacy group
that placed the idea of returning a streetcar to Tampa on the local transportation agenda.
This individual emphasized the partnerships between the advocacy group and key public
officials, including the former director of the transit agency and the former mayor of Tampa,
in procuring the federal funding needed to build the streetcar line.

THE GOALS OF STREETCAR IMPLEMENTATION IN FIVE U.S. CITIES
The key-informant interviews focused a great deal on the informants’ identification of
streetcar goals and their assessments of the streetcars’ performance in attaining these
goals. Three goals emerged across the interviews. First, in each city, informants noted
a development rationale for the streetcar, including the streetcar’s potential role as a
“permanent amenity” that might encourage developers to make investments in areas
adjacent to a streetcar line. Portland’s experience with development loomed large for
each of the cities that built their streetcars after Portland’s first line opened. Second, in
many cities, informants emphasized the streetcar’s role as a symbol or icon that might
be used to give identity to the city, or to a neighborhood at a more localized scale, and
might be a valuable asset in marketing the city to attract tourists, conventioneers, and
other visitors. Finally, in a couple cities, informants discussed the streetcar’s potential role
as a transportation investment that might help to serve local goals to encourage more
use of non-automobile transportation, including by serving as a pedestrian or bicycle “trip
extender.” Particularly noteworthy here is the striking contrast between the significance
accorded to this role in Portland versus most other cities. It is important to note that the
goal(s) for streetcar development in each city affected the selection of alignment locations
and their lengths, as well as stop locations, which had significant implications for ridership
and transportation performance once the streetcar began operations.

Streetcar as Development Tool
Most key informants identified development promotion as the primary goal of streetcar
investment in their city. The business leader informants in Tampa and the business leader
informant in Portland used the word “catalyst” and the phrase “tool to assist development”
when discussing the streetcar’s potential development role, while key informants in
Memphis, Seattle, and Tampa referred to the streetcar as a development “amenity.” The
business leader informant in Portland went even further and asserted that the “streetcar
was never primarily a transportation tool” and that the streetcar’s goal was “assisting
and reviving intercity neighborhoods” and “encouraging intercity development.” Figure 8
depicts a Portland streetcar operating near higher density urban development.
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Figure 8. Portland Streetcar Near Higher Density Urban Development54
In Portland, the business leader emphasized the role of the streetcar as a good “catalyst
for change in decayed or underdeveloped urban areas,” and he pointed to European cities
as models because of their well-developed transit systems that served their urban cores.
The streetcar advocate added that the first streetcar line (NS Line) was linked to a central
city redevelopment plan that called for 10,000 residential units and 3.5 million square
feet [325,160 square meters] of retail development in areas near the streetcar line. The
regional transit planner concurred with these views and emphasized that key stakeholders
in the decision making process around the first line viewed it as “more of a land use project
than a transit project… It was part of the package of a development strategy.” The local
land planner and local transit planner concurred with the idea that the streetcar was a
development tool that was placed in an area that both planners and policymakers felt had
significant development potential.
According to the regional transit planner, the “city had a high density vision” for the
Pearl District located adjacent to downtown Portland, and the streetcar was seen as a
“permanent… symbol of public investment and commitment to the area and its high density
vision.” The same informant said the recent Central Loop line (opened in 2012) is driven
by similar development goals, although the city is not promoting very high densities in the
area, as they wish to retain its “mixed use character.”
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Portland served as a model for many of the other cities, which adopted the streetcar to
further their own development goals. In Tampa, the streetcar advocate pointed to Portland
as a key model for the streetcar in that community. He articulated the view that “urban
redevelopment follows transit,” in this case the streetcar, and cited Portland as “the model”
of a community that had successfully used its streetcar to further its redevelopment and
densification policies. The developer informants in Seattle also pointed to Portland as an
inspiration for Seattle’s own streetcar line and its development promotion goals. They
recalled that Seattle officials had commissioned an appraiser to study the value of new
development along the Portland Streetcar line with an eye toward estimating development
potential in their city. The Seattle informants also noted that local policymakers took a field
trip to see Portland’s streetcar when they were making the decision whether or not to build
the South Lake Union Line.
Memphis’ first streetcar line predates the Portland streetcar line, and the key informants
also emphasized the development rationale for its implementation. The business and
transit informants described downtown Memphis in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a
distressed area in need of serious revitalization. The immediate impetus to the construction
of the city’s first Trolley was a desire to revitalize a failed pedestrian mall along Main Street.
The transit planning informants characterized the streetcar as a tool that would provide
better access to this area, which was perceived as lacking good pedestrian access, and
that the streetcar would in turn stimulate development activity. The redevelopment agency
informant agreed that the Memphis Trolley was built primarily to encourage development.
Figure 9 depicts a streetcar operating on Memphis’ Main Street Trolley Line.
Most informants across the five cities spoke favorably of the streetcar as a development
tool. Informants spoke about the streetcar’s potential to “activate the street” by encouraging
walking and outside activity. They spoke about the signals the investment sent to developers
about a strong public “commitment” to an area in the form of a “permanent” investment,
which would then presumably encourage developers to make their own investments. The
stark contrast with bus services, which were not seen as permanent, and thus would
presumably be of little or no interest to private developers’ long-term market interests, was
implicit in many informant interviews.
Informants viewed the streetcar as important for development, although few characterized
it as a cause of development activity on its own. Instead, they tended to discuss the streetcar
as being one of many assets necessary to attain positive development outcomes in their
community. Informants also emphasized the importance of strong regional economies,
healthy local real estate markets, and synergies with other public and private investments
in areas adjacent to the streetcar as key factors for successful development outcomes.
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Figure 9. Trolley on Memphis’ Main Street Line55

Streetcar as Symbol or Icon to Construct Identity and Promote Tourism
The use of the streetcar as a symbol or icon was the second most noted goal that
arose in the interviews. This goal was explicitly tied to local efforts to market a city to
tourists, conventioneers, and other visitors, and it was particularly noteworthy in Little
Rock, Memphis, and Tampa, the three cities whose streetcar ridership is overwhelmingly
dominated by visitor-serving trips. These kinds of comments did not emerge as frequently
or consistently in the Portland and Seattle interviews.
In Little Rock, the tourism promoter spoke about the “charming vintage streetcar experience”
and the “nostalgic feel” of the local streetcar, which was something that the city tries to
market to visitors. In Tampa, the regional planning informant spoke about the “abstract
benefits” of the streetcar, including its role as “icon” or “symbol” of the city. He favorably
noted the TECO Line streetcar’s visibility in television coverage of major events, such as
the Super Bowl, in the city. He thought it served as a very positive symbol of the city. The
Memphis business leader informant made similar statements when he referred to the
Trolley as a “marketing investment” for the city and spoke approvingly of its appearance
on television coverage of Memphis events. One of the Tampa transit informants noted that
the streetcar has become an iconic image of the city. He further reported that “it’s cute,”
although he also lamented that most people “don’t ride it.”
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The nostalgic image of the streetcar, derived from its central role in an earlier era of urban
development, loomed large in the minds of many informants. The Memphis business
leader spoke of the streetcar helping to “support the historic feeling of the neighborhood…
(it) creates an emotional connection to downtown and (helps communicate) the sounds/
smells of the city.” He characterized the streetcar as providing a “theatrical event” and a
“unique feeling that can’t be achieved with other modes.” Along similar lines, one Tampa
business leader informant characterized the TECO Line streetcar as a “cultural asset”
that tells people what Tampa is “all about, (including) its historical significance.” Figure 10
depicts a TECO Line streetcar in Tampa.

Figure 10. TECO Line Streetcar in Tampa56

Streetcar as Transit Service
In three cities, the key informants did not cite any transportation-related goals for the
streetcar. The regional planner in Little Rock emphasized that River Rail was “not a
commuter service.” In Tampa, one business leader informant noted that the TECO Line
was “less a mode of transportation” and “more of a cultural and entertainment piece.”
The Memphis transit informants noted that they didn’t change any bus routes when the
Trolley lines opened and do not try to coordinate Trolley service schedules with local
buses. These comments together point to the lower priority placed on the Trolley’s role as
a utilitarian transportation service than its use to achieve other ends.
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By contrast, the streetcar’s transportation role emerged during the key informant interviews
in Portland and Seattle. In Portland, the local land planner and local transportation planner
characterized the streetcar as being a combination transportation service and development
tool. They spoke of its placement in an area with ridership potential and its ability to serve
as a pedestrian trip extender in the downtown that allowed people to shift from motorized
transportation to combination streetcar-walking trips. The streetcar advocate and regional
transit planner both spoke of a transportation role that has grown in importance as the
streetcar lines have been extended over time. The regional transit planner further noted
that now Tri-Met includes the streetcar lines as part of its frequent service transit network,
which means they are seen by Tri-Met officials as important pieces of the regular local
transit system.
In Seattle, the transportation role of the streetcar emerged in interviews, although not quite
to the same degree as seen in Portland. The transit planner spoke about the South Lake
Union line’s role serving the “last mile” in the local transit system. He further noted its role
as a circulator that also links to other transit services and to the nearby downtown core.
In both Portland and Seattle, the key informants spoke with some pride about the higherthan-forecast ridership of the streetcar lines, which indicates that they pay some attention
to the streetcar’s ridership and other transportation performance measures.

ASSESSMENT OF STREETCAR GOAL ATTAINMENT
The authors asked the informants for their assessments of the streetcars’ performance
in meeting its goals. The authors discuss the informants’ assessments of the streetcars
performance as a development tool, as a symbol or icon used for tourism promotion,
and as a transit investment in turn in the sections below. The authors then assess the
streetcar’s performance based on the evidence obtained during the study.

Informants’ Assessment of the Streetcar as Development Tool
In most cities, the informants offered a positive assessment of the streetcar’s performance in
promoting development in the areas adjacent to its alignment, although these assessments
were tempered to a significant degree in Tampa. Most informants stated that the streetcar’s
presence encouraged developers or businesses to invest in areas near the streetcar alignment.
However, the same informants also recognized the importance of other factors, such as the
health of the local real estate market, other synergistic public or private investments, and
financial and regulatory incentives as factors in development outcomes. Most assessments
were made on the basis of an individual’s observations as opposed to any detailed analyses.
Indeed, studies of streetcar development effects were available only for Portland and Little
Rock, and these studies were purely descriptive in nature.
Little Rock. The Little Rock informants offered a minimal assessment of the streetcar’s
development effects, as they seemed more focused on its symbolic role in tourism and visitor
attraction. Their assessments also emphasized the importance of the Clinton Presidential
Library’s opening in 2004 as a crucial factor that influenced economic activity in downtown
Little Rock. The tourism promoter tended to place the strongest emphasis on the Library as
the key local investment that drove economic activity, as opposed to the streetcar.
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The local transit planner made the most specific assessment of the streetcar’s development
effects. He pointed to a study conducted for the transit agency that found $1 billion in new
development activity (after streetcar implementation) within one-quarter mile [400 meters]
of the streetcar alignment. The study implicitly attributed this activity to the streetcar’s
presence, although the informant was more careful to note that the streetcar is “one of
only several factors” that are likely responsible. On the other hand, the tourism promoter
pointed to a similar assessment done for the Presidential Library that claimed a role in
$2.5 billion of development activity for the Library. Presumably, most if not all of this activity
was also claimed for the streetcar in its study.
Later in the interview, the tourism promoter emphasized that so much has occurred in the
downtowns of Little Rock and North Little Rock with the Library, Arena development, and
the streetcar that it is hard to know which of these investments, if any, is really the key
driving force behind downtown development activity. Nevertheless, the regional planner
emphasized the view, echoed by the other informants, that the streetcar seemed to be a
catalyst of some kind for development activity.
Memphis. The Memphis informants offered a positive assessment of what they saw as the
Trolley’s role in helping to redevelop a distressed downtown. The informants spoke of the
Trolley as having been an influence on the decisions of developers and business owners
to invest in the community. One of the informants spoke from his personal experience as
a local business owner.
The redevelopment agency informant painted a picture of a Memphis in steep economic
decline, with high vacancy rates for commercial properties. He noted that the area began
to turn around about 20 years ago, and that growth has continued steadily except during
the recent recession. In this informant’s view, the Trolley fits in with Memphis’ role as
the regional cultural and entertainment center, and that it is an important amenity in its
downtown district. The informant characterized the area around the Trolley as being “hot”
for development activity because of its walkable, mixed-use character and its location. He
also stated that developers did consider the Trolley’s presence, along with more traditional
financial and economic factors, when they made investment decisions.
The transit informants emphasized the Trolley’s origins in revitalizing Memphis’ failed Main
Street pedestrian mall. The Trolley had been implemented to improve mobility along a
corridor that was deemed too long to be walkable. These informants thought the Trolley
had played a synergistic role, along with other investments, such as an Arena (Great
American Pyramid) and the renovation of hotels and other historic buildings, in revitalizing
downtown Memphis. These informants did note that they thought the redevelopment
efforts had been more successful in attracting residents than in attracting other activity.
The business leader noted that “people in the area built their businesses around the Trolley;
it provides a unique feel that can’t be achieved with other modes (of transit). Personally, as a
business owner, I wouldn’t have moved to South Main without the Trolley.” This informant’s
comments pointed to the importance of the Trolley as a tangible public commitment to the
area, a permanent investment that sent signals to developers and business owners that
they could safely make their own investments. The informant said that “(The) Trolley revived
downtown Memphis… Memphis turned the corner after the Trolley came.”
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Portland. Portland’s experience with development around the streetcar is by far the best
documented, having been highlighted in a report by Hovee and Gustafson and discussed
in a Transit Cooperative Research Program study as well. The Hovee and Gustafson
study identified about $800 million of redevelopment activity in areas near the streetcar
line in downtown Portland, with plans for an additional $1.2 billion in development.57 While
the authors do not explicitly claim the streetcar was the sole cause of this activity, they
do suggest it played a very important role. By and large, the informant interviews take
the same approach. They point to very favorable development outcomes and assign an
important role to the streetcar as a catalyst as opposed to the primary cause of the activity.
Several informants offered very long-term perspectives on development outcomes as a result
of their long involvement in streetcar-related issues in Portland. The streetcar advocate,
who has been involved in these issues for several decades, recalled the streetcar’s origins
in earlier downtown plans that emphasized the redevelopment of the Pearl District and
other central locations. The plans for these areas permitted higher densities than previously
existed, and the informant emphasized that these high densities were not in place. The
informant emphasized that the development goals for the area were exceeded and that the
area now features high density, mixed use, walkable environments with some affordable
housing. The informant characterized the streetcar as a catalyst for this development and
as an “incentive” for the development of other policies. The streetcar enabled an “alignment
of policies” developed to achieve the same ends, including land regulation, zoning, fiscal
incentives, and investments in other amenities. In this informant’s view, the streetcar was an
important factor, although not the causal factor, for these outcomes.
The business leader offered a similar assessment of development outcomes based on his
similarly long experience with streetcar issues in Portland. He noted that the streetcar’s
role has been as a tool to assist development; he also used the word “catalyst” in
describing the streetcar. The informant pointed to high levels of development activity (50
percent of new development) and high densities (floor-to-area ratios that are more than
double that of the downtown area average) along the streetcar alignment as important
indicators of its development outcomes. This informant emphasized the attractiveness
of the streetcar to developers because it operates on tracks that are “perceived as a
permanent commitment of the city” to the area through which the tracks run. He contrasted
this with the impermanence of buses. He said that the streetcar also permitted developers
to be more creative and to approach development differently than they had in the past.
The informant noted that the streetcar “yes, absolutely” achieved its goals with respect
to development. He said it has “proven to be an agent of change” in the Pearl District,
the South Waterfront, and potentially on the East side of the Willamette River as well. He
pointed to the increased residential and business activity in these areas as the clearest
and strongest indicators of its performance. He pointed to increased street-level activity
and higher property values as other key indicators of its success. He emphasized the
“sense of vibrancy” it added to the central city. But he also acknowledged that the city also
relied on tax abatements and other infrastructure investments to support development in
these areas, so the streetcar was a contributing factor but not the sole factor.
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The local land planner and local transit planner also spoke favorably about development
activity in downtown Portland, and they spoke of the streetcar as a “big success” in its role
as a development tool. As with other informants, they pointed to the change in development
in the Pearl District and other downtown areas as the evidence for its performance. And
like the other informants, they emphasized its role as a permanent, fixed amenity that
appealed to developers and could serve as an anchor for redevelopment. These two
informants seemed the most sensitive to concerns that streetcar proponents might be
overselling its development capabilities, as they emphasized the particular importance
of efforts now underway to develop a local model to separate the effects of the streetcar
versus other factors (streetscape improvements, sidewalk investments, etc.) when
assessing development outcomes. Nevertheless, they did conclude that the streetcar was
an important part of a “convergence of public investments” in the Pearl District and South
Waterfront areas that have resulted in the significant redevelopment of these two areas.
Seattle. The Seattle informants offered a highly positive assessment of the streetcar’s
development role, although many informants also noted that the area around the streetcar
alignment seemed already well positioned to enjoy a development renaissance. In
general the informants emphasized the importance of larger economic forces, private
sector investments, and local land development policy as key factors in explaining the
redevelopment of the South Lake Union area, with the streetcar’s role being more that of
catalyst than of cause. Figure 11 depicts a South Lake Union streetcar.

Figure 11. South Lake Union Streetcar in Seattle58
The local business leader, who also works in economic development, assessed the
streetcar as being highly successful in increasing development, aiding retail activity,
connecting neighborhoods, and supporting the use of alternative modes of transportation
for mobility. This informant particularly emphasized what he regarded as the streetcar’s
role in encouraging street-level activity, which led to a more active street.
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The developer informants also offered a favorable assessment of the development
effects. They noted that rental rates and land values have increased since streetcar
implementation, and they suggested that the streetcar has been a factor in these results.
They further noted that the increased development activity generated about $155 million
in tax revenues for the City of Seattle, suggesting the magnitude of the development
activity. These informants mentioned a number of specific development outcomes that
they related to the streetcar, including the doubling of the number of bank branches near
the alignment, the development of an apartment complex that was quickly filled, and a
number of other large projects, including Amazon’s relocation to the South Lake Union
area. These comments thus suggest that the streetcar’s development goals are being met.
However, other informants recognized the difficulty in linking this activity specifically to the
streetcar. The local land planner observed that “it’s really hard to give a good approximation
of success. The neighborhood had been rapidly changing. (The streetcar) likely helped
(increase) land values along the ‘spine’ of the streetcar. (But) the South Lake Union district
was already on a trajectory to grow so much, so it’s hard to tell whether the streetcar was
the reason. Perhaps it helped pushed development in that direction.” The same informant
believed that “(the streetcar is) probably more effective as a development tool” than as
a transit tool because it generates “interest and excitement” around development in the
South Lake Union area. But he thought the city had a very strong development market in
any case. The local land planner seemed to share this view that the streetcar tended to
attract attention to the area, “interest and excitement” so to speak, but that the underlying
economic conditions made the area ripe for redevelopment anyway.
Tampa. The Tampa informants offered perhaps the most qualified endorsement of the
streetcar’s development effects of any of the study cities. The more negative assessments
emphasized the vulnerability of the city’s development sector to larger economic forces,
such as the 2008 recession.
The business leaders characterized the streetcar as a catalyst for about $1 billion in
development activity along the alignment, and they pointed to the new condominium
developments in the city’s Channelside district as an example of streetcar-related
development that materialized without the aid of other local development incentives. The
regional planner also pointed to development activity in this district, pointing to a major hotel
and the condominium development as having been due to the presence of the streetcar.
Both the business leaders and regional planner also pointed to development activity in
Ybor City as being linked to the streetcar. However, the latter informant also noted that the
Ybor City district had evolved into area that was not so family-oriented, with the presence
of bars and other adult uses. This individual felt this evolution had affected both the level
and nature of development activity and resulting streetcar ridership.
At the same time, the informants also spoke of the effects of the 2008 recession and larger
economic forces as negative influences on local development activity. One business leader
noted that “there were plans prior to the economic downturn for mixed use development
in the north end of Ybor Channel but these have not happened.” The streetcar specialist
observed that “Channelside businesses are gone due to the economic and tourism
downturn. This was one of the areas that was expected to activate streetcar ridership,”
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but which has not done so due to the decline in visitor activity. The same informant also
observed that the Channelside area had likely been “overbuilt” prior to the recession,
which has made it harder for the area to recover.
As the interviews proceeded, many informants’ assessments of the streetcar’s development
effects became more qualified. For example, the streetcar advocate informant stated that
“I can’t say that new businesses have been established because of the streetcar; but
one restaurant ‘Streetcar Charlie’ was established on the streetcar line across a stop. It
ran for 4 years before closing for administrative reasons…it could have been established
because of the streetcar.” And, one of the business leader informants observed that “there
is new investment in Ybor City, although it is hard to gauge the streetcar’s role.”

Informants’ Assessment of the Streetcar as Symbol or Icon
As noted earlier, informants in three cities (Little Rock, Memphis, and Tampa) emphasized
the streetcar’s role in tourism promotion and city marketing efforts by virtue of its use as
a symbol or icon of the city. By and large, the assessment of its performance in this role
was limited to noting the streetcar’s use in television coverage of the community during
major events, or its use in marketing materials by local convention and visitors’ bureaus
or business organizations. None of the cities had undertaken a formal assessment of the
streetcar’s performance with respect to this goal. Several Tampa informants spoke about
these “abstract benefits” of the TECO Line Streetcar in that city, especially its use in visitor
marketing efforts, including the regional planner, transit planner, streetcar specialist, and
business leaders. Many informants emphasized the importance of this role of the streetcar
in this city. However, there had been no specific assessment undertaken in Tampa as to
how well the streetcar actually performed in this role.
The informants in Little Rock and Memphis made similar comments. In Little Rock, River
Rail’s role in city marketing and in local events catering to visitors came up in several
interviews. One informant explicitly stated that River Rail’s purpose was to “promote
tourism and visitorship, not to serve commuters.” The informants spoke about the role that
River Rail operators play as tour guides in pointing out key sites along the streetcar line.
So, clearly this is regarded as an important function of that city’s streetcar. One informant
emphasized the need to evaluate streetcars that primarily serve this kind of role differently
from those focused on serving commuters or other more utilitarian trips. However, there
appeared to be no performance measures in place in Little Rock to assess River Rail’s
actual performance.
In Memphis, the informants spoke of the Trolley’s use as a connection to the Mississippi
Riverfront and to downtown attractions that served visitors. As noted earlier, one
informant emphasized the “nostalgic feel’ associated with the streetcar. Another informant
characterized the Trolley as “a marketing investment.” But as in the other two cities just
discussed, there were no formal assessments of whether the Trolley had been effective or
ineffective as this kind of investment.
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Informants’ Assessment of the Streetcar as Transit
Only in the cases of Portland and Seattle did the informants report that providing transit
service was an important goal for the streetcar. In the other cities, the informants emphasized
that transit service/transportation was not a primary goal of the streetcar, although many
informants offered their assessments of the streetcar’s performance as a transit service.
In Little Rock, the informants spoke about the service’s operating hours, alignment, and
speed as leading it to be a tourism service as opposed to a utilitarian service. This in turn
makes ridership very dependent on the health of the tourism sector, which has been in
decline in recent years. The regional planner noted that “tourists are most of the riders...
(the streetcar) has not evolved to serve the larger local community; …even for the tourist
market it is still noticeably underused.”
The key informants in Tampa made similar comments. The regional planner noted that “given
the operating characteristics of the service, the streetcar functions now in a tourist serving
role.” A business leader reported that the streetcar’s transit performance “is not really taking
off because of the hours of operation/service; most riders are visitors and conventioneers
and not the local community; the streetcar is not used as much for day-to-day (no commute);
however residents will use streetcar to go back-and-forth to special events (i.e. Hockey
games).” The transit planning informants spoke of ridership that continues to decline year
after year, due to a combination of the long-term economic effects of the recession and
budget problems that have led to a reduction in service and an increase in fare. The Tampa
informants also noted that the availability of plentiful inexpensive parking also tends to reduce
the attractiveness of the streetcar as a modal option. The streetcar ridership declines in Little
Rock and Tampa stand in stark contrast with stable or increasing bus ridership in recent
years (see details in Table 17 in Appendix A and Table 70 in Appendix E).
The key informants in the other cities offer somewhat different assessments of streetcar
transit performance. Informants from Portland were particularly enthusiastic about the
streetcar’s transit performance, which is perhaps not surprising given its status as the
highest ridership streetcar among these cases. Several informants emphasized that
ridership, particularly on the original North-South (NS) streetcar line, is much higher than
initially forecast. The streetcar advocate noted that the original goal was about 10,000
riders per day, but as of the date of the interview (summer 2014), they had reached about
16,000 riders per day. The business leader added that “the streetcar has become an
effective transit system that operates near capacity at peak travel times.” This informant
emphasized the streetcar’s connections to other transit services as an important factor in
its high use. The regional transit planner noted that despite overlaps between streetcar
and bus service in some corridors neither appears to have experienced any negative
consequences for ridership. This informant thinks this is due to the streetcar tapping a
different rider market than the bus.
In Seattle, the informants emphasized the riders’ use of streetcars for a number of different
types of trips, including for commuting. The local transit planner noted that the service
carries some tourists and visitors but that its alignment does not make it as dependent
on these rider markets as the streetcars in many other cities. The developer informants
emphasized the streetcar’s appeal to major employers, including Amazon, who view it
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favorably enough to have invested money in improving service quality. Both the local transit
planner and local land planner spoke about the upcoming streetcar alignment extensions,
which they believe might increase its utility as a transportation service.

Informants’ Views on Greatest Challenges Facing the Streetcar
The authors asked key informants in each city about what they regarded as the greatest
challenges affecting the streetcar. In most cities, funding issues emerged as the most
frequently cited concern of the key informants.
Little Rock. The transit planner discussed policy decisions that undercut the River Rail’s
ability to serve tourists as major challenges, including decisions to suspend operations
during major events. The regional planner agreed that this was a large problem, although
he also raised the inability to extend the streetcar alignment to tap into other rider markets
as a major challenge. This informant viewed dependence on the tourism rider market as
having hindered River Rail’s ridership. The tourism promoter thought the streetcar’s slow
speed and relatively high cost were serious challenges for the service.
Memphis. The transit planning informants emphasized that funding stability was a
major challenge for the Trolley. These informants reported a 25 percent drop in streetcar
service, which has resulted in a 20 percent decline in ridership. They still see demand
for ridership but lack the resources necessary to adequately serve it. The redevelopment
agency informant agreed that service levels were a challenge, and he noted that higherfrequency service was needed to increase the Trolley’s appeal for serving utilitarian trips.
The informants also spoke of the challenges associated with operating vintage vehicles.
The transit informants noted that operating vintage vehicles has posed challenges
because they are more difficult for disabled people to access, and they also suffer frequent
breakdowns. The redevelopment agency informant also mentioned these concerns. The
local business leader recognized these operating challenges but nevertheless thought
it was still important for Memphis to operate vintage vehicles because of their role as a
“signature” of the city.
Portland. All the key informants in Portland emphasized funding as the most important
challenge facing the streetcar. The business leader mentioned that funding issues have
required local officials to be creative when finding ways of paying for new investments
or to operate existing services. The local transportation planning and local land use
planning informants concurred that funding was a big challenge. These informants noted
that Portland relies on general funds to cover operations, relying significantly on a local
payroll tax. They believed a sales tax would provide a much more stable funding source
for the community. A number of informants also emphasized the streetcar system’s
current incomplete status as a challenge that suppresses ridership, but they emphasized
that when the final segment is completed that closes the loop around both sides of the
Willamette River, this should be addressed. A number of informants believed that the lack
of a complete loop suppressed ridership, particularly on the newer CL streetcar line.
Seattle. The key informant interviews pointed to funding as a challenge in Seattle. At
present, the informants characterize streetcar funding as stable, while bus funding has
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been reduced in recent years. However, there is obviously some concern that unless
transit funding is stabilized, streetcar funding might also one day be cut. Locating the
tracks adjacent to curbs on the South Lake Union line was another challenge noted by
the developer informants. This location has resulted in interference with bicyclists. The
informants noted that future streetcar lines will locate the tracks in the middle of the street
to avoid these conflicts.
Tampa. Funding issues also loom large in Tampa, where funding shortfalls have led to
decreases in operating hours and service frequency, as well as fare increases, for the
TECO Line streetcar. These issues have in turn led to declining ridership, which was
also cited as a major challenge by the key informants. Tampa previously relied on an
endowment to help finance streetcar operations, but this endowment has been depleted
due to higher than anticipated annual expenses, particularly for insurance required to
operate the streetcar across CSX tracks. The business leaders further noted that annual
contributions by the Port Authority and other agencies have also declined in recent years.
Every informant pointed to the need for more certainty and stability in funding, and indeed
for enhanced funding, so the necessary quality of service can be provided for the streetcar
to operate frequently enough, and for long enough during a day, to be attractive to riders.
They felt that lack of funding led to the operational decisions and fare policy decisions that,
in turn, led to ridership decline in recent years. A number of informants also pointed to the
importance of identifying additional money to allow the streetcar alignment to be extended
into other areas and to serve new destinations that might increase the rider market and
provide connections to other transit services.

Authors’ Assessment of Streetcar Performance
Most key informants offered very positive assessments of the streetcar’s performance
in attaining the goals set out by streetcar promoters, although few of the assessments
were grounded in any careful evaluation of the streetcar’s actual performance. Most
assessments were instead based on the informant’s general perception of outcomes. The
exceptions to this pattern are the assessments of development outcomes undertaken in
Portland by Hovee and Gustafson59 and in Little Rock by the local transit agency,60 both of
which highlighted positive development outcomes using purely descriptive methodologies
that have been questioned by some streetcar skeptics.
Also noteworthy across the range of cases discussed here is the important role played
by the private sector as the instigators of streetcar development in most of the cities. The
private sector role proved especially strong in Portland and also in Seattle where the
private sector has even made financial commitments to help support streetcar operations.
The authors offer their own assessment of the streetcars in each city in the paragraphs
that follow.
Little Rock. The authors found Little Rock’s River Rail streetcar to be the weakest transit
performer among the five cases considered here, with its much lower ridership, lower cost
effectiveness, and lower service productivity than its peers. The authors attribute these
poor results to a number of planning and policy decisions related to the streetcar, including
its operating hours and service frequencies, its alignment location, and the relative lack of
integration between the streetcar and local bus services.
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The informants appeared to recognize the poor transit performance of the River Rail, as
well as the underlying reasons for the poor transit performance. However, the informants
also emphasized that its purpose was not really transportation. Instead, they emphasized
that River Rail functions as a development tool and as a marketing device to help the
community attract visitors. It is difficult for the authors to gauge the performance of River
Rail in both of these respects, given methodological concerns with the transit agency’s
development study and the lack of any quantitative assessment of its role in tourism.
The authors suspect that factors other than the streetcar, including the health of the local
real estate market and the presence of other major investments such as the Clinton
Presidential Library, are likely much more important factors than the streetcar in these
two respects. However, the key informants believe the streetcar to be an important factor,
and they perceive it to have had positive effects. And these beliefs and perceptions drive
streetcar policy and planning decisions in the community.
Memphis. The authors place Memphis’s Trolley in the middle of the cases presented
here, when it is assessed as a transit investment. Its ridership is second only to Portland,
and it is the most cost effective system. The authors assess it as being partially integrated
with the local bus system, due to the connecting bus services that are available at the two
terminals, although the lack of schedule coordination between the various transit services
reduces its attractiveness for utilitarian trips. The key informant interviews suggest that
serving utilitarian transit trips was not a primary objective of the streetcar, save perhaps for
the case of the Madison Avenue Line that serves the Medical complexes, so the Trolley’s
mid-level transit performance results are perhaps not surprising. The informants also
noted the service’s slow speed, which reduces its attractiveness for many potential riders.
The key informant interviews emphasized the Trolley’s role as a development tool and as
an icon of the city. The Trolley’s origins in efforts to revitalize the Main Street pedestrian mall
and its later role to aid in the redevelopment of downtown Memphis figured prominently
in the interviews. All the informants perceive that the Trolley has had a positive effect on
development, given the economic revitalization they have seen in the area over the past
two decades. The clustering of redevelopment activity along Trolley lines or around Trolley
stops stands as further testimony to the Trolley’s role, in the informants’ views.
Given the tone of the interviews and the nature of press coverage that is recounted in the
historical narrative found in Appendix B, the authors suspect that the Trolley might have
played a role in helping to excite people about downtown Memphis and its attractions
and that the Trolley’s presence might have indeed influenced decisions by businesses
and developers to make investments in the area. The key informants indeed emphasized
this catalyst role. There is little doubt that downtown Memphis is much more vibrant and
stronger economically than it was two decades ago, and there is a strong belief that the
Trolley has played an important role. The authors cannot make a definitive judgment on
this aspect of the Trolley’s performance due to the lack of studies that control for other
possible factors that might have influenced development activity.
Portland. Portland is by far the strongest performer of any of the streetcar cities considered
here. The authors attribute its stronger performance to a number of key planning and policy
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decisions. First, the planners who selected the alignment located the original North-South (NS)
streetcar line in area that already had strong redevelopment potential and where
redevelopment activity was likely to generate relatively high transit ridership. Second, the
city of Portland implemented other policies that supported the effort to redevelop this area
and encourage residents and visitors to the area to use transit and other non-automobile
modes of transportation. Third, planners paid attention to the transportation role of the
streetcar by coordinating its schedules and fare policies with other transit services. The
higher ridership and higher service productivity that place Portland’s streetcar at the top on
both of those critical transportation indicators were the result. Portland’s streetcar stands
out because of its strong transportation role, a role that attracts many utilitarian transit
riders to use the streetcar service. The importance of the transportation role emerged in all
the interviews, and the belief in the importance of transportation objectives influences local
decision making around the streetcar to an extent seen in few of the other cities. Perhaps
only Seattle even comes close.
However, Portland’s streetcar is most known for its purported development effects, as
assessed by Hovee and Gustafson. These development effects in turn led other cities, most
notably Seattle, to implement their own streetcars. The authors explored the development
effects of the streetcar in the interviews with key informants and learned that everyone
interviewed believes the streetcar had a positive effect of some kind on development
activity. However, none of them claimed the streetcar was the sole determinative factor.
Instead, they characterized it as a catalyst, or an amenity, that was part of a set of other
important factors including other public investments and most importantly the health of the
local real estate market.
Perhaps the most interesting point made in the informant interviews was the streetcar’s
symbolic role as evidence of a public commitment to a location. The streetcar’s “permanence”
emerged in several interviews in which the informants emphasized the strong signal such
a permanent public investment made to businesses and developers who could then make
their own private investments in an area, safe in the knowledge that they would not be
abandoned by the public sector. The authors suspect that this symbolic role is one of the
most important non-transportation roles that the streetcar plays in Portland and elsewhere.
Seattle. Seattle possesses the shortest alignment of all the cities considered here, but
its streetcar has the third-highest ridership, second-highest productivity, and third-most
cost effective service of any of the streetcars. Assessed as a transit investment, the South
Lake Union streetcar thus emerges as a pretty strong performer, as compared to its peers,
and ranks perhaps second only to Portland. Seattle also stands out as a case, along with
Portland, in which each key informant emphasized the streetcar’s transportation role. The
importance placed on the transportation role then influenced policy and planning decisions
about service levels, including coordinating fares and schedules with other transit services.
Still, development objectives are the primary rationale for the South Lake Union streetcar,
and the roles of major private sector developers, such as Vulcan, in leading the push for
a streetcar are quite striking in Seattle. Indeed Seattle is the case in which the private
sector’s leading role was most visible. Self-interest on the part of major developers and
landowners undoubtedly helps to explain their activities in support of the streetcar; it also
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helped to mobilize public opinion in support of the investment. The key actors perceived
the streetcar as helping to bring about redevelopment of the area, and the development
and business community have indeed made significant investments in this location.
Tampa. Tampa emerges from this study as one of the poorer performers, having the
second-lowest ridership and second-least cost effective service. Only Little Rock’s River Rail
performed worse than the TECO Line streetcar on these two transportation performance
measures. The poor transportation performance is the consequence of a number of factors,
including its service characteristics (speed, operating hours, and headways), its relatively
high fare, its lack of integration with other transit services, and its alignment in an area
that does not appear to produce a large number of trips. Barring a sudden resurgence in
the development market, it is hard to imagine its ridership increasing without significant
additional public investment to extend the alignment to more trip generators, increase
speeds, increase service hours and service frequencies, and reduce fares. The relatively
low cost of nearby parking also is a factor in the streetcar’s poor transit performance.
The TECO Line’s poor performance as a transit investment emerged quite strongly in most
of the key informant interviews, although the interviews with the non-transit informants had
a more positive view of its future. The authors attribute this positive view to the belief on
the part of many of these informants that the streetcar might be an effective transportation
investment and development tool if its service characteristics were improved and the local
real estate market were to turn around.

Strategies to Improve Streetcar Performance
The authors asked the informants for their recommended strategies to improve the
performance of the streetcars in their communities. Their recommendations included calls
for new capital investments such as extending streetcar alignments to serve additional
origins and destinations, or creating a more extensive network of streetcars, to operational
improvements such as improving service frequencies, extending service hours, and
replacing vintage vehicles with more reliable modern streetcars. A few informants also
mentioned the importance of having more supportive parking policies and land development
policies in place to encourage streetcar use.
The authors concur with many of the suggested operational improvements, with the
further recommendation that cities that operate streetcars should better coordinate their
schedules with other local transit services to increase their utility for a wider array of trips
beyond the tourist rider market. Portland stands out as a city that already does this, while
most of the others do not. The authors are somewhat skeptical of extending streetcar
lines to improve performance, particularly without making significant changes in how
streetcars are operated in many cities, because of the high costs involved in doing so, as
well as the uncertain benefit. The authors support strategies that use parking policy as a
lever to encourage more transit use in general, and the authors support coordinating land
development policy with transportation planning decisions. The authors discuss each city
in turn.
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Little Rock. The key informants had three recommendations for improving the performance
of River Rail in Little Rock. First, all three informants recommended changing the current
policy of shutting down streetcar service during some major downtown events. The city
currently does this to increase the supply of on-street parking. This struck the informants as
counterproductive, particularly given River Rail’s dependence on visitors as its primary rider
market. The authors agree that Little Rock should seriously reconsider this local policy.
Second, the informants suggested extending the alignment outside the downtowns and
into neighborhoods, or potentially even further to the airport. The regional planner and
transit planner informants thought extending the lines would allow the service to grow
beyond its current primarily tourist market. The authors are somewhat skeptical of this
recommendation given the River Rail’s very uncompetitive operating characteristics
(speeds, hours, headways) compared with local bus services or the automobile. The
authors believe that a much more effective and lower-cost strategy to increase transit
ridership would be to improve local bus services, and the transit planning informant did
report that bus service improvements are the top priority in the community at present time.
Finally, the informants suggested implementing a more transit-supportive parking policy
in the downtown area, which the authors agree would help to increase the attractiveness
of transit vis-à-vis the automobile. However, such a policy must have significant support
from a local business community that has not yet indicated a willingness to do so due to
fears about the loss of business to outlying locations with plentiful free or low-cost parking.
Memphis. The key informants had few substantive recommendations to improve streetcar
performance in Memphis beyond increased resources to restore some of the service
cuts made in recent years. The transit planning informants reported that there were
many potential Trolley riders who did not use the service because of service cuts that
had reduced service frequencies. The other suggestion offered by the informants was
to replace Memphis’s vintage streetcar vehicles with more modern replica vehicles. The
informants asserted that the vintage vehicles were good symbolic investments, but they
also emphasized the frequent problems with vehicle breakdowns and difficulties obtaining
parts for vehicle repair. They believed that replacing the vintage vehicles with modern
replicas would maintain the sense of nostalgia while also improving service reliability and
reducing maintenance and operating costs.
The authors generally concur that Memphis’ Trolley would likely see improved performance
as a result of some of these changes, particularly with respect to replacing the vintage
vehicles with modern ones; however, the present poor service productivity of the Trolley
system gives some pause for concern about the effectiveness of additional investments
unless carefully targeted. It is likely that more targeted improvements on the higherridership streetcar lines would be better uses of limited public resources than investments
across all three lines. For example, at present the Madison Avenue line has only about
half the ridership of the other two lines, although its service levels are roughly comparable
to the other lines.
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Portland. Generally speaking, the key informants were pleased with the performance of
Portland’s streetcar service, which is perhaps not surprising given how much it stands
out compared with the other cities. The only areas of concern were related to the newer
CL streetcar line, in which ridership is much lower than on the older NS line. The transit
planning and local land planning informants thought ridership on the newer line would
increase over time, particularly once the envisioned southern section of the cross-river
loop is completed. Completion of the loop would reduce travel times between the east and
west sides of the Willamette River and thus increase accessibility of many areas on the
east side.
The authors tend to agree with the key informants. Portland already coordinates its
streetcar with other transit services, and it operates pretty frequent streetcar service, so no
obvious operational improvements come to mind as logical next steps to improve streetcar
performance. Portland also has a progressive parking policy that uses pricing to encourage
non-automobile use and devotes some of the resulting parking revenue to transit uses.
Seattle. The key informants had few suggested improvements for the streetcar service
in Seattle. Two informants emphasized the importance of the new streetcar lines that will
eventually connect with the South Lake Union line. These informants believed that a more
extensive system would increase the appeal of the streetcar to riders. The local transit
planning informant suggested a need to better coordinate the South Lake Union line, and
future streetcar lines, with other transit services. This informant believed that this had not
yet been done as well as it could have been.
The authors generally rank Seattle as one of the better performers in this set of streetcar
cities, so the authors support cost-effective strategies that might increase the appeal of the
service to other riders. The operational improvements related to better coordination with
other transit services is a logical step. Seattle’s streetcar appears to serve commuters and
other non-visitor riders, so such strategies that increase the service’s appeal for utilitarian
trips are likely to be beneficial. The authors are more cautious about the major capital
investments presently underway on Seattle’s emerging streetcar system, mainly because
of the relatively high costs involved for what is still relatively low daily ridership on the
present South Lake Union line.
Tampa. The key informants in Tampa seemed divided between those who liked the
streetcar very much, despite its problems (which they largely conceded), and those who
disliked the streetcar very much. This latter group realized that the streetcar was likely to
be there for a while, given that shutting it down would require the city to repay the Federal
Transit Administration’s capital grant that helped build the line. The transit informants were
most pessimistic in their assessments, but they did suggest improving service frequencies,
extending service hours, and reducing the fare as strategies that would likely increase
TECO Line ridership. The problem for them was the lack of local resources to make these
changes. These informants also suggested moving away from vintage vehicles for many
of the same reliability and cost reasons mentioned in Memphis. Every other informant
agreed with these suggested changes to TECO Line service.
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Many informants also suggested making additional capital investments to extend the
TECO Line into areas with more trip attractors, particularly downtown Tampa and a transit
center located downtown, where the streetcar might connect with other transit services.
The regional planner was enthusiastic that extending the streetcar to the transit center
would allow riders to transfer to and from the line to access more destinations. The
streetcar advocate thought the streetcar likely needed to be extended to form a complete
loop around the downtown area.
The authors are pessimistic about the TECO Line, given the continuing decline in ridership
even after the Tampa area has begun to recover from the recession. Extending service
hours and reducing fares seem like logical steps to better leverage the existing capital
investment. However, the authors have serious questions about the wisdom of making
additional significant capital investments in a streetcar extension, given the track record
of the TECO Line’s performance to date and the Tampa area’s very low use of transit in
general. Improvements to the local bus system’s headways would likely result in larger
ridership gains than any improvements to the streetcar, although local bus service does
not have the same cachet as the streetcar.
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VI. LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Through this study, the authors sought to better understand the purpose, function, and
performance of modern-era streetcars in five U.S. cities. The authors discovered that in
these cities, the primary purpose of the streetcar was to serve as a development tool
(all cities), a second objective was to serve as a tourism promoting amenity (Little Rock,
Tampa), and transportation objectives were largely afterthoughts with the notable exception
of Portland and, to a lesser degree, Seattle. The cities’ different conceptions of streetcar
goals led to different decisions about alignment locations, rider markets to be targeted,
and service coordination (or lack thereof) with other local transit services, all of which in
turn affected the function the streetcars serve in the community and the transportation
performance that results.
In Little Rock and Tampa, the streetcars function as short circulator type services that cater
primarily to tourists and visitors, and the streetcars have poor transportation performance.
In Memphis, the more successful streetcar lines on Main Street and the Riverfront also
serve circulator functions and cater to visitors, but they enjoy better performance than
those in the other two cities. The difference in performance results across these three
cities might be a function of the different urban environments within which the streetcars
operate, with Memphis’ streetcars operating in a much denser urban environment. They
might also be a function of the health of the tourism sectors of the three local economies;
the tourism sectors in both Little Rock and Tampa have been quite economically depressed
since the 2008 recession.
In Seattle and Portland, the streetcars serve a wider variety of trip types as a result of the
somewhat different function they play in the local transit system. Informants in both cities
referred to the streetcars as “trip extenders,” which gives an indication of their somewhat
more utilitarian role. The ability of Portland’s streetcar in particular to serve a wide variety
of trips makes it much less dependent on the health of any one economic sector and
increases the number of possible trips the streetcar can serve. The streetcar also operates
within an area that already possesses a large number of potential trip generators and
attractors by virtue of the relatively large population and employment near the streetcar.
The authors briefly recap the key lessons from the performance investigation and key
informant interviews in the paragraphs that follow. The authors then conclude the main
part of the report with a set of recommendations for other cities contemplating making their
own streetcar investments.

LESSONS FROM STREETCAR PERFORMANCE INVESTIGATION
The authors’ investigation of the streetcar’s transportation performance had the following
results related to performance and possible explanations for variation in performance.
First, Portland emerged as the clear standout performer among the five streetcar cities
with respect to ridership as well as the key service performance measures, with Seattle
and Memphis in the next tier, and Little Rock and Tampa at the bottom. Portland had
by far the highest ridership and the best service productivity, and it ranked second to
Memphis with respect to cost-effectiveness measures. Portland was also the only city in
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which streetcar performance on both service productivity and cost effectiveness measures
surpasses that of the average local bus.
Second, the authors attributed the higher ridership and better service productivity in
Portland to a number of important local planning and policy decisions. Portland’s planners,
and to a lesser extent those in Seattle, made the key decision to locate the streetcar
in an area that either possessed, or had the strong economic potential to possess, the
population and/or employment necessary to generate higher levels of streetcar ridership.
Portland’s planners then worked to ensure that the streetcar was well connected with other
local transit services, with respect to stop locations, service schedules, and fare policy.
These decisions reflected a view held by Portland’s transit planners that the streetcar was
not just a development tool, which was the original rationale for its creation, but that it also
needed to function effectively as a transit service that catered to a broader ridership. The
positive experience in Portland suggests that cities that approach streetcars with transit
service objectives in mind are likely to have better ridership and performance results, all
else being equal. Portland now receives significant attention for its streetcar’s purported
role in economic development, but this study suggests that more might be learned from
how Portland approaches decisions related to its streetcar’s role as transportation.
Third, the authors attribute the lower ridership and poor performance in Little Rock and
Tampa to a combination of factors. The streetcars in these two cities were negatively
affected by the economic recession and its impact on tourism and convention activity.
Given that the streetcars were developed with a primary objective of serving this rider
market, it has proven difficult for either system to recover. A number of local policy decisions
about service hours, service frequencies, and fare levels have also undercut ridership.
In general, these two cities’ experiences emphasize that modern-era streetcar systems
that specialize in tourist travel markets are much more vulnerable to changes in broader
economic conditions than those that focus on serving a wider array of potential users.

LESSONS FROM KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS
The key informant interviews identified several important themes about streetcar planning
and operation in the five cities. These themes emerged across several of the case-study
cities.
First, in most cities the private sector emerged as the key set of actors in promoting
streetcar development. Private sector actors from the local development and downtown
business communities, as well streetcar advocacy groups, whose members often included
development and business community representatives, played critical roles in placing the
idea of a streetcar on the local policy agenda. In several cities, the private sector then
led the drive to implement the streetcar. The strong role played by developers in Seattle
in particular is noteworthy. These private actors then partnered with the public sector in
pursuing the financing necessary to build and operate the streetcar services.
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Second, the primary objective of modern streetcar implementation in these cities has been
development and urban revitalization of underused or declining urban cores. Transit has
been a secondary goal, at best, even in Portland where the streetcar has the strongest
transit performance. The primary focus on development objectives is perhaps unsurprising
given the strong role played by developers and other private actors. In most cities, the
streetcar was seen as a development “catalyst” that could jump-start economic activity
in an area. The streetcar also stood as a symbol of a “permanent” public commitment
to a particular area within the community. The streetcar’s symbolic role appeared to
be particularly important as its presence, and status as a public investment, reassured
developers and business owners that it was now “safe” for them to make their own private
economic investments in the same area.
Third, the streetcars in many cities have now taken on a symbolic role completely separate
from any transportation function. In three cities (Little Rock, Memphis, Tampa), they are
widely regarded as icons of the city, and they play a role in promoting the city to others
outside the community. It is no surprise that this role was most cited in the cities where
serving tourists is a key emphasis of the streetcar. The streetcar’s image as a symbol of
a bygone age—the nostalgia factor—also emerged in numerous interviews. Streetcars
seem to possess an image that makes them much more attractive to many individuals
than other transportation modes.
Fourth, strong support remains for the streetcar among key actors even in what appear
to be the most troubled streetcar cities. However, even the most supportive actors do
recognize the challenges facing their streetcar, whether due to financial difficulties,
declining ridership, or some other factor. These challenges are severe in cities such as
Tampa and Little Rock, although most of the actors still generally support the streetcar
investment decision.
Fifth, and finally, a real disconnect seems to exist between enthusiasm for the streetcar
and its transportation performance. In most of the studied cities, streetcar ridership is quite
low and compares quite unfavorably with the ridership on a local bus route operating in the
same general area. A strict transportation assessment would tend to regard a streetcar that
had lower ridership than a typical bus route as a misuse of scarce transportation resources.
But few of the informants tended to think in such terms. Instead, poor transportation
performance tended to be downplayed because the streetcar was not seen as primarily a
transportation investment but instead as something else.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OTHER CITIES
So, what should other cities take away from this study? The authors suggest a few key
lessons. First, the authors urge planners and policymakers to think very carefully about the
fundamental purpose of any proposed streetcar in their community and to proceed in all
their decision making with that fundamental purpose clearly in mind. The authors strongly
believe that a transportation investment should be primarily about providing transportation
service, and they would thus suggest first evaluating the streetcar versus other transportation
services on transportation criteria. However, even if the planners and policymakers have
another approach in mind, they should proceed carefully, clearly, and cautiously.
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Second, the authors urge people in other cities to approach the model of Portland with
much more caution. Many streetcar advocates point to Portland’s experience, and then
they proceed as if it could be easily replicated elsewhere. But the authors suggest that
Portland’s experience, whether in the form of its ridership or its development activity, is
the result of a unique combination of external factors (local population and employment
patterns, the health of the real estate market) and local decisions (land development policy
decisions, financial decisions, other public investments, streetcar alignment location and
length, streetcar operations decisions, streetcar fare policy decisions) that may or may not
be applicable elsewhere. The reality is much more complicated than it seems to appear
in many TCRP reports or consultant studies that have considered Portland’s experience.
Third, the authors urge people in other cities to beware of unintended consequences. Of
course, a streetcar is a major capital investment, and it also requires funding to operate
and maintain the service. Communities must think much more carefully about the wisdom
of a streetcar investment given the state of their local transit finances. In some cases, the
opening of a streetcar might necessitate later cuts in bus services, for example, when
budgets tighten. Such an outcome would seem to defeat any transportation rationale for
making a streetcar investment. Additionally, the decisions made early on about seemingly
trivial things, such as the type of vehicle to operate (modern, replica, or vintage), can have
significant consequences for operations and finances later on.
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APPENDIX A: PROFILE OF RIVER RAIL IN
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS
The first of the five case studies is Little Rock’s River Rail. According to our key local
informants, River Rail was explicitly built to serve visitors and promote economic
development in the two downtowns (Little Rock and North Little Rock) (Figure 12). River
Rail has the lowest ridership of the five case studies. Given its predominantly tourist and
visitor ridership, it is not surprising that ridership follows a strongly seasonal pattern and
depends highly on the health of the local convention and tourism markets. Ridership has
declined significantly since the 2008 recession.

Figure 12. A River Rail Streetcar in Operation61

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STREETCAR SERVICE
The River Rail Electric Streetcar operates on a 3.4-mile [5.47 kilometer] alignment that
serves 15 stops in the downtowns of the cities of Little Rock and North Little Rock, Arkansas.
There are five stops in North Little Rock (Main at 5th; Main at 7th; Maple at 6th; Maple at
Broadway; Verizon Plaza, 120 Main) and ten stops in Little Rock (Main St. Bridge Stop;
President Clinton Ave. at River Market Ave.; River Market Ave. at 3rd; Presidential Library/
Heifer Intl.; World Ave. at 3rd; 3rd at River Market Ave.; Main Library Stop, 2nd at Rock;
Historic Arkansas Museum Stop, 2nd at Scott; 2nd at Center; W. Markham at Spring; The
Peabody Little Rock Stop, Markham at Scott) (Figure 13). The $28.8 million River Rail
streetcar service began operation in 2004.
River Rail is operated by the Central Arkansas Transit Authority (CATA), which also operates
the local bus system. The streetcar system includes three streetcar vehicles that operate
primarily in mixed traffic, except for a dedicated segment on a bridge over the Arkansas
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River connecting Little Rock to North Little Rock. The River Rail functions as a short,
circulator system within and between the two downtowns. The physical characteristics of
the River Rail streetcar service, which consists of a blue line and a green line, are shown
in Table 14. The blue line provides north-south travel between the two cities’ downtowns,
along with east-west travel within downtown Little Rock. The green line provides east-west
travel solely within downtown Little Rock.

Figure 13. Map of River Rail Electric Streetcar in Little Rock, Arkansas62

Table 14. Physical Characteristics of Streetcar System in Little Rock63
Characteristic

Value

Year Open

2004

Capital Cost (unadjusted dollars)

$28,800,000

Number of Lines

2 (Blue, Green)

Number of Vehicles

3

Number of Stations

15

Length
Alignment Type*

3.4 miles
(5.47 km)
Exclusive

0.4 miles

Mixed Traffic

3.0 miles

*Note: Alignment Types are measured from Google Map. Accessed date: December 20th, 2013.
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In addition to operating River Rail streetcars, CATA also operates a bus system that
consists of 22 local routes and four express routes. The bus system is primarily focused
on the downtowns of Little Rock and North Little Rock, and thus it exhibits a largely radial
structure. According to the CATA website, most local bus routes operate on 20-minute
or 35-minute consistent all-day schedules during the week.64 As Figure 14 indicates,
River Rail is a very small piece of this local transit network, with service confined to the
downtowns of the two cities, whereas local bus routes provide service primarily into the
downtowns from many outer parts of the two communities. Figure 15 indicates that local
bus service exists in the area directly served by River Rail, particularly in downtown Little
Rock, where several bus routes provide potential connections to River Rail stops. The lack
of passenger transfer data means that there is no way to assess the degree to which riders
of one service also use the other. Our local transit informant suspects that little transfer
activity exists between modes, given the very different rider markets for bus and streetcar
transit in the community. Still, the fare structure, as noted later, is designed to permit crossmode transfers.

Figure 14. Map of Transit System in Little Rock, Arkansas65
According to Virginia Johnson, the manager of River Rail, “Our (three) streetcars consist
of vintage Birney double ended replica cars from Gomaco Trolley Company out of Ida
Grove, Iowa. We have limited dedicated ways of travel and no private boarding stations,
as these are located on city owned properties. We were only expected to cover about 25
percent of operating costs through fare revenue and have exceeded this to date. We are
all ADA compliant and have stop-level boarding. We average anywhere from 300 to 500
passengers daily and in upwards of 1600 on a typical peak season Saturday. Our ridership
varies, as the system is dependent upon weather, local events and time of year. Our peak
seasons are Spring and Summer.”66
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River Rail does not collect station-level boarding data, nor does it conduct rider surveys,
so this email communication, coupled with insights about rider markets gleaned from a key
transit informant interview, represent the extent of the team’s knowledge of the streetcar
service’s ridership derived from transit agency sources. The authors rely primarily on
National Transit Database (NTD) data and other external sources for their examination of
River Rail’s mode-level ridership, service, and performance, discussed later in the profile.
The lack of regular data collection reflects the River Rail’s primary local role as a downtown
amenity and tourist-oriented service as opposed to a service geared toward serving more
traditional transit riders. This specific riding market emphasis can be seen in the River Rail’s
service characteristics, which are shown in Table 15. The River Rail operates service at a
consistent 25-minute headway across weekdays and weekends, as well as during peak
travel periods and off-peak periods. The service operates for more hours of the day toward
the end of the week than it does earlier in the week. It does not begin operation until after
the weekday morning peak hours, so the streetcar operations do not interfere with, nor are
negatively impacted by, rush-hour auto travel. Both of these service attributes denote a
service that is not focused on regular utilitarian transit riders. The blue line provides service
seven days a week, while the green line operates Monday through Saturday. Table 16 shows
that fares are low and transfers are free between buses and River Rail, but not between River
Rail and bus. This difference is due to the streetcar fare being lower than the local bus fare.
No passenger transfer data are available to assess the amount of transfer activity between
River Rail and local buses, although the local transit informant suspects little transfer activity
occurs, given the predominantly visitor-based streetcar ridership and predominantly transitdependent bus ridership.
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Figure 15. Map of River Rail and Local Buses in Core of Little Rock, Arkansas67

Table 15. Service Characteristics of Streetcar System in Little Rock68
Characteristic

Value

Headways
Weekday Peak

25 min

Weekday Off-Peak

25 min

Weekend Average

25 min

Hours of Service
Monday-Wednesday

14 hr

Thursday-Saturday

16 hr

Sunday

7 hr
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Table 16. Fare and Transfer Policy for Transit Services in Little Rock69
Characteristic

Type

Fare Type

Base fare

$1.00

*Reduced fare

$0.50

Pass Type

Persons age 4 & under

Free

Day Pass

$2.00

3-Day Pass

$5.00

20-Ride Card
Transfer Fee

Cost ($)

**Bus/Streetcar

$15.00
--

Notes:
* Senior 65 years and older, persons age 5-11, and people with disabilities receive fares at a reduced price.
** Transfers are free from bus to streetcar but not streetcar to bus.

SOCIOECONOMIC AND BUILT ENVIRONMENT CONTEXT FOR STREETCAR
SERVICE
The River Rail streetcar operates within the downtown areas of two cities: Little Rock
and North Little Rock. The authors examined the socioeconomic characteristics and the
built-environment contexts within which River Rail operates as part of the study, given
the importance of these factors for transit ridership in other communities. The authors
believed that a consideration of these factors would provide some explanation for the
level of ridership on River Rail and the particular rider market being served. A discussion
of these issues follows in the next several pages.
At the time of the 2010 census, the city of Little Rock had a population of just under 194,000
people, and the city of North Little Rock had just over 62,000 people; the metropolitan area
population was just under 700,000.70 Most streetcar service is concentrated in Little Rock
proper, although the service connects the two downtowns. The city’s median household
income was just over $45,000 per year, while 18 percent of the population lived below the
poverty line. The city population was more than 42 percent black and 49 percent white at
the time of the census; the Latino population accounted for about 7 percent of the city’s
total population. North Little Rock’s median household income was about $39,000 per
year, and 22 percent of the population lived below the poverty line. In 2010, North Little
Rock’s population was about 54 percent white, 40 percent black, and 6 percent Latino.
Figures 16 and 17 display city-scale population and population density of the two cities,
both by 2010 census block group. Looking over the two maps, one notes that the block
groups in the areas in and around the two downtowns have comparatively low populations,
particularly compared with the areas to the southwest and northwest of the downtowns.
However, the population densities are moderately high. The highest population density
areas in the downtowns appear to be located near, but not immediately adjacent to, River
Rail stops.
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Figure 16. Population by Block Group in Little Rock (2010)71

Figure 17. Population Density by Block Group in Little Rock (2010)72
Figures 18 and 19 focus on population and population density, respectively, in the areas
immediately surrounding the streetcar lines. In these maps, the river is the empty space
running east-west through the lower portion of the maps. Little Rock’s downtown is at
the bottom of the maps and, North Little Rock’s downtown at the top of the maps. The
maps highlight the patterns already noted above. River Rail’s alignment takes it through
areas of low-to-moderate populations, with the southeastern terminus in an area of very
low relative population. Population density in the latter area is below the city’s average,
while population densities in the former areas are in the general range of the city average.
These are clearly not major population centers in either community.
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Figure 18. Population by Block Group in Core of Little Rock (2010)73

Figure 19. Population Density by Block Group in Core of Little Rock (2010)74
Population represents potential origins for many trips, including by transit, while employment
can represent potential destinations for trips. Figures 20 and 21 display employment and
employment density, respectively, for the Little Rock area. The maps indicate that the areas
to the west and south of the downtowns have larger numbers of jobs than the downtown
areas. There are several dense employment centers located outside the downtowns,
including just south and just west of downtown Little Rock, in the west-northwest section
of Little Rock, and just north of the North Little Rock downtown segment of the River Rail.
Figures 22 and 23 depict the same phenomena solely in the core areas of downtown Little
Rock and downtown North Little Rock. They also reemphasize that the downtowns are
only moderately sized and moderately dense employment centers.
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Figure 21. Employment Density by Block Group in Little Rock (2010)76
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Figure 22. Employment by Block Group in Core of Little Rock (2010)77

Figure 23. Employment Density by Block Group in Core of Little Rock (2010)78
Based on population or employment (or their density counterparts), which are among the
variables most strongly associated with transit ridership, the areas within which the River
Rail operates would not appear to be the most promising locations for attracting traditional
transit riders to use transit. In fact, this is not surprising, given the primarily tourist market
orientation of the River Rail streetcar. As Figure 24 depicts, while the downtown areas
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might possess only moderate employment densities and relatively modest population
levels, they do possess a number of destinations that are important for tourists. These
special activity centers include museums, libraries, and historic buildings. In North Little
Rock, there is a cluster of such sites around the streetcar line. In Little Rock, significant
clusters are located around the streetcar line, as well as to the south of the alignment.
The Clinton Presidential Library serves as the terminus of the line in the eastern part of
downtown Little Rock. River Rail is thus positioned to provide access to and across many
of these locations, highlighting its role as a tourist and visitor oriented downtown circulator
service in the two downtowns.

Figure 24. Special Activity Centers in Core of Little Rock (2012)79
As part of the exploration of socioeconomic conditions in the community, the authors
examined the spatial distribution of a number of demographic and socioeconomic
variables obtained from the U.S. Census. As noted earlier, Little Rock has a sizeable
black population and a growing Hispanic population. Figures 25 and 26 depict the spatial
distribution of the black population, highlighting the larger black populations in the eastern
and southern portions of the two communities. The latter map also notes the relatively high
black population shares among the residents of the block groups in the two downtowns.
Figures 27 and 28 note that the white population tends to be higher in the northern and
western portions of the community. This would suggest a degree of residential segregation
by race. The white population share is moderately high in the downtown areas served by
River Rail.
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Figure 25. Black Population by Block Group in Little Rock (2010)80

Figure 26. Black Population by Block Group in Core of Little Rock (2010)81
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Figure 27. White Population by Block Group in Little Rock (2010)82

Figure 28. White Population by Block Group in Core of Little Rock (2010)83
The Hispanic population is higher in the southern and western parts of Little Rock and
in scattered locations in North Little Rock (including its downtown) (Figures 29 and 30).
However, the high-value categories for the Hispanic population share represent much
smaller numbers than for the prior two groups due to its much smaller size in the total
population. The Asian population share is much higher in the western portion of Little Rock
and is very small in the areas served by River Rail (Figures 31 and 32).
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Figure 29. Hispanic Population by Block Group in Little Rock (2010)84

Figure 30. Hispanic Population by Block Group in Core of Little Rock (2010)85
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Figure 31. Asian Population by Block Group in Little Rock (2010)86

Figure 32. Asian Population by Block Group in Core of Little Rock (2010)87
Two of the key socioeconomic correlates of transit use are household income and vehicle
access, which tend to be related to one another. The spatial distribution of median household
incomes is shown in Figures 33 and 34. From the first map, one sees that the areas around
the downtowns fall into the lower tier for household incomes. Income levels increase to the
northwest and north of the two downtowns. These higher income areas are also the locations
of larger white and Asian population shares, as noted on the preceding maps. Areas in the
downtown core and to the south of the downtowns tend to have lower incomes; these were
areas with higher black population shares, as noted in the preceding maps.
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Figure 33. Median Household Income by Block Group in Little Rock (2010)88

Figure 34. Median Household Income by Block Group in Core of Little Rock (2010)89
The spatial pattern of vehicle ownership is similar to that for household income and is also
closely linked with the transit commute share. Figures 35 and 36 depict the spatial pattern
of vehicle access, mapped as vehicles per housing unit. The maps indicate higher numbers
of vehicles per housing unit the further one moves out from the downtown cores. The
downtown areas served by River Rail tend to fall into the lower vehicle-access categories.
The transit commute share follows a similar spatial pattern as shown in Figures 37 and 38.
The areas near the core have higher transit commute mode shares, while the areas further
away tend to have lower transit commute shares.
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Figure 35. Vehicles per Housing Unit by Census Tract in Little Rock (2010)90

Figure 36. Vehicles per Housing Unit by Census Tract in Core of Little Rock (2010)91
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Figure 37. Transit Commute Share by Block Group in Little Rock (2010)92

Figure 38. Transit Commute Share by Block Group in Core of Little Rock (2010)93
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In summarizing the socioeconomic conditions in Little Rock and North Little Rock, the
two downtowns do not emerge as major population centers and are modest employment
centers within the context of local employment patterns. The downtowns do have lower
levels of household vehicle access and high levels of transit commute usage. Overall, the
downtowns thus possess some of the attributes that scholars have linked to high transit
use but are deficient in some others.
However, the two downtowns do possess a large number of special activity centers,
including museums, hotels, and historic sites, that cater to visitors. The River Rail lines
provide access to many of these locations in the two downtowns, and the largest site, the
Clinton Presidential Library, sits at the eastern end of the line. All of this seems to indicate
a River Rail planning strategy of catering toward a visitor rider market as opposed to
traditional transit-dependent riders or even resident-choice riders. The authors explore
this issue in more detail later in this profile.
The authors also considered the built environment context within which River Rail
operates. The streetcar alignment lies in areas where larger footprint structures exist,
which suggests venues that might host higher-intensity activities or events. Figure 39
shows the building footprints on both North Little Rock and Little Rock, together with the
alignment of the River Rail streetcar and 400m [one quarter mile] pedestrian service area.
Structures in Little Rock seem to be larger than those of North Little Rock, although North
Little Rock accommodates two large sport venues and a hotel at walkable distances from
streetcar alignment and stops: Verizon Arena and Dickey Stephens Park (baseball), and
the Wyndham Little Rock Hotel. On the other hand, North Little Rock accommodates a
variety of activities – cultural, commercial, and recreational, among others – that could
complement the entertainment/assembly type activities on the north bank of the Arkansas
River. As such, the link across the river potentially expands the number of potential activities
riders could reach within the streetcar-serviced areas.
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Figure 39. Building Footprint and Urban Morphology, Little Rock (2014)94
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In both North Little Rock and Little Rock, vacant parcels and large parking lots are
noticeable along the streetcar alignment. However, transit commute share for North Little
Rock (shown earlier in Figures 37 and 38) exhibit larger values as compared with Little
Rock, although the specific modal split of transit is not specified (i.e., bus vs. streetcar).
Both North Little Rock and Little Rock exhibit traditional orthogonal grid street network
with similar block size (2.53 acres [1.02 hectares]). Based on aerial images in both North
Little Rock and Little Rock, sidewalks are provided along the streetcar alignment and
at least one block away from alignment. Trees populate some street segments along
Little Rock’s East-West alignment and North Little Rock North-South alignment. These
physical characteristics would make a favorable walking environment for potential River
Rail streetcar patrons, although the existing quality of the infrastructure was not assessed
as part of this study.
Figure 40 exhibits land value ranges for a wide area surrounding streetcar alignment
in North Little Rock and Little Rock (1:35000 scale). It is apparent that the River Rail
trolley has been deployed in areas within or adjacent to medium-to-high land value areas
relative to the Pulaski County sample (upper quintile; >$30.65/sq. meter). A downtown
revitalization effort was put forward by the City of Little Rock in 1995, of which the streetcar
formed part. A recent economic development report prepared by transit agency staff claims
that one billion dollars in capital investments occurred within the streetcar-serviced areas
between 2000 and 2012.95 The purported effect of this revitalization initiative and streetcar
re-implementation might then be reflected as higher land values in downtown and streetcarserved areas.
Figure 41 provides a more detailed view (1:15000 scale) of land value patterns within the
two downtowns. The map indicates that the parcels adjacent to the streetcar in North Little
Rock tend to have more consistently high land values than those in Little Rock, which is
undoubtedly a reflection of the different land uses in each case.
In summary, the areas within which the streetcars operate tend to possess the types of
attributes one would expect from a visitor- and tourist-oriented service as opposed to a
traditional transit service catering to transit-dependent riders. The downtowns are not the
highest density centers for population or employment, although employment levels are
moderately high. Land values are in the moderate-to-high range, although the downtowns
are not the only major clusters of high land-value parcels. The downtowns do possess
a large number of special activity centers, including historic sites, museums, libraries,
hotels, and arena and convention facilities that visitors might wish to access. The streetcar
appears to do a good job of physically connecting many of these locations.
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Figure 40. Land Values in Little Rock and North Little Rock Downtowns96
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Figure 41. Land Values in Little Rock and North Little Rock Downtown Cores97
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON STREETCAR DEVELOPMENT
Little Rock, Arkansas, like many cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, supported
an urban streetcar system. Arkansas Power & Light owned the electric Birney streetcars,
which were originally horse cars in 1876 and then upgraded to steam-powered cars in
1888, and the rail system. This streetcar system was quite influential for Little Rock, as it
helped catalyze growth that allowed the residents to live outside of downtown, but it still
granted them the privilege of being connected to the urban environment.98 It is no surprise
that Little Rock expanded, developing new residential areas like Pulaski Heights and North
Little Rock and increasing its population from around 13,000 to almost 26,000 during the
1880s alone.99 However, despite the streetcars’ early popularity and urban influence, Little
Rock’s streetcar system soon faced declining ridership as a result of the rapid increase of
automobile use in the early to mid-20th century. By December 24, 1947, the Little Rock
streetcar system had become obsolete and was shut down.100
Fast-forward 48 years to 1995, the Central Arkansas Transit Authority (CATA) planned to
bring streetcars back to Little Rock as part of a downtown revitalization. CATA planned to
use a new streetcar system, the River Rail, as a means of attracting tourists. The plan was
not only to use the streetcar itself as an attraction, but also to transport streetcar riders to
other important landmarks and venues throughout Little Rock.101 CATA’s leadership and
other downtown interest group leaders believed the streetcar would encourage downtown
living, help spur economic development (job/business growth), and attract more visitors.
Other advocates believed the streetcar would be a better transportation option for the
urbanizing city. One supporter told reporters “we simply cannot afford to build all the roads
and highways or expand enough to move the number of cars needed to come in.”102
Supporters also pointed to possible air quality improvements spurred by the streetcar
reducing automobile usage. The streetcar plan received legislative backing in 1996.103
A year later, a feasibility study was completed for the River Rail, and in 1998, CATA applied
for funding through the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) New Starts/Small Starts
Section 5309 grant program. The original proposal was for a 1.9-mile [3.05 kilometer]
overhead-cable electric streetcar system, including seven vintage streetcars and seven
stations that would connect North Little Rock, along with its Alltel Arena, with the key areas
of downtown Little Rock such as the River Market.104 The plan was to utilize some part of
Little Rock’s existing streetcar track along with several existing terminals. CATA estimated
the total cost for the project to be $7.6 million. However, the FTA approximated total costs
of $8.28 million, of which 80 percent would be federally funded under Section 5309.105
The remaining amount of capital cost, as well as all future operating costs, was to be
split among the three major beneficiaries of the grant: Little Rock, North Little Rock, and
Pulaski County. Estimated annual operating costs were approximately $500,000, and daily
projected ridership was between 1,000 and 1,200, with a possible high of 1,800 on special
event days.106
The proposal was spared the burden of undertaking a Major Investment Study (MIS)
because of the project’s limited scale. It also was exempt from meeting certain New
Starts criteria due to its relatively low cost.107 In January 1998, upon Central Arkansas’
Metropolitan Planning Organization (Metroplan) decision to include the River Rail project
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in its long-range transportation plan Metro 2020, the proposal was approved, despite
its low FTA project ratings. Under TEA-21 Section 3030 (a)(36), the final design of the
River Rail was approved, and CATA was granted $2.98 million for the 1999 fiscal year.
Preliminary engineering was set to start in May 1998 and end a year later.108 Problems
arose in March, however, when the Amalgamated Transit Union held up the money for
preliminary engineering because it was trying to secure the right to use existing employees
for the new jobs that would be generated by the River Rail. However, by August, with the
help of the U.S. Department of Labor, the Union was not given its employee protection
rights, and the money was approved.109
Following up the 1998 proposal, in November 1999 and 2000, the FTA and CATA made
several changes to the River Rail construction and financing plan. The revised plan
included 0.2 miles [0.32 kilometers] of extra streetcar rail, one more terminal station, and
also a proposal for an additional 0.4-mile [0.64 kilometers] double-track extension and two
more streetcars.110 As a result of these additions, the FTA estimated the project to cost
approximately $13.2 million, of which it would be responsible for $8.6 million.111 Accordingly,
annual projected operating costs rose to $700,000. CATA received authorization to spend
$5.94 million through the 2001 fiscal year, and regular River Rail service was forecasted
to begin in late 2002.112
By early 2001, CATA began reviewing bids for the first River Rail construction phase and
began receiving bids for the 0.4-mile [0.64 kilometers] second construction phase, which
would bring the entire line out to 3.4 miles [5.47 kilometers] and connect it to the Clinton
Presidential Library. The City of Little Rock would be responsible for the majority (around
42 percent) of the funding for the second phase because the loop would run only within
its city limits.113 Throughout the second half of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, other bids
were advertised that included building the streetcar maintenance barn, completion of a
traction power system, and “modifying the Main Street Bridge to carry trolleys.”114 Gomaco
Trolley Co. had been retained to provide vintage streetcars for the line and reported the
first one to be complete by December 2001.
Midway through 2002, CATA encountered several issues that slowed construction
progress and inflated project costs. Among these issues was difficulty with the local
utility company, the inaccurate estimation of the trolley barn expenses, and prolonged
negotiations with the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department over the Main
Street Bridge modifications.115
CATA experienced other problems during this time, as well. One major problem was that
city funding for public transit was being reduced for the upcoming year – 2003. This would
put CATA more than $200,000 over the estimated budget, not including the revenue loss.
To retain the streetcar, CATA proposed cutting several bus routes. This proposal received
intense opposition from those who used the bus system to travel to and from work. Many of
these same people were upset that the streetcar project would continue, as they believed
the money to fund its development should go to save the bus routes. Other users offered
to pay higher fares to save the major bus routes.116 Eventually, a compromise that included
a fare increase, some staff layoffs, and reduction of other services saved the bus routes
from elimination.117
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By the time it came to choosing a contractor for final construction in early 2003, Little Rock
officials hesitated to move on with the streetcar development. With the recent increases
in total projected costs, the officials were not ready to commit to the project until they
discovered more precisely how much the streetcar system would cost and whether or not
they, along with the other contributors, would find the revenues necessary to fund it. One
city director stated, “I cannot see us moving forward until we know what kind of liability
we have.”118 After some time reviewing the plan, Little Rock officials became comfortable
enough to move on, and on April 17, 2003, CATA finally agreed to a contract with Mobley
Contractors to begin construction on the streetcar track and its power supply.119 Gomaco
completed three, not the originally envisioned eight, vintage streetcars just four months
later.120 The first phase of streetcar track was completed in August 2004, and testing started
in September.121
As of July 2004, just four months before the River Rail opening, CATA operated 73 buses
that serviced 7,805 miles during the weekday; the service miles for Saturday and Sunday
were 5,648 and 1,576 respectively.122 The bus service had an average fixed route daily
passenger ridership of 7,000 to 8,000 trips. A number of Little Rock citizens and leaders
questioned the River Rail investment instead, advocating bus service expansion as a
more effective means of increasing ridership. Nevertheless, the CATA leadership remained
committed to streetcar development. A number of new concerns also emerged at about
this time, including the large size of the streetcars and the possible elimination of parking to
accommodate this size. According to The Arkansas Times, however, only 12 parking spots
were eventually removed, and these were replaced with a new parking structure of more
than 250 spaces. Some observers complained about the final price tag of $19.6 million for
the first construction phase, which was approximately $6 million over original estimates that
included the extensions.123 Nevertheless, on November 1, 2004, the River Rail streetcar
system officially began service with operations on the first phase of the system.124
During the year following its opening, streetcars on the first phase of the River Rail
carried nearly 200,000 riders. However, many people complained about the streetcar
not generating even half of its expected fare revenue, and they noted that the streetcars
usually were void of riders.125
Supporters mobilized to defend the system. According to an Arkansas Times article written
later in 2006, “…the River Rail project has met and exceeded all local goals regarding
ridership, supporting economic development, supporting convention and concert events…
and other intangible and tangible benefits alike.”126 Other supporters pointed to the
increasing development activity along the line. These development-related arguments
were used to justify the funding of the second phase extension to the federal government.
After receiving this additional federal funding, construction for the second phase of the
River Rail, which would cost an additional $9.2 million, was under way in January 2006.127
This would bring the total streetcar system cost to $28.8 million. One of the two new
streetcars arrived in April, with the other on its way.128 A year later, on April 17, 2007, the
second phase of the River Rail began service.129
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Since the new phase’s opening, additional plans have emerged for streetcar extensions.
In October 2007, Metroplan unveiled plans to connect the River Rail to the Little Rock
National Airport.130 This idea had been discussed since the inception of the original River
Rail line. After a lengthy feasibility study that ended in mid-2009, Metroplan’s consulting
group presented its findings to the MPO’s officials. The consultants identified several
possible streetcar routes and estimated the project to cost anywhere from $70 million
to $105 million.131 The MPO officials quickly realized that the new streetcar line was too
expensive, and according to a local judge, “’the economic development it created was
not going to be enough…to warrant an investment of these kinds of dollars.”132 The plan
to have the River Rail connect to the airport was not completely abandoned, but those
involved in streetcar promotion began looking to other projects that were regarded as
having greater potential economic benefits. Among these other projects was an extension
of the River Rail in North Little Rock.133
In April 2010, North Little Rock’s mayor submitted a request for “a feasibility study for a
northern extension of the River Rail.”134 The study would also include plans to replace an
old viaduct that was located along where the new River Rail line was designed to run. The
request was approved. In May 2010, the North Little Rock City Council began to apply
for federal funding, for both the River Rail extension and the viaduct replacement, from
the TIGER II grant program.135 Costs were projected to be around $70 million. During
this same time, Little Rock initiated a study to extend the River Rail along its Main Street.
Some critics believed it was not the right time for further streetcar investment, especially
considering the lack of ridership on the current lines. They again advocated spending
additional funds on bus services as a better ridership attraction strategy.136
In late 2011, CATA officials gathered to generate ideas on how to increase people’s interest
in the River Rail. After seven years of River Rail service, local residents tended to have
a predominantly negative attitude toward the streetcar, which was considered a tourist
attraction and not a transit service for area residents. According to many critical observers,
the streetcar was usually empty, had slow service, and was “a waste of money.”137 Some
critics proposed that streetcar service stop during the weekdays and that the service run
only on the weekends as a means to save costs. Advocates of the River Rail, which largely
included city and CATA officials, thought these feelings were misguided, and they did not
think people understood how influential the streetcar was in the growth of the downtown
area. This disconnect between their view and the predominant public sentiment led to
CATA attempting to create a better marketing strategy for the River Rail.138
Nevertheless, despite the negative local public sentiment, plans for future extensions
have continued to materialize. A second study that focused on extending the streetcar in
either Little Rock or North Little Rock was completed in September 2011. The River Rail
Airport Study: Phase Two listed the goals of providing efficient transportation alternatives,
promoting transit-oriented development, continuing studies for expanding the River Rail
within central Arkansas, and exploring possible travel demand for the airport extension of
the streetcar.139 No specific action was taken on this plan, and as of January 2014, River
Rail expansion options still remain in the planning stages with no specific plan option
ready for approval.
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STREETCAR RIDERSHIP AND SERVICE PERFORMANCE
As noted earlier, Little Rock’s transit system consists of River Rail streetcar service and
local and express bus service operated by CATA. The authors examined ridership, service,
and performance characteristics, and they looked for trends in these indicators, for both
the River Rail (streetcar) and bus modes from River Rail’s opening in 2004 through 2012.
The following analytic focus is solely on fixed-route service operated by CATA.
The authors began by considering ridership trends, using data obtained from the NTD.
Table 17 reports mode-level annual ridership using unlinked passenger trips (boardings)
and passenger miles as different measures of transit usage. Ridership data are reported
for River Rail (streetcar), bus, and total (which here represents the total of streetcar
and bus). Whether using unlinked passenger trips or passenger miles as the ridership
measure, the table clearly indicates that streetcar ridership has generally declined from its
high point in the years immediately following the opening of the first line in 2004, even as
bus ridership has experienced a steady increase over the same time period. Over most
of the time period reported in the table, streetcar ridership has accounted for between 5
and 6 percent of total transit patronage on a boardings basis and between 1 and 2 percent
of total transit patronage on a passenger-miles basis. The significant difference between
these two numbers is a function of the sizeable differences in the average trip lengths
(passenger miles divided by unlinked passenger trips) for streetcar versus bus trips. The
average trip length by streetcar over this time period is typically between 1.5 and 1.6 miles,
whereas the average bus trip is three times that distance. These trip length differences
reflect the very different functions the two modes play locally, with the streetcar playing a
downtown circulator role and the buses providing longer-distance service predominantly
destined from outer areas into the downtowns.

Table 17. Annual Ridership by Mode in Little Rock (2004-2012)140
Unlinked Passenger Trips

Passenger Miles

Year

Streetcar

Bus

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Total

2004

44,457

1,954,394

1,998,851

62,723

7,284,202

7,346,925

2005

154,745

2,127,711

2,282,456

249,060

7,882,839

8,131,899

2006

154,432

2,202,262

2,356,694

248,950

8,158,462

8,407,412

2007

154,644

2,243,697

2,398,341

249,052

8,311,218

8,560,270

2008

134,204

2,452,572

2,586,776

206,752

13,371,780

13,587,352

2009

119,758

2,343,232

2,462,990

183,751

12,752,928

12,936,679

2010

107,088

2,369,500

2,476,588

165,718

12,890,930

13,056,648

2011

136,380

2,581,334

2,717,714

240,083

14,420,147

14,660,230

2012

104,868

2,823,614

2,928,482

162,616

15,788,380

15,950,996

The authors also obtained monthly NTD ridership data for 2012, which is the primary
focus year for the study. Monthly ridership data are available only for unlinked passenger
trips; these data are shown in Table 18 for streetcar, bus, and total fixed-route (streetcar
plus bus) modes. The table clearly indicates that streetcar ridership on River Rail has a
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seasonal pattern that is not evident in bus patronage. River Rail patronage is much higher
from March to July than it is during the remainder of the year; River Rail ridership reaches
its peak in May. By contrast, bus patronage is remarkably consistent from month to month
over the course of the year. These data tend to support the idea of River Rail playing, at
least to a significant degree, a tourist- and visitor-serving role in the local transit system.

Table 18. Monthly Unlinked Passenger Trips by Mode in Little Rock (2012)141
Unlinked Passenger Trips
Month
January
February

Streetcar

Bus

Total

5,236

228,516

233,752

5,049

229,539

234,588

March

13,650

235,754

249,404

April

11,506

224,623

236,129

May

16,536

231,605

248,141

June

10,420

228,591

239,011

July

10,221

232,505

242,726

August

7,310

264,866

272,176

September

5,915

241,047

246,962

October

5,855

264,784

270,639

November

5,589

236,160

241,749

December

7,531

205,626

213,157

While River Rail ridership has declined in recent years from its earlier peak, its service
levels have been relatively stable. Table 19 reports annual service characteristics for
streetcar, bus, and the total for fixed-route modes (streetcar plus bus) from 2004-2012.
Service is reported on a revenue-hours and revenue-miles basis, which also allows
average modal speeds to be calculated for each of the fixed-route modes operated by
CATA. The table clearly shows an increase in streetcar service with the extension of the
streetcar line in 2007, but since then service has been stable. Bus service levels have
also been relatively stable throughout this time period. The far panel of the table highlights
the much lower average speed of the streetcar versus the typical bus in Little Rock. The
streetcar’s downtown location undoubtedly explains some of this difference in average
speeds between the modes.
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Table 19. Annual Service Characteristics by Mode in Little Rock (2004-2012)142
Vehicle Revenue Miles
Year
2004

Streetcar
6,353

Vehicle Revenue Hours

Average Speed (VRM/VRH)

Bus

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Total

2,242,987

2,249,340

1,322

157,294

158,616

4.81

14.26

14.18

2005

37,041

2,243,292

2,280,333

8,072

157,056

165,128

4.59

14.28

13.81

2006

37,475

2,261,395

2,298,870

8,107

157,311

165,418

4.62

14.38

13.90

2007

52,256

2,262,758

2,315,014

11,866

157,419

169,285

4.40

14.37

13.68

2008

53,000

2,270,240

2,323,240

11,992

157,936

169,928

4.42

14.37

13.67

2009

53,903

2,317,039

2,370,942

12,087

161,616

173,703

4.46

14.34

13.65

2010

52,702

2,288,542

2,341,244

11,848

158,732

170,580

4.45

14.42

13.73

2011

54,901

2,343,053

2,397,954

12,535

162,409

174,944

4.38

14.43

13.71

2012

54,668

2,307,906

2,362,574

12,436

162,174

174,610

4.40

14.23

13.53

Inflation-adjusted operating expenses for both transit modes have increased slightly over
the recent time period, as shown in Table 20. These operating expense increases are a
function of increased streetcar service at the time the 2007 extension was opened and the
general cost increases associated with transit operation.

Table 20. Annual Operating Expense by Mode in Little Rock (2004-2012)143
Streetcar
Year

Unadjusted $

Bus
2012 $

Total

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

2004

$224,289

$272,614

$8,917,040

$10,838,287

$9,141,329

$11,110,901

2005

$547,066

$643,146

$9,649,901

$11,344,686

$10,196,967

$11,987,832

2006

$552,363

$629,080

$10,479,779

$11,935,304

$11,032,142

$12,564,384

2007

$708,625

$784,854

$10,385,409

$11,502,604

$11,094,034

$12,287,459

2008

$818,119

$872,445

$11,108,147

$11,845,773

$11,926,266

$12,718,219

2009

$898,802

$961,908

$11,427,069

$12,229,383

$12,325,871

$13,191,291

2010

$1,007,510

$1,060,848

$11,358,249

$11,959,561

$12,365,759

$13,020,409

2011

$942,933

$962,472

$12,187,047

$12,439,577

$13,129,980

$13,402,049

2012

$1,007,601

$1,007,601

$12,564,460

$12,564,460

$13,572,061

$13,572,061

The combination of declining River Rail ridership over a period characterized by stable
service levels and modestly increasing service expenditures has resulted in a deterioration
of the streetcar’s performance on both cost effectiveness (operating expense per
passenger trip) and service productivity (passenger miles per vehicle miles) measures, as
shown in Table 21. Streetcar cost effectiveness was at its best in the years immediately
after the River Rail’s opening, as was service productivity. Since then, both measures
have experienced steady declines. In contrast to the deteriorating streetcar performance,
local bus service has become more cost effective and more productive over the same
time period. Thus, transit in Little Rock presents a tale of two modes heading in different
directions. The authors’ local informants suggest that the decline in streetcar ridership
results largely from the effects of the recent recession on convention and visitor activity
in the community. They believe that the bus service is not as sensitive to these same
phenomena due to its focus on a traditional local transit riding market.
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Table 21. Service Performance by Mode in Little Rock (2004-2012)

Year

Cost Effectiveness

Service Productivity

(Operating Expense per Passenger Trip, 2012$)

(Passenger Miles per Vehicle Mile)

Streetcar

Bus

Streetcar

Bus

2004

$6.13

$5.55

9.87

3.25

2005

$4.16

$5.33

6.72

3.51

2006

$4.07

$5.42

6.64

3.61

2007

$5.08

$5.13

4.77

3.67

2008

$6.50

$4.83

3.90

5.89

2009

$8.03

$5.22

3.41

5.50

2010

$9.91

$5.05

3.14

5.63

2011

$7.06

$4.82

4.37

6.15

2012

$9.61

$4.45

2.97

6.84

Note: Values calculated from Tables A-4, A-6, and A-7.

Tables 22 and 23 summarize the ridership and performance information for the River Rail
streetcar on an annual basis from 2004-2012 and on a monthly basis for 2012, respectively.
Summarizing the information discussed earlier and recapitulated in these tables, the River
Rail experienced an early surge in ridership that has since declined even as service levels
and expenditures have stabilized at higher levels due to the expansion of the streetcar
service in 2007. Productivity has declined and cost effectiveness has diminished as a
result. River Rail ridership is seasonal in nature, with much ridership concentrated during
the peak tourist months. This fact, combined with the relatively short trip lengths on this
relatively slow system, supports the notion that the system’s primary market likely consists
of tourists and others who are visiting the city, as opposed to a market consisting of local
residents and/or regular riders. This suggestion cannot be confirmed through any rider
surveys, as River Rail does not collect much data on its users, but it is in accord with
information learned during the authors’ discussions with River Rail staff.

Table 22. Summary of Streetcar Ridership, Service, and Performance by Year in
Little Rock (2004-2012)144
Year

Unlinked
Passenger Trips

Passenger
Miles

Vehicle
Revenue Miles

Vehicle
Revenue Hours

2004

44,457

62,723

6,353

1,322

2005

154,745

249,060

37,041

8,072

2006

154,432

248,950

37,475

8,107

2007

154,644

249,052

52,256

11,866

2008

134,204

206,572

53,000

11,992

2009

119,758

183,751

53,903

12,087

2010

107,088

165,718

52,702

11,848

2011

136,380

240,083

54,901

12,535

2012

104,868

162,616

54,668

12,436
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Year

Productivity
(PM/VM)

Cost
Effectiveness

Speed
(VRM/VRH)

Average Trip
Length (PM/UPT)

2004

9.87

$6.13

4.81

1.41

2005

6.72

$4.16

4.59

1.61

2006

6.64

$4.07

4.62

1.61

2007

4.77

$5.08

4.40

1.61

2008

3.90

$6.50

4.42

1.54

2009

3.41

$8.03

4.46

1.53

2010

3.14

$9.91

4.45

1.55

2011

4.37

$7.06

4.38

1.76

2012

2.97

$9.61

4.40

1.55

Table 23. Summary of Streetcar Ridership and Service by Month in Little Rock
(2012)145
Month

Unlinked Passenger Trips

Vehicle Revenue Miles

Vehicle Revenue Hours

January

5,236

4,618

1,050

February

5,049

4,122

938

13,650

4,832

1,098

April

11,506

4,438

1,028

May

16,536

4,636

1,054

June

10,420

4,569

1,042

July

March

10,221

4,524

1,028

August

7,310

4,814

1,094

September

5,915

4,383

996

October

5,855

4,777

1,086

November

5,589

4,477

1,018

December

7,531

4,383

996

INSIGHTS FROM KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS
In addition to collecting and analyzing quantitative data and documentary evidence, the
authors conducted one-hour semi-structured telephone interviews with key informants in
the Little Rock region who provided their perspectives on streetcar goals, performance,
and future prospects. Informants representing a diverse set of perspectives, including
regional planning, transit planning, and the local tourism promotion industry, participated in
the interviews. These informants were identified through documents or were suggested by
other interviewees as pertinent informants, given the nature of the questions the authors
hoped to address.
The authors sought to use the interviews to complement the insights developed from their
quantitative assessment discussed earlier and to identify hard-to-quantify phenomena
that might impact people’s perceptions of the streetcar and impact its performance. Each
informant was provided a set of 12-24 questions in advance of the interviews, including
a set of questions asked of all informants and specific questions asked of that individual,
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given the role they play in the community. A set of typical interview questions can be found
in Appendix F.
For Little Rock, the authors conducted three semi-structured interviews with three key
informants. Several key themes emerged from the interviews, including: the streetcar’s
perception as a development catalyst, its role as a visitor-oriented service, its status as
an icon of the city, and the efforts by streetcar advocates to shape public attitudes about
the streetcar in more favorable directions. The three informants included a transit planner
who is also a member of both the River Rail Marketing Committee (which promotes local
events) and River Rail Economic Development Committee (which works to promote
economic development); a regional planner involved in long-range transportation and
land use planning; and an individual involved in marketing and promoting the convention
and visitors industry (Table 24). Each individual is identified by his or her role within the
narrative that follows.

Table 24. Key Informants Interviewed for Little Rock Study
Informant

Role

1

Transit Planner

2

Regional Planner

3

Marketing Expert

Streetcar Goals
The key informant interviews identified two sets of goals for streetcar implementation in
Little Rock. The first goal is to promote downtown development, which is a goal shared
by all the case-study cities. The second goal is to promote tourism and visitorship. This
goal is reflected in planning and operational decisions, which tend to neglect the local
commuter ridership market.
The regional planning informant spoke about the development goals of the streetcar
plan. The informant noted the streetcar’s emergence as part of a downtown development
strategy in a study undertaken by local businesses and developers with the Urban Land
Institute. Both mayors (Little Rock and North Little Rock) were engaged in this effort, as
well. The streetcar was seen as a potential catalyst for development. The MPO regarded
it as a tool that could bring transportation and land use planning together and advance
the agency’s goals of promoting higher density development. The informant observed that
these goals were part of a vision articulated in the MPO’s Metro 2020 Plan, which was
prepared after passage of TEA-21.
The regional planning informant recalled that the streetcar was selected because its size
seemed most appropriate for a downtown context. The informant observed that this view
was supported by a “few big players” that included a group of local developers and key
elected officials who were interested in downtown revitalization. These key figures were
helped secure federal funding earmarks to aid in streetcar construction. Major entities
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such as the Clinton Presidential Library and Heifer International participated in the second
phase of streetcar construction, with the Library designing, building, and maintaining its
own stop. The transit planning informant thought that former President Clinton’s position
and influence helped the community obtain the funding for the second streetcar phase that
included service to the library.
The regional planning informant noted that the MPO recognized that the streetcar’s
downtown alignment meant that it would serve primarily visitors, at least until the line might
be extended into neighborhoods. The regional planning informant also observed that MPO
officials regarded the streetcar as a first step toward a future regional LRT system. The
transit planning informant concurred with the primarily tourism and visitor orientation of the
service. He explicitly stated that the service was tourism oriented and not transit oriented.
This informant observed that promoting tourism and visitorship is indeed an important
goal of the service. This goal is reflected in policy decisions, such as starting service on
weekday mornings at 8:20 a.m., after much of the morning commute, to avoid streetcar
conflicts with motor vehicle congestion. The streetcar does not have its own right-of-way
and is often hindered by congestion as well as vehicles parked within its right-of-way.
The marketing expert, who promotes tourism and convention activity in the community,
spoke of the streetcar’s role in connecting the two downtowns and particularly in enabling
people to easily reach the major attractions located there. Thus, tourism promotion figured
prominently in this informant’s assessment of the streetcar’s goals. The informant noted
that the local convention and visitors bureau has worked with the other agencies involved
in streetcar planning and operations to develop and promote events around the streetcar
that are focused on visitors.

Assessment of Streetcar Goal Attainment
The informants offered a mixed assessment of the streetcar’s attainment of its original
goals, with two informants more favorable and one more pessimistic in the assessment. The
marketing expert characterized the streetcar as playing a good role as an “amenity” of the
city, indeed as an attraction itself for visitors because of the nostalgia associated with it. This
individual noted the economic development that had occurred in the downtowns, although
the person conceded that it was hard to know whether the streetcar was responsible.
Indeed, the individual’s comments seemed to point toward the Clinton Presidential Library
as more of a driving factor than the streetcar. Nevertheless, the individual’s assessment
was largely favorable.
The transit planning informant focused his assessment on the streetcar’s economic
development effects and on its performance as a tourism and visitorship promotion
device. With respect to economic development outcomes, the informant pointed to its
“outstanding development effects” as documented in a local study that found about
$1 billion in development activity within one-quarter mile [400 meters] of the streetcar line.
Although the informant conceded that other factors were undoubtedly also important, he
still viewed the streetcar as a critical catalyst for development.
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With respect to the tourism and visitorship goals, the transit planning informant thought
the streetcar had been very successful as well. As evidence, he pointed to the streetcar’s
strongest ridership months (April and May) as being tied to visitors and tourists. The
patronage has a strongly seasonal pattern and is closely tied to major visitor-focused
events, including conventions, fairs, school events, and other major public gatherings. He
also noted the streetcar’s role as an icon of the city that is featured prominently in media
coverage of the community.
The regional planning informant agreed that the streetcar had been embraced as an icon
of the city, but he also focused on a number of frustrations he had about the streetcar’s
performance. He was frustrated by what he regarded as the service’s “underutilization”
even as a streetcar service, let alone a service that served the larger community. He
expressed frustration with local decisions that undercut the streetcar’s ability even to
attract visitor riders, such as the City of Little Rock’s decision to suspend service for
“safety” reasons during major public events. He thought this decision was an example
of “shooting themselves in the foot” due to the ridership it meant they would forego. The
transit planning informant thought these decisions were often made to increase the supply
of on-street parking, which would certainly echo the “shooting themselves in the foot”
criticism raised by the other informant.
Finally, he expressed frustrations with the process of trying to move the streetcar beyond
the visitor-serving market. He noted that CATA and the MPO have studied extending the
streetcar alignment into neighborhoods north and south of the current alignment, as well
as to the airport. He believes the extensions would increase the ridership for the service.
But he noted that efforts to pursue funding to permit these extensions to go forward have
not been well handled. He pointed to CATA’s two failed efforts to pass a local sales tax to
support transit investments. He believed that CATA leadership had failed to articulate a
vision for how the tax revenue would be used to supplement what they are able to do with
their regular, locally-appropriated revenue sources. Nevertheless, he also recognized that
CATA has its hands full in simply upgrading and maintaining a long neglected bus system.
The most positive assessment of this informant was simply that the streetcar had been built.

Public Attitudes Toward the Streetcar
The key informants expressed generally favorable public attitudes about the streetcar, but
their comments also noted that the streetcar has been the target of increased criticism about
the low ridership and the cost of the system. These criticisms have resulted in much more
promotional activity around the streetcar, and they led to a local development study to provide
evidence of the streetcar’s development effects, as noted earlier. Among the criticisms noted
by the informants were the cost, low ridership, and slow speed of the streetcar. The marketing
expert also noted the sense among some streetcar skeptics that the money spent on the
streetcar might have been better used on some other transit service.
The transit planning informant spoke a great deal of efforts to counter the increased
criticism that the streetcar is receiving from some quarters, particularly from “naysayers”
who do not live or work near the streetcar. He noted that CATA has undertaken more public
outreach and marketing as a result of these criticisms. For example, CATA has sponsored
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public activities around the streetcar, including events catered to schoolchildren, to help
boost the streetcar’s image. He also pointed to the economic development study that CATA
commissioned that found $1 billion of economic development located within one-quarter
mile [400 meters] of the streetcar alignment in the two downtowns. The informant believes
that pointing to economic development has brought some developers and businesses on
board as more supportive of the streetcar. He also observed that the economic development
study has been used to help recruit new developers and businesses to the area. He thinks
these efforts have been successful in “calming things down.”
The regional planning informant observed that generally the community supports the
streetcar; he noted that while the criticism about low ridership is certainly present, it is not
organized or formalized. He noted that the “criticism (is) not too loud.” He thought the fact
that the streetcar “has its own identity” as an icon for the community helped to explain its
“broader appeal.” He referred to the streetcar as “symbolic” and as an “intangible” that
“enhances the quality of life.” His more detailed explanations for why this “broad appeal”
was present related to the streetcar’s role as a community icon and as a part of tourism
and visitor promotion for the community.

Rider Markets and Ridership Trends
The key informant interviews emphasized the primarily tourist and visitor rider market for
the streetcar service. The transit planning informant spoke in the greatest detail about
these aspects of the streetcar in Little Rock.
The transit planning informant’s comments focused first on the differences between
streetcar and local bus riding markets. The informant noted that bus riders are primarily
transit-dependent people. This informant noted that CATA permits free transfers from bus
to streetcar (but not in the reverse direction due to fare differences: $1.35 for bus and
$1.00 for streetcar), but that there is little transfer activity due to the different rider markets.
He pointed to a bus service that focuses on utilitarian riders that emphasizes speed and
reliability. By contrast, the transit planning informant noted that streetcar operators also
serve as tour guides who point out key destinations as the streetcar passes them; this role
slows the streetcar operating speeds. However, this is not a major concern for CATA due
to the primarily visitor rider market being served by the streetcar.
The transit planning informant attributed the decline in streetcar ridership in recent years
to a decline in visitors to Little Rock. He reported that ridership is down (as of 2014) from
2012 levels and is below 100,000 riders per year. Ridership in the usually busy May was
down significantly due to much lower attendance at River Fest, a major local event. The
inability of the streetcar to effectively serve local riders, due to its service location and
operating characteristics, makes it especially sensitive to the health of the local visitor and
convention markets, which have declined in Little Rock since the recession began.
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Other Transit and Transportation Issues
The interviews also touched on transit-related issues affecting the streetcar, such as the
selection of vehicle types, possible changes to the bus system that might have occurred
as a result of streetcar implementation, and possible streetcar expansion plans. The
interviews also touched briefly on parking policy in Little Rock and how it relates, if at all,
to the streetcar. The transit planning informant was the key informant on these issues. The
regional planning informant spoke briefly about the implementation of some streetscape
improvements, funded partially by the MPO, around the River Market and the Arena just
prior to the streetcar opening. The marketing expert noted that the slow streetcar speed
and its role in downtown traffic congestion are among the service’s challenges.
The transit planning informant noted that CATA operates replica vintage trolleys, as
opposed to true vintage trolleys, and that the agency has had no serious problems with
these vehicles. They feature heating and air conditioning. They are easily reparable, and if
necessary, replaceable. The present vehicles are only about ten years old, and they have
a regular maintenance cycle.
The transit planning informant noted that there were no changes to the local bus system
when the streetcar first opened or when the Phase II segment was completed. The bus
system had not been changed for decades until February 2013, when the transit share
of some tax revenue allowed CATA to add two new routes and make smaller changes to
a number of other routes. The informant noted that the bus service changes have been
effective, with positive ridership results save for one route that was implemented largely
for political reasons to serve a previously unserved location. The favorable condition of the
bus system thus stands in some contrast to the current state of the streetcar system. In fact,
the positive view of the bus systems now means that CATA receives “more compliments
than complaints” from the riding public.
The transit planning informant also observed that, while there have been studies about
possible streetcar expansion (as noted earlier), there is “no groundswell of support” to
fund any expansions. The informant noted that the CATA and MPO are focusing their
attention and resources on making bus service improvements, and no organizations are
taking a lead role to advocate streetcar expansion in their absence.
Finally, the transit planning informant spoke briefly about parking policy issues. He noted
that he would like to eliminate on-street parking in the streetcar right-of-way due to the
interference of this parking with streetcar operations. He noted that there might be some
potential support for such a strategy due to the recent adoption of “complete streets” policies
in Little Rock, although he also conceded that many businesses oppose the removal of
spaces because they fear that they might lose customers as a result. The informant is
also trying to get parking fines raised as a means to discourage vehicle parking within
the streetcar right-of-way. The informant noted that there is a new parking garage near
the streetcar line, but he is unsure whether or not they use market prices for parking. In
general, there was a sense that, although the informant understood how important parking
policy was to streetcar operation and potential ridership, little had been done to use it in
such a way.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix A: Profile of River Rail in Little Rock, Arkansas

101

Non-Transit Issues
The regional planning informant spoke about several non-transit issues of relevance to
the streetcar in Little Rock. Most of the discussion touched on land use and development
issues. The informant first characterized Little Rock as having a diversified local economy
without a single dominant sector. The informant noted that this fact has allowed the region
to weather economic circumstances reasonably well and to avoid booms and busts. The
informant noted that in the early 2000s, around the time the streetcar came into operation,
the regional economy was doing well. It subsequently slowed during the 2008 economic
downturn but has continued to “plod along.” This means that there are rarely significant
positive or negative developments in the local real estate development market.
The regional planning informant noted that the streetcar does seem to have invigorated
neighborhoods and served as a catalyst for development, anyway. Despite the lack of
any local financial incentives for development in the areas served by the streetcar, the
informant pointed to significant development activity. The informant observed that Little
Rock and North Little Rock have reworked their land development regulations to encourage
higher densities and mixed uses, particularly along the streetcar line, as part of a more
coordinated land use-transportation strategy.

Downtown Rivalry
The key-informant interviews noted that a strong rivalry exists between the downtowns of
Little Rock and North Little Rock. (The streetcar line connects the two downtowns.) Each
of the informants spoke about this rivalry in their interviews.
The transit planning informant noted the economic basis for the rivalry between the two
downtowns, which compete for tourists, events, and economic development. The informant
noted that the two downtowns have mirror organizations (two chambers of commerce,
two convention and visitors bureaus) to facilitate this competition. The competition often
requires policymakers to strive for balance between them. For example, the informant
noted that when the 20,000-seat Verizon Center was built in North Little Rock, the State
Convention Center was then built in Little Rock. He noted that he frequently tries to
schedule events evenly between the two cities.
The transit planning informant and the regional planning informant believed that the
streetcar had helped to bring the two downtowns together by virtue of its role as a link
between them. The transit planning informant noted cooperation between the downtowns
on very large events, which are alternated between them, and on streetcar decisions. The
regional planning and marketing informants echoed this sentiment in their interviews.

Takeaways from Key Informant Interviews
Toward the close of the interviews, the authors asked each informant for a set of final
takeaways, or pieces of advice, based on the experience of Little Rock. The regional
planning informant advised cities contemplating making a streetcar investment to “go for
it,” but to recognize that implementing it would be a long, complex process. This informant
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advised other communities to allow time for land use development to occur and ridership
to materialize.
The transit planning informant advised other communities to be sensitive to rider markets
because of important differences between services that focus on visitors and those
oriented toward serving commuters. He observed that services should be tailored to the
market being served. He also noted that outcome measures would likely be quite different,
which might make comparisons between streetcar systems that serve one market versus
the other more difficult to make.
The marketing expert advised other communities to think carefully about the purpose and
goals they had in mind with respect to a streetcar. The informant also stressed that all
transportation investments involve the expenditure of limited resources, and decisions
should prioritize the best use of these resources. In this person’s view, these issues should
drive the decision making about investing, or not investing, in a streetcar or some other
transit mode in any community.

CONCLUSIONS
Evaluated as a transit investment on the basis of ridership, service productivity, and cost
effectiveness, the River Rail streetcar in Little Rock emerges as the poorest performer of
the cases considered here. It has low and declining ridership. Its service productivity and
cost effectiveness continue to deteriorate as a result of the ridership decline, which gives
no indication of abating.
However, despite these challenges, the key informant interviews suggest that the River
Rail streetcar continues to maintain significant public support because of its role as an
amenity, or icon, of the community and its perceived roles in tourism promotion and
downtown economic development. Indeed its potential ability to play these roles drove the
decision to build the streetcar, where to build it, and how to operate it.
Most planners or policymakers gave little thought to any role the streetcar might play as
a utilitarian transit service, so it is not surprising that the streetcar does not function as
transit. It is hard to see how it could be easily adapted to play such a role, given its physical
location, physical characteristics, and operating conditions. Communities planning to build
a streetcar with a view toward using such a transit service to serve a primarily ridership
function would thus not be advised to emulate Little Rock as a model.
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APPENDIX B: PROFILE OF RIVER RAIL IN
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
The second of the five case studies is the streetcar system in Memphis, Tennessee, which
is referred to locally as The Trolley (Figure 42). The streetcar system in Memphis is the
oldest of the five cases examined in this study (with the first line dating to 1993), and it is
the second-most extensive system (the length of its alignment is second only to Portland).
The Trolley’s origins lay in local efforts to revitalize the Memphis downtown. Consisting of
three different lines that connect with one another in the downtown area, the Trolley serves
primarily a visitor and non-utilitarian trip-making ridership market. As of the 2012 study
year, the service is the most cost effective among those examined in this study, but it has
relatively low service productivity.

Figure 42. A Streetcar in Memphis146

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STREETCAR SERVICE
Streetcar service in Memphis, Tennessee is branded the Trolley, and it consists of three
lines: Main Street Line, Riverfront Line, and Madison Avenue Line. The three lines total
7 miles [11.27 kilometers], with 4.2 miles [6.76 kilometers] of mixed traffic operation and
2.8 [4.51 kilometers] miles of exclusive rights-of-way (Table 25). The Main Street and
Madison Avenue Lines are each 2.5 miles [4.0 kilometers] long, while the Riverfront line
is 2 miles [3.2 kilometers] long. The system includes a total of 25 stations or stops. The
system cost more than $100 million to build. The Trolley system’s public information map
is shown in Figure 43.
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Table 25. Physical Characteristics of Streetcar System in Memphis147
Characteristic

Value

Year Open

1993

Capital Cost (unadjusted dollars)

$104,000,000

Number of Lines

3 (Main Street, Riverfront, Madison Avenue)

Number of Vehicles

10

Number of Stations

25

Length
Alignment Type

7 miles
Exclusive

2.8 miles

Mixed Traffic

4.2 miles

Figure 43. Map of Trolley Lines in Memphis, Tennessee148
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Streetcar service in Memphis is operated by the Memphis Area Transit Authority (MATA),
which also operates the local bus system. The MATA transit system is displayed in Figure 44.
The Trolley is shown as a set of darker lines in the approximate center of the map, while
local bus routes are shown in a lighter gray. The map shows that the local bus system has
a very strong radial orientation, with many routes serving as links between outlying areas
and the downtown. Some cross-town routes are included, but they are relatively few. The
Trolley represents a very small piece of the transit network that serves a geographically
small part of Memphis.

Figure 44. Map of Transit System in Memphis, Tennessee149
Figure 45 shows a larger-scale view of the Trolley lines, Trolley stops, and nearby bus
routes. The map suggests that multiple bus routes connect with the Trolley stops, providing
potential transfer opportunities between the two transit modes, while other bus routes
parallel to the Trolley lines on nearby streets may take away potential riders, as their
respective service areas overlap. An understanding of the potential complementarities
versus competitiveness of Trolley and bus service in Memphis is one objective of the
Memphis case study.
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Figure 45. Large-Scale Map of the Trolley and Local Buses in the Core of
Memphis, Tennessee150
Consultant John Smatlak observes that the original Trolley line was “conceived as part of
a plan to resuscitate a failing pedestrian mall in a fading downtown; (since then) the trolley
has grown into an effective transit circulator system… The 2.5 mile Madison Line … was
intended as the starter line for a future light rail system.”151 The three lines serve a host of
downtown Memphis landmarks. The transit agency website lists the following landmarks
served by the Trolley lines. The Main Street Line serves the Main Street Mall, Pinch District,
Cook Convention Center, Civic Center Plaza, Court Square, Peabody Place, Beale Street,
National Civil Rights Museum, FedEx Forum, and the South Main Historic Arts District.
In addition, the Riverfront Line serves the Tennessee Welcome Center, Pyramid Arena
(presently inactive) and Mud Island, River Walk, and the Mississippi River Museum, plus
public art at each trolley stop on the Madison Line.152
The Trolley provides relatively frequent service during much of the day on weekdays and on
Saturdays, with limited hours on Sundays (Table 26). Fares are $1 per ride, with discounts
for seniors and disabled people (Table 27). MATA also sells single-day, three-day, monthly,
and six-month passes for use on the Trolley. Trolley day passes may also be used on
buses. There are free transfers between the Trolley lines and buses. Trolley (streetcar)
riders tend to use the different types of fare options in roughly the same proportions as
transit system riders (primarily bus riders) as a whole, as Table 28 indicates.
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Table 26. Service Characteristics of Streetcar System in Memphis153
Characteristic

Value

Headways
Weekday Peak

10 min

Weekday Off-Peak

16 min

Weekend Average

13 min

Hours of Service
Monday-Thursday

17 hr

Friday

18 hr

Saturday

15 hr

Sunday

8 hr

Table 27. Fare and Transfer Policy for Transit Services in Memphis154
Characteristic

Type

Fare Type

Base Fare

$1.00

*Reduced fare

$0.50

Day-Pass

$3.50

3-Day Pass

$9.00

*Reduced 3-Day Pass

$4.50

Pass Type

Cost ($)

Monthly Pass

$25.00

*Reduced Monthly Pass

$12.50

6-Month Pass

$75.00

*Reduced 6-Month Pass

$37.50

Note: Reduced fare is available for students, seniors, and individuals with disabilities.

Table 28. Fare Media Utilization, MATA, Memphis155
Fare Category

MATA System %

Streetcar %

69.5

67.6

Children (base fare)

3.2

0.3

Senior (base fare)

1.5

3.2

25.8

26.0

Adult (base fare)

Pass/Discount Card
Missing
Total

100.0

2.9
100.0

Trolley riders do differ from riders of the transit system at large in terms of the kinds of
trips they use the Trolley to serve, as the lower right panel of Table 29 indicates. While
work and work-related trips account for 58 percent of all MATA rides, they account for
only 9.2 percent of Trolley rides. Trolley rides are primarily taken to make hotel, shopping,
entertainment, and errand-serving trips (combined total of 46.5 percent of rides). These
survey results strongly indicate that the Trolley lines cater primarily to a non-utilitarian
riding market that is very different from the more traditional transit market served by MATA
buses. This difference has important transit planning implications in Memphis, and it also
affects the relative performance of the Trolley compared to local buses.
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Table 29. Customer Profiles, MATA, Memphis156

Gender

Male
Female

Race

Age

49.7

not available

50.3

not available

Access
Mode

Walked

MATA
System %

Streetcar %

81.0

not available

Bicycle

0.8

not available

Drove

2.0

not available

11.0

not available

1.0

not available

100.0

White

8.2

not available

Was dropped
off

Black

88.9

not available

Rode with
someone

Hispanic

0.6

not available

Other

3.0

not available

Asian

0.4

not available

Missing

1.2

not available

Other

1.9

not available

Total

Total

100.0

Trip
Work
Purpose Work-related
business

100.0
52.7

7.8

5.3

1.4

15.3

0.5

Errands/
Restaurant

2.7

18.0

not available

Entertainment

0.8

5.9

35.6

not available

Medical/
Hospital

6.0

-

15.6

not available

Legal/Court

1.0

-

1.7

not available

16 or under

0.9

not available

16 - 18

7.8

not available

School/
College

19 - 24

19.5

not available

24 - 34

19.0

35 - 49
50 - 64
over 65

100.1

Hotel/Motel

0.3

15.2

Recreation/
Social

4.2

1.3

Full Time

42.6

not available

Shopping

7.3

7.4

Part Time

18.4

not available

Home

0.4

21.2

Not
Employed

20.5

not available

Other

4.0

10.6

Student

15.2

not available

Missing

-

10.7

Retired

3.3

not available

Total

100.0

100.0

Total
Income

Streetcar %

Total

Total
Employment
Status

MATA
System %

100.0

Under
$6,000

34.0

not available

$6,000 to
$18,000

31.8

not available

$18,001 to
$30,000

18.0

not available

$30,001 to
$42,000

11.2

not available

$42,001 to
$60,000

3.2

not available

$60,001 to
$90,000

1.3

not available

$90,000 or
more

0.5

not available

Total

100.0
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The other panels of the table provide a demographic profile of MATA riders as a whole,
portraying them as disproportionately black, lower-income, and working-age individuals
who access transit primarily by walking. Although it is not specifically reported in the rider
survey, one suspects that MATA riders disproportionately lack easy access to automobiles
in their households. So, by and large, MATA transit riders tend to resemble transit-captive
riders in many other communities. It is unclear the extent to which Trolley riders share
these demographic characteristics, as these questions have not been asked specifically
of these riders in the Trolley rider surveys. But given the different proportions of trip types
served by the two transit modes, some differences are likely here as well.

LOCAL SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT FOR STREETCAR SERVICE
At the time of the 2010 Census, the city of Memphis, Tennessee had a population of
just under 647,000 people within a metropolitan area whose population totaled about
1.3 million people.157 The city’s median household income was just under $37,000 per
year, while more than one-quarter of the population lived below the poverty line. The city
population was more than 63 percent black and less than 30 percent white at the time of
the census; the Latino population counted for 6.5 percent of the city total.
Figures 46 and 47 display city-scale population and population density, both by census
block group, at the time of the 2010 Census. The first map suggests the dispersed nature
of population in the community, which becomes much clearer in the population density
map, the second map, which displays people per square kilometer. Here, the core of
Memphis emerges as a major center of population, along with a series of suburban or
outlying population clusters. A box on both maps indicates the approximate areal extent
of the Trolley lines. These city-scale maps suggest that much of the area served by the
Trolley tends to have populations and population densities in the middle range of values
seen in Memphis. They are neither the highest nor the lowest population centers in the
community. This is not surprising given the downtown location of the Trolley lines. Figures
48 and 49 display population and population density at a larger map scale focusing on the
Memphis core. The pattern of generally moderate populations and population densities
suggested by the city-scale maps becomes much more evident on these maps. The
highest population concentrations are located due east of the downtown core along the
Madison Trolley line.
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Figure 46. Population by Block Group in Memphis (2010)158

Figure 47. Population Density by Block Group in Memphis (2010)159
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Figure 48. Population by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)160

Figure 49. Population Density by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)161
While population in the Memphis area is decentralized, so is employment. Figure 50
displays city-scale employment by block group in 2010. The map does indicate sizable
employment in the area served by the Trolley lines, denoted by the black box on the
map, with the cluster of jobs along the riverfront clearly noticeable. However, there are
also a number of major outlying employment centers in the community. The employment
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centers become much clearer in Figure 51, which displays employment densities as
jobs per square kilometer. Here, the high employment areas in the downtown/riverfront
and Madison Avenue corridors served by the Trolley lines appear as the end of a major
employment corridor that stretches to the southeast. The Trolley lines extend through just
a small piece of this extensive swath of employment. These patterns are also quite clear
in the core area maps shown in Figures 52 and 53.

Figure 50. Employment by Block Group in Memphis (2010)162

Figure 51. Employment Density by Block Group in Memphis (2010)163
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Figure 52. Employment by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)164

Figure 53. Employment Density by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)165
The combination of population and employment represents the set of possible trip origins
and destinations in a community like Memphis. The authors decided to produce a series
of maps that combine population and employment to identify areas that might be most
likely to produce or attract large numbers of trips, and to determine whether the Trolley
lines were located in such parts of the community that would seem to be the areas that
might produce the most transit riders. Figure 54 maps the combination of population plus
employment, by block group, at a city-scale, while Figure 55 is a density map for this same
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set of phenomena. Figures 56 and 57 map the same phenomena at a larger scale for
the core of Memphis. The Trolley lines are located in areas with moderate to high levels
of population plus employment, with the Madison Line operating within an area of high
population plus employment densities. The Trolley thus operates in areas with moderate
to high ridership generating potential.

Figure 54. Population plus Employment by Block Group in Memphis (2010)166

Figure 55. Density of Population plus Employment by Block Group in
Memphis (2010)167
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Figure 56. Population plus Employment by Block Group in Core of
Memphis (2010)168

Figure 57. Density of Population plus Employment by Block Group in Core of
Memphis (2010)169
As noted earlier, Memphis is an overwhelmingly minority community, with the black
population accounting for more than three-fifths of the city total; by contrast the white
population is less than 30 percent of the total city population. There are also small but
growing Latino and Asian communities. Figures 58 and 59 map the distribution of the
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black population as a percent of block group totals on the city-scale and in the center of
Memphis, respectively. The maps appear to depict a somewhat segregated city with very
large concentrations of black population in block groups to the south, southwest, and
immediate northeast of downtown. By contrast, the areas due east of downtown have
relatively small shares (for Memphis, which is a heavily minority city) of black population.
Figures 60 and 61 display the percentage of the white population by block group. The
maps indicate higher percentages of white residents in the downtown area and the areas
due east of downtown.

Figure 58. Black Population by Block Group in Memphis (2010)170

Figure 59. Black Population by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)171
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Figure 60. White Population by Block Group in Memphis (2010)172

Figure 61. White Population by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)173
Memphis also has small but growing Latino and Asian populations. The distribution of the
Latino population is shown in Figures 62 (city-scale) and 63 (core area). The share of the
Latino population is relatively low in the area served by the Trolley, with somewhat higher
percentages along the Madison Line than along either the Riverfront or Main Street Lines.
The Latino population tends to be highest in the geographic middle of Memphis than on
any of its outer ends. Figures 64 and 65 indicate that the share of the Asian population
tends to be high along the Madison Line and due east of the line toward the eastern
sections of the city.
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Figure 62. Latino Population by Block Group in Memphis (2010)174

Figure 63. Latino Population by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)175
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Figure 64. Asian Population by Block Group in Memphis (2010)176

Figure 65. Asian Population by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)177
There tends to be a close connection between the spatial distributions of the different
racial and ethnic groups and the spatial distributions of attributes related to income, vehicle
access, and transit use. First, the authors consider the distribution of household incomes
in Memphis to identify the wealthier and poorer sections of the city. Figure 66 depicts
median household income by block group at a city-scale, while Figure 67 focuses on the
same attribute within the downtown area served by the Trolley. Apparent in both maps is
the close spatial correspondence between the household income patterns and the maps
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of black and white population shown earlier. Higher-income areas tend to be the locations
with very high white population shares, while lower-income areas tend to be the locations
with high shares of black residents. Focusing on the areas served by the Trolley lines, one
sees that the Main Street corridor and riverfront district of downtown Memphis emerge
as areas with high median household income that are surrounded by a lower household
income ring. The Madison Avenue Line links the high-income areas in the downtown with
the higher-income clusters to the east, while passing through areas with slightly lower
income levels.

Figure 66. Median Household Income by Block Group in Memphis (2010)178

Figure 67. Median Household Income by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)179
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There is a general consistency between the spatial pattern of household income and those
of vehicle ownership and transit usage, with higher income areas tending to have high
levels of vehicle ownership and low levels of transit use. The spatial pattern of household
vehicle ownership, depicted as vehicles per housing unit, is shown at the city-scale in
Figure 68 and for the core area of Memphis in Figure 69. In Memphis, as in most U.S.
cities, vehicle ownership tends to be higher in the outer areas and lowest in the downtown
and core areas. The Trolley lines operate in areas with very low levels of household
vehicle ownership, a function primarily of their downtown location. Areas with low vehicle
ownership tend to be those with the highest transit commute shares, although commute
shares for transit tend to be very low in Memphis, as shown in Figures 70 and 71. The
Trolleys themselves operate in an area where residents have low transit commute shares,
except for the middle section of the Madison Line.

Figure 68. Vehicles per Housing Unit by Block Group in Memphis (2010)180
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Figure 69. Vehicles per Housing Unit by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)181

Figure 70. Transit Commute Share by Block Group in Memphis (2010)182
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Figure 71. Transit Commute Share by Block Group in Core of Memphis (2010)183
To summarize, while transit commute shares are relatively low in the area served by the
Trolley lines, the area served by the Trolley would seem to be a promising location based
on the other socioeconomic factors just discussed. The area has sizeable concentrations of
employment, moderate concentrations of population, and low levels of vehicle ownership,
compared with Memphis as a whole.

LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT FOR STREETCAR SERVICE
In addition to exploring the socioeconomic context in Memphis within which the Trolley
is situated, the authors also obtained data from the local planning department to better
understand land use patterns and the nature of the built environment within the area
served by the Trolley lines, given the connections between the built environment and
transit usage cited in the transit literature. The first map in this series depicts land uses
in the area served by the three Trolley lines (Figure 72). The map indicates that local
planners have designated this area as primarily commercial and/or mixed-use zones. This
is not surprising, given the downtown location within which the lines are situated. The map
also indicates that immediately beyond the downtown area, land uses tend to follow more
typical segregated patterns. Average block sizes within the areas served by the Trolley
lines are relatively small (3.26 acres [1.32 hectares]), which indicates a more traditional
street pattern in the area.
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Downtown Memphis tends to have fairly high land values (dollars per square meter),
as shown in Figure 73. The area also tends to be heavily developed with structures, as
shown in Figure 74. This last map provides an interesting, and ultimately counterintuitive,
perspective on the relationship between the physical environment and route planning. The
map shows building footprints and average weekday ridership by Trolley stop within the
core area of Memphis. From the figure, one sees that the Main Street trolley line traverses
an area characterized by intensive built development, and the stops located here register
the highest stop level boarding counts. The Madison Avenue corridor is much less built out,
and stops along that line register much lower boarding counts. The map also depicts the
locations of special generators such as hospital complexes, retail clusters, and convention
centers that might serve as important trip origins or destinations. At best, an inconsistent
spatial pattern seems to exist between the location of these activity sites and ridership.
The authors discuss ridership in much more detail later in the profile.

Figure 72. Land Use Map for Core of Memphis184
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Figure 73. Land Values in Core of Memphis ($ per square meter)185

Figure 74. Built Structures and Ridership in Core of Memphis (2012)186
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON STREETCAR DEVELOPMENT
Streetcar service in Memphis dates originally to the 1880s, when the Citizens’ Street
Railroad Company (CSRC) ran a system that covered over 40 miles [64.37 kilometers]
of track and was powered by more than 600 mules. During the late 1880s, the East End
Railway Company (EERC) developed and operated a steam-powered system that ran on
11 miles [17.70 kilometers] of track. Memphis featured a number of streetcar companies at
the time the electric streetcar was introduced, and the Memphis Street Railway Co. (MSRC)
was created in 1895 to merge the many streetcar operators into one system. During its
heyday, the MSRC operated more than 300 streetcars on approximately 78 miles [125.53
kilometers] of single and double track. At one of the main downtown intersections during
rush hour, a streetcar would pass every 15 seconds.187
However, during the early 1900s, Memphis’ streetcar system, like those in many other cities,
began to be phased out as ridership declined with the mass adoption of the automobile.
In 1931 the first trackless, electric trolley bus line was implemented, and by 1947 the
entire streetcar system was converted to electric trolley bus. This new electric bus system
operated for more than a decade before it, along with the last remnants of the old streetcar
system, was finally replaced by a motorized bus system in April 1960.188
In 1970, Memphis tried to bring life back to its downtown area by launching a Main Street
revitalization plan that included a pedestrian mall corridor called the Mid-America Mall.189
The plan was considered a failure as a result of many issues: walking distances were too
long, no transportation was provided along the mall, not enough parking was available
near the mall, and decaying buildings, crime, and deteriorating pavement made the
environment an unattractive one to visit.190 By late 1980, the city officials decided that the
mall area itself needed complete redevelopment. They soon turned to the reintroduction
of the streetcar as a strategy for revitalizing the area. “Following a number of studies and
public hearings, it was decided that a trolley [streetcar] line would enhance the mall by
providing transportation for trips too far for walking.”191 However, not much happened over
the years that immediately followed.
At the start of the 1990s, however, officials began to take action. In January 1990, the
Memphis City Council approved a $33 million, 4.9-mile [7.89 kilometer] streetcar system
plan, allowing the Memphis Area Transit Authority (MATA) to begin with the project design.
MATA and the city hoped to have the streetcars ready for service by the opening of the
Great American Pyramid, a downtown arena that was once home to the NBA’s Memphis
Grizzlies. Financing the streetcar project was to be split three ways, with $25 million from
federal funding, $5 million from city/state funding, and $3 million in private sponsorship
of the streetcars. In July 1990, the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA)
released $7 million to start the project, and an appropriations bill was presented to
Congress to approve an additional $12.4 million for the 1991 fiscal year. These funds were
to be reprogrammed from Memphis’ large Interstate 40 highway project.192
The state legislature required environmental evaluations and an assurance that the city
would be able to match its proposed cost share before it passed its own bill. Just two
weeks after the state bill was evaluated, and with assurance from Memphis mayor Dick
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Hackett that the city would contribute its share and find investors for the ten streetcars, the
state appropriations bill was passed to provide the state share of project funding.193
With federal and state funding in place, city officials and MATA began dealing with the many
issues surrounding the streetcar system’s physical development. One of the first matters
to surface was the creation of a multi-modal regional transportation hub, which also would
house the streetcar maintenance facility, in downtown Memphis’ Central Station. The
refurbishing of Central Station was Mayor Hackett’s answer to the federal government’s
insistence on integrating different transportation services through the project, and it was
also a convenient way to reduce the costs associated with building a separate streetcar
facility/station.194
Another topic of serious discussion was how the city would pay for the expected annual
operating costs of more than $1 million. City officials proposed ideas such as specialized
downtown taxing districts, city government subsidies, and passenger fares as different
options for raising the operating costs. The taxing district strategy ran into opposition
quickly, as downtown business owners were still roiling over taxes paid for the original
downtown mall revitalization plan. Until the operating cost problem was solved, however,
the Memphis City Council would not vote to approve construction. Nevertheless, this
did not stop local officials and planners from setting a starting construction date in early
December 1990.195
Although many downtown businesspeople were worried about losing business during
streetcar construction, the city was optimistic about the economic stimulus that could
come from the downtown redevelopment due to the streetcar. A study at Memphis State
University’s Regional Economic Development Center claimed that “the trolley would be
instrumental in helping the city create 1,817 jobs and would account for $110 million
in annual tourism sales.”196 This same study also predicted that downtown Memphis
would see $648 million in new construction as a result of the streetcar and associated
redevelopment. This would bring in nearly $20 million in additional property taxes and
$2.5 million in additional sales taxes. However, to satisfy the short-term transportation
needs in the area, MATA planned to operate shuttles near Main Street to connect visitors
of the Great American Pyramid to nearby parking and local businesses.197 This response
muted some of the business opposition to the plan.
In late September 1990, the first $4.3 million in federal funds came in to aid in the
preliminary engineering and design of the streetcar. The rest was held back by the Urban
Mass Transit Administration (UMTA).198 One month later, Mayor Hackett presented the
final design plans for a 2.5-mile [4.02 kilometer] Main Street streetcar line, along with its
associated cost estimates, to a City Council transportation committee. The committee
unanimously supported the design plans, and a final City Council vote to release funds for
construction was slated to take place in December.
However, raising operating revenue still proved a challenge. The proposed strategy of
expanded special taxing districts still encountered fierce opposition from the affected areas.
The councilmembers found the tax unfair, and they planned to further discuss the operating
cost funding problem before the December vote.199 Despite these ongoing controversies
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over operating expenses, capital costs seemed to be secured. So on December 11, 1990,
the Memphis City Council approved construction of the Memphis Trolley, with nine out of
11 “yes” votes. Construction was set to start the beginning of February 1991.200
With everything in place to begin construction on the trolley line, the first big barrier for
the streetcar system arose. In late January, the president of the Memphis Development
Foundation (MDF), the group responsible for fundraising for the trolley cars, revealed
that only three out of the ten streetcars had sponsorships. Close observers believed that
the poor economy had led many assumed sponsors to back out of their pledges. Mayor
Hackett, who had earlier assured the City Council and UMTA that the project would attract
enough sponsors, responded publicly, saying that he had solid backing for six streetcars.
Subsequently, the City informed UMTA that the “funds will either be raised privately or
[the City] would use local funds.” Without appropriate funding, the UMTA would not allow
further construction to continue, and the city would have to pay back the federal funds it
received to that point.201
As a result of ongoing negotiations among UMTA, the city, and MATA, in February 1991,
MATA released nearly $300,000 of its reserve money to make a payment on ten antique
streetcars in addition to the $400,000 the agency used as a deposit to hold the streetcars.
Another final payment was due when the streetcars arrived, and money was still needed
to renovate them. At this point, no money had been received from any of the sponsors.
Mayor Hackett requested all sponsors to sign contracts that would bind them to their
commitments. He also asked the Center City Development Corporation (CCDC) to replace
the MDF and take over streetcar funding efforts.202
Another barrier was the difficulty of selecting an acceptable bid offer for the largest
construction contract. Although most of the other bid agreements had been reached,
MATA’s first round of bids for this contract disintegrated due to calculation errors and
very low bid proposals. The process of receiving new bidders was expected to delay the
construction about two months.203
Despite the lingering issues with the original streetcar plan, MATA began, in April 1991,
preparing a plan to extend the system with another $36 million project.204 MATA and Mayor
Hackett had proposed this plan several times before. The plan included adding a loop to
the trolley line, creating more parking spaces, and finally renovating Central Station. MATA
and Mayor Hackett expected some opposition from the City Council.205 As expected, in
May, the City Council rejected the trolley loop plan. The loop addition was to be postponed
for at least a year.206 This did not stop the congressional delegation from working on the
plan’s behalf. In September, the Senate Appropriations Committee authorized $7.15 million
for the streetcar loop extension.207
While the future of the additional loop was in limbo, MATA finally secured its last contract
for the Main Street streetcar construction project. In August, several months after the
original bidding failed, MATA agreed to a $16 million contract with Flintco, Inc. Completion
was scheduled for the fall of 1992.208 Construction work started in September and was on
schedule throughout the latter part of 1991.209 At the turn of the year, however, construction
slowed due to the deterioration of surrounding buildings. After the collapse of a nearby
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building, an inspection commenced to determine if the area was safe. The inspection
caused some minor delays in construction.210
However, this problem was minor in comparison with the other two issues that had
plagued the streetcar plan since inception – the need for private streetcar sponsorship
and funding for operating expenses. Mayor Hackett was now out of office and had not
even raised one-third of the money needed for the streetcars and their renovation. He had
also failed to reach an agreement with the City Council on how to fund streetcar operating
costs. City taxpayers would be responsible for these bills, as well as the costs to pay back
$26 million in federal grants, if a solution was not soon found. In March, several business
leaders collaborated to have a study completed on how the city could obtain sponsors for
the streetcars. The same month, the City Council proposed spending $800,000 to avoid
payback of federal grants and to start renovating the streetcars that would arrive in April.211
Regrding operating costs, MATA announced in late October 1992 that it would charge a $1
fare for a 90-minute ridership window on the Trolley.212
As track and mall construction came to completion at the end of 1992, restoration efforts on
the streetcars lagged behind. Though MATA predicted that it would have six fully functional
streetcars ready for grand opening, it was expected that only three would be available for
testing.213 A month before opening service day, the first Memphis streetcar since 1947 ran
down Main Street for a test run.
On April 29, 1993, MATA’s Main Street Trolley Line officially began service.214 During the
same week, city officials and Mayor W.W. Herenton, who were hoping to capitalize on the
momentum and excitement generated by the Main Street Line opening, developed new
plans for Trolley line expansion to propose to the City Council. Among these plans was the
Riverfront Line loop, which would run along the Mississippi River and eventually connect
to the Main Street Line, and the Madison Avenue Line, which would connect Main Street
to a local medical center.215 In July 1993, the City Council, which had initially opposed the
Trolley, approved $2.5 million for further studies on both lines and for startup construction
on the Riverfront Line. The 2.5-mile [4.02 kilometer], $8 million project, which was mostly
(80 percent) federally funded, was tentatively set to open in 1996.216
However, final City Council approval was not granted until more than two years later in July
1995.217 Many observers, including some local officials, believed the line, much like the
Main Street Line, would serve as a tourist attraction and would have a greater percentage
of tourist ridership than local ridership.218 Nearly a full year after the final approval, in May
1996, ground broke on the MATA Trolley Riverfront Line, and on October 2, 1997, it began
service.219 Following the completion of the new line, many supporters pointed to positive
development effects in downtown Memphis. More people were moving into downtown
Memphis, many buildings started to be renovated, and a plethora of businesses were
attracted to the area. Streetcar supporters pointed to the return of the Trolleys as a key
reason for these positive developments.220
A week after the opening of the Riverfront Line, Memphis received $1 million from Congress
to continue development of the Madison Avenue Line.221 Around this same time, however,
Mayor Herenton, who had long supported streetcar development in Memphis, surprised
everybody when he told a reporter “that the trolley system was one of the worst mistakes
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that we made downtown.”222 This negative attitude toward the Trolley system was made
worse when reports came out that the Main Street Line was attracting less than 30 percent
of projected ridership. However, optimists pointed out that the Riverfront Line opening had
actually caused total monthly ridership to double, and in fact, ridership on the Trolley did
increase significantly in the following years.223
This positive outlook became more important starting in 1999, when the city, with help
from a Federal Transit Administrator, applied for federal funding that would take care of
80 percent of the $30 million cost for the Madison Avenue Trolley Line project. Among the
benefits presented in the application were “improved mobility for the area’s residents. A
more livable community. A more healthy environment. And a stronger economy.”224 The
city received full funding from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) for the now $75
million project at the beginning of 2001.225 The line was finished $20 million under budget,
and service for the Madison Avenue Line began March 15, 2004.226
At a 2004 year-end meeting, MATA gave a presentation on the Trolley system and pointed
to the large amount of development that had occurred since the completion of the three
lines. Increased housing on Main Street, AutoZone Park (baseball stadium), Peabody
Place, and FedEx Forum (home of the NBA’s Memphis Grizzlies) were some of the
specific larger developments mentioned.227 In 2005, the Trolley system had its highest
ever ridership levels of more than 1 million annual riders. City officials pointed to the
increase in downtown development and activity, which was supposedly spurred by the
Trolley development, as a reason for this increase in Trolley ridership.
More critical observers were still not convinced a streetcar system was a good investment,
especially the Madison Avenue Line. One Council member suggested the line was built
prematurely, as many of the Trolley cars were often empty. Regarding the entire system,
a think tank leader from Oregon noted the high costs of the service and its inability to
decrease congestion.228 Despite its critics, the system experienced a significant ridership
increase by 2012, when it carried more than 1.4 million riders. The increase in ridership
in the years preceding 2012 was attributed to promotional efforts and to local residents
becoming more familiar with and reliant on the Trolley system. Observers also pointed to
positive ongoing development downtown and to downtown apartment occupancy rates
that were up to 93 percent.229

STREETCAR RIDERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE
The authors sought to understand how the streetcar performs in Memphis as a transit
investment. To that end, the authors obtained and compiled data on ridership, service,
and operating expenses from the National Transit Database (NTD) and agency sources
that were then used to develop basic performance indicators. The authors collected the
same data for the bus system to understand the trends in its performance and whether
the streetcar exhibited similar or different performance characteristics or trends than
the buses. For Memphis, the authors obtained the basic data from the first Trolley line’s
opening in 1993 to 2012, which is the primary year of interest in the study.
The authors began the study by looking at mode and system-level ridership and
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performance. Table 30 reports ridership statistics on a modal basis for 1993-2012.
Ridership is reported for streetcar, bus, and the transit system’s fixed-route service total
(streetcar plus bus) in terms of unlinked passenger trips (boardings) and passenger miles.
The table clearly indicates that Memphis has experienced a long-term secular decline in
bus ridership since the early 1990s. And increased streetcar ridership has not made up for
this lost bus patronage. Streetcar ridership, on its own, has increased over time. Streetcar
trips do seem to be lengthening if the dramatic increase in passenger miles from 2011 to
2012 can be taken as reliable. Looking at passenger miles as the key ridership measure,
2012 represented a peak year in streetcar use in Memphis.
Monthly ridership data (unlinked passenger trips) for 2012 are reported in Table 31 for
streetcar, bus, and the total transit system. Streetcar ridership peaks between May and
August, and it is at its lowest point from November to February, while bus ridership does
not appear to follow a seasonal pattern. This difference highlights the seasonal nature of
streetcar usage, and is perhaps a function of the roles of the Riverfront and Main Street
Lines as downtown circulators that serve a large tourist and visitor rider market.

Table 30. Annual Ridership by Mode in Memphis (1993-2012)230
Unlinked Passenger Trips
Year

Streetcar

1993
1994

Passenger Miles

Bus

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Total

166,658

12,652,539

12,819,197

--

56,771,043

56,771,043

530,919

12,115,265

12,646,184

364,226

55,323,322

55,687,548

1995

512,223

13,879,445

14,391,668

392,404

60,241,948

60,634,352

1996

519,972

11,255,111

11,775,083

472,822

62,851,553

63,324,375

1997

555,597

11,561,397

12,116,994

595,190

62,021,794

62,616,984

1998

861,576

10,592,874

11,454,450

957,356

62,027,083

62,984,439

1999

976,835

10,395,874

11,353,268

1,041,919

60,888,906

61,930,825

2000

976,835

10,395,874

11,372,709

1,032,138

60,788,610

61,820,748

2001

912,058

10,668,459

11,580,517

1,613,116

62,926,898

64,540,014

2002

925,336

10,675,294

11,600,630

1,607,242

62,926,898

64,534,140

2003

778,442

10,692,573

11,471,015

1,562,396

61,166,849

62,729,245

2004

982,467

11,452,178

12,434,645

1,010,442

68,717,606

69,728,048

2005

1,018,139

10,882,883

11,901,022

891,968

61,333,620

62,225,588

2006

959,269

10,519,005

11,478,274

919,638

57,568,539

58,488,177

2007

1,031,168

10,542,407

11,483,575

873,928

60,788,190

61,662,118

2008

1,014,777

10,245,458

11,260,235

820,185

55,634,988

56,455,173

2009

1,113,809

10,358,212

11,472,021

940,028

56,019,024

56,959,052

2010

1,154,848

10,114,033

11,268,881

917,815

54,460,560

55,378,375

2011

1,086,125

9,287,206

10,373,331

718,468

49,985,948

20,704,416

2012

1,491,841

8,562,828

10,054,669

1,672,193

46,749,627

48,421,820

Note: Total is sum of bus and streetcar only.
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Table 31. Monthly Unlinked Passenger Trips by Mode in Memphis (2012)231
Unlinked Passenger Trips
Month

Streetcar

Bus

Total

January

74,306

645,806

720,112

83,680

729,541

813,221

March

140,217

722,968

863,185

April

136,711

638,766

775,477

May

182,956

719,249

902,205

June

154,976

665,720

820,696

July

157,432

728,028

885,460

August

150,602

761,899

912,501

September

114,425

666,209

780,634

October

February

118,069

830,754

948,823

November

93,205

746,543

839,748

December

85,262

707,345

792,607

Service characteristics (vehicle revenue miles, vehicle revenue hours, and average speeds)
are reported for streetcar, bus, and total transit (streetcar plus bus) in Table 32. The table
reports long periods of relative stability in the amount of streetcar service since the lines
reached full operational status in the late 1990s, with a peak in the mid-2000s, and a modest
decline in service since that time. Bus revenue miles were generally between 6 million and
7 million over the entire time period, with a service decline between 2011 and 2012. The
table also reports modal average speeds (vehicle revenue miles divided by vehicle revenue
hours) with streetcar speeds tending to be slightly less than one-half those of the average
local bus. The speed values are modal averages, and the difference between streetcar and
bus is at least partially a function of the different operating environments of the average
vehicle for each mode, with the streetcars operating in primarily downtown locations.

Table 32. Annual Service Characteristics by Mode in Memphis (1993-2012)232
Vehicle Revenue Miles
Year

Streetcar

Bus

Total

Vehicle Revenue Hours
Streetcar

Bus

Total

Average Speed (VRM/VRH)
Streetcar

Bus

Total

1993

97,175

6,064,340

6,161,515

17,947

427,787

445,734

5.41

14.81

13.82

1994

125,692

6,080,448

6,206,140

19,278

421,749

441,027

6.52

14.42

14.07

1995

130,720

5,686,499

5,817,219

20,187

417,249

437,436

6.48

23.63

13.30

1996

146,118

5,710,890

5,857,008

22,568

410,150

432,718

4.47

13.92

13.54

1997

267,789

6,051,932

6,319,721

33,406

430,399

463,805

8.02

14.06

13.63

1998

298,403

6,156,937

6,455,340

37,300

407,107

444,407

8.00

15.12

14.53

1999

313,067

6,359,816

6,672,883

39,020

414,893

453,913

8.02

15.33

14.70

2000

311,843

6,497,590

6,809,433

38,890

417,952

456,842

8.02

15.55

14.91

2001

308,104

6,607,076

6,915,180

38,410

421,897

460,307

8.02

15.66

15.02

2002

313,481

6,619,459

7,120,269

38,151

422,458

460,609

8.22

15.67

15.46

2003

318,858

6,160,600

6,479,458

46,727

381,418

428,145

6.82

16.15

15.13

2004

369,008

7,059,486

7,428,494

54,950

445,132

500,082

6.72

15.86

14.85

2005

394,837

7,003,649

7,398,486

49,804

424,388

474,192

7.93

16.50

15.60
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Average Speed (VRM/VRH)

Year

Streetcar

Bus

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Total

2006

450,852

6,432,546

6,883,398

60,380

415,478

475,858

7.47

15.48

14.47

2007

447,557

6,268,114

6,715,671

60,949

399,885

460,834

7.34

15.67

14.57

2008

374,280

6,208,772

6,583,052

57,742

425,944

483,686

6.48

14.58

13.61

2009

345,416

6,207,708

6,553,124

54,561

421,643

476,204

6.33

14.72

13.76

2010

374,280

6,000,512

6,374,492

57,742

410,069

467,811

6.48

14.63

13.63

2011

259,867

6,001,317

6,261,184

40,448

385,971

426,419

6.42

15.55

14.68

2012

332,469

5,688,257

6,020,726

43,211

385,971

429,182

7.69

14.74

14.03

Note: Total is sum of bus and streetcar only. Speed (miles per hour) is a modal average calculated from the vehicle
revenue miles and vehicle revenue hours totals.

Operating expenses are reported in Table 33. Operating expenses (in inflation-adjusted
2012 dollars) for buses peaked in the early to mid-2000s before steadily declining over the
years leading to 2012. Operating expenses for streetcars increased with the expansion
of the system and have tended to echo the fluctuations in service levels over the years
since then. A significant drop in streetcar operating expenses was reported between
2011 and 2012, although it is not clear whether this represents the start of a trend toward
more cost effective service, as shown in Table 34. Cost effectiveness measures for buses
deteriorated slightly between 1993 and 2012, while streetcar cost effectiveness measures
demonstrated wide fluctuations from year to year. Streetcar service productivity exhibits a
similarly varied trend, while bus service productivity has been less volatile and appears to
be improving in recent years.

Table 33. Annual Operating Expense by Mode in Memphis (193-2012)233
Streetcar
Year
1993

Unadjusted $
$579,016

Bus
2012 $

$920,014

Total

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

$36,561,395

$28,093,400

$37,140,411

$59,013,414

1994

$1,746,219

$2,705,343

$33,480,538

$51,869,983

$35,226,757

$54,575,327

1995

$1,691,253

$2,547,977

$34,333,455

$51,725,468

$36,024,708

$24,273,445

1996

$1,670,624

$2,444,712

$32,405,807

$47,421,117

$34,076,431

$49,865,829

1997

$1,909,269

$2,731,266

$33,352,241

$47,711,368

$35,261,510

$40,442,634

1998

$2,858,027

$4,025,785

$36,539,189

$51,468,698

$39,397,216

$55,494,483

1999

$3,111,018

$4,287,453

$37,203,295

$51,271,768

$40,314,313

$55,559,221

2000

$3,217,232

$4,289,643

$38,879,564

$51,839,419

$42,096,796

$56,129,061

2001

$3,364,435

$4,361,797

$40,851,049

$52,961,044

$44,215,484

$57,322,841

2002

$3,479,137

$4,440,299

$46,821,941

$59,757,185

$50,301,078

$64,197,485

2003

$4,423,269

$5,519,470

$49,842,982

$62,195,373

$54,266,251

$67,714,844

2004

$4,373,385

$5,315,665

$47,934,808

$58,262,742

$52,308,193

$63,578,407

2005

$4,654,956

$5,472,493

$44,658,964

$52,502,295

$49,313,920

$57,974,788

2006

$4,230,666

$4,818,259

$43,369,569

$49,393,120

$47,600,235

$54,211,379

2007

$4,788,748

$5,303,891

$44,271,952

$49,034,444

$49,060,700

$54,338,334

2008

$4,253,541

$4,535,994

$42,901,365

$45,750,191

$47,154,906

$50,286,185

2009

$4,271,523

$4,571,434

$43,860,551

$46,940,073

$48,132,074

$51,511,507

2010

$4,340,918

$4,570,728

$44,811,672

$47,184,026

$49,152,590

$51,754,754
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Total

Year

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

2011

$4,796,905

$4,896,302

$43,410,309

$44,309,822

$49,106,727

$50,124,276

2012

$3,887,983

$3,887,983

$43,975,537

$43,975,537

$49,729,115

$49,729,115

Note: Total is sum of bus and streetcar only.

Table 34. Service Performance by Mode in Memphis (1993-2012)
Cost Effectiveness

Service Productivity

(Operating Expense per Passenger Trip, 2012$)

Passenger Miles per Vehicle Mile

Year

Streetcar

Bus

1993

$5.52

$4.59

Streetcar
--

Bus
9.36

1994

$5.10

$4.28

2.90

9.10

1995

$4.97

$3.73

3.00

10.59

1996

$4.70

$4.21

3.24

11.01

1997

$4.92

$4.13

2.22

10.25

1998

$4.67

$4.86

3.21

10.07

1999

$4.98

$4.89

3.33

9.57

2000

$4.39

$4.99

3.31

9.36

2001

$4.78

$4.96

5.24

9.52

2002

$4.80

$5.60

5.13

9.51

2003

$7.09

$5.82

4.90

9.93

2004

$5.41

$5.09

2.74

9.73

2005

$5.37

$4.82

2.26

8.76

2006

$5.02

$4.70

2.04

8.95

2007

$5.14

$4.69

1.95

9.70

2008

$4.47

$4.47

2.19

8.96

2009

$4.10

$4.53

2.72

9.02

2010

$3.96

$4.67

2.45

9.08

2011

$4.51

$4.77

2.76

8.33

2012

$2.61

$5.14

5.03

8.22

Note: Values calculated from Tables B-6, B-8, and B-9.

Annual mode-level streetcar performance is summarized in Table 35, while Table 36
summarizes the key dimensions of streetcar performance on a monthly basis for 2012.
According to the summary table, 2012 represented a year of higher ridership, more service,
and stronger performance for the Trolleys in Memphis.
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Table 35. Summary of Streetcar Ridership, Service, and Performance by Year in
Memphis (1993-2012)234
Year

Unlinked
Passenger Trips

Passenger
Miles

Vehicle
Revenue Miles

Vehicle
Revenue Hours

1993

166,658

--

97,175

17,947

1994

530,919

364,226

125,692

19,278

1995

512,223

392,404

130,720

20,187

1996

519,972

472,822

146,118

22,568

1997

555,597

595,190

267,789

33,406

1998

861,576

957,356

298,403

37,300

1999

861,650

1,041,919

313,067

39,020

2000

976,835

1,032,138

311,843

38,890

2001

912,058

1,613,116

308,104

38,410

2002

925,336

1,607,242

500,810

38,151

2003

778,442

1,562,396

318,858

46,727

2004

982,467

1,010,442

369,008

54,950

2005

1,018,139

891,968

394,837

49,804

2006

959,269

919,638

450,852

60,380

2007

1,031,168

873,928

447,557

60,949

2008

1,014,777

820,185

374,280

57,742

2009

1,113,809

940,028

345,416

54,561

2010

1,154,848

917,815

374,280

57,742

2011

1,086,125

718,468

259,867

40,448

2012

1,491,841

1,672,193

332,469

43,211

Year

Productivity
(PM/VM)

Cost Effectiveness
(2012$)

Speed
(VRM/VRH)

Average Trip Length
(PM/UPT)

1993

--

$5.52

5.41

--

1994

2.90

$5.10

6.52

0.85

1995

3.00

$4.97

6.48

0.77

1996

3.24

$4.70

6.47

0.72

1997

2.22

$4.92

8.02

0.68

1998

3.21

$4.67

8.00

0.70

1999

3.33

$4.98

8.02

0.75

2000

3.31

$4.39

8.02

0.83

2001

5.24

$4.78

8.02

0.74

2002

3.21

$4.80

13.13

0.75

2003

4.90

$7.09

6.82

0.73

2004

2.74

$5.41

6.72

1.03

2005

2.26

$5.37

7.93

0.88

2006

2.04

$5.02

7.47

0.96

2007

1.95

$5.14

7.34

0.85

2008

2.19

$4.47

6.48

0.81

2009

2.72

$4.10

6.33

0.84

2010

2.45

$3.96

6.48

0.79

2011

2.76

$4.51

6.42

0.66

2012

5.03

$2.61

7.69

1.12
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Table 36. Summary of Streetcar Ridership and Service by Month in Memphis
(2012)235
Month

Unlinked Passenger Trips

Vehicle Revenue Miles

Vehicle Revenue Hours

January

74,306

28,183

3,593

83,680

26,992

3,505

140,217

29,691

3,829

April

136,711

27,495

3,553

May

182,956

29,389

4,081

June

154,976

26,221

3,575

February
March

July

157,432

26,326

3,575

August

150,602

27,223

3,705

September

114,425

25,019

3,400

October

118,069

26,998

3,692

November

93,205

25,579

3,480

December

85,262

25,395

3,452

Table 37 presents streetcar stop-level average weekday boardings and alightings by stop,
segregated for each of the three lines. There is noticeable variability in ridership among
the stops within each line and in total ridership carried by each of the three lines. The
Main Street Line reports higher total boarding and alighting values compared with the
other two lines, but it is only slightly above that for the Riverfront Line (1406 vs. 1187).
The Madison Line reports significantly lower boarding and alighting values compared to
the other two (647). Table 38 presents the same data, but it is aggregated by stop for each
line that serves that stop. Here, the terminal stations and those serving the Beale Street
area and other important convention, hotel, and tourism serving locations clearly emerge
as important stops in the Trolley system.

Table 37. Streetcar Stop Level Average Weekday Boardings and Alightings
(by Line and by Stop) in Memphis, Tennessee (2012)236
Stop

Line

Direction

Central

Main

Northbound

74

2

Butler

Main

Northbound

27

7

Huling

Main

Northbound

22

3

Linden

Main

Northbound

27

3

Beale

Main

Northbound

90

24

Main/Gayso

Main

Northbound

45

17

Union

Main

Northbound

63

26

Main/Madison

Main

Northbound

103

50

Court

Main

Northbound

29

17

Poplar

Main

Northbound

35

19

Convention Center

Main

Northbound

41

88

Overton

Main

Northbound

6

7

N. Main/Overton Avenue

Main

Northbound

76

285

N. Parkway

Main

Southbound

293

13

Overton

Main

Southbound

7

3
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Stop

Line

Direction

Convention Center

Main

Southbound

143

30

Poplar Clock

Main

Southbound

52

30

Jefferson

Main

Southbound

68

47

Main/Madison

Main

Southbound

37

44

Union

Main

Southbound

36

51

Main/Gayso

Main

Southbound

29

42

Beale

Main

Southbound

43

110

Linden

Main

Southbound

21

33

Huling

Main

Southbound

12

18

Butler

Main

Southbound

20

30

Central

Main

Southbound

7

141

1,406

1,139

Central

Riverfront

Northbound

97

2

Butler

Riverfront

Northbound

48

24

Huling

Riverfront

Northbound

49

6

Linden

Riverfront

Northbound

42

9

Beale

Riverfront

Northbound

154

81

Main/Gayso

Riverfront

Northbound

93

36

Union

Riverfront

Northbound

124

61

Main/Madison

Riverfront

Northbound

168

93

Court

Riverfront

Northbound

39

27

Poplar

Riverfront

Northbound

53

27

Convention Center

Riverfront

Northbound

46

114

Overton

Riverfront

Northbound

3

17

N. Main/Overton Avenue

Riverfront

Northbound

21

370

N. Parkway

Riverfront

Southbound

148

12

Pyramid Stop

Riverfront

Southbound

0

0

Riverfront-Jefferson

Riverfront

Southbound

51

20

St. Louis-SF

Riverfront

Southbound

19

8

Beale Street Landing

Riverfront

Southbound

6

4

Huling

Riverfront

Southbound

17

10

Central

Riverfront

Southbound

9

92

1,187

1,013

Subtotal for Main Street Line

Subtotal for Riverfront Line
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Main/Madison

Madison

Eastbound

57

12

Madison/Danny Thomas

Madison

Eastbound

45

50

Madison/Hospital

Madison

Eastbound

24

24

Madison/N. Pauline

Madison

Eastbound

11

16

Madison/Cleveland

Madison

Eastbound

2

86

Madison/Cleveland

Madison

Westbound

196

7

Madison/N. Pauline

Madison

Westbound

43

11

Madison/Dunlap

Madison

Westbound

54

26

Madison/Orleans

Madison

Westbound

34

19

Madison/Danny Thomas

Madison

Westbound

51

61

Madison/Stadium Court

Madison

Westbound

41

102

Main/Madison

Madison

Westbound

Subtotal for Madison Avenue Line
Total
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5,540

Appendix B: Profile of River Rail in Memphis, Tennessee

138

Table 38. Streetcar Stop Level Average Weekday Boardings and Alightings
(Aggregated by Stop) in Memphis, Tennessee (2012)237
Stop

Line(s)

Boardings

Alightings

Central

Main, Riverfront

Butler

Main

Huling

Main, Riverfront

Linden

Main, Riverfront

90

45

Beale

Main, Riverfront

287

215

Main/Gayso

Main, Riverfront

167

95

Union

Main, Riverfront

223

138

Main/Madison

Main, Riverfront, Madison

454

403

Court

Main, Riverfront

68

44

Poplar

Main, Riverfront

88

46

Poplar Clock

Main

52

30

Convention Center

Main, Riverfront

230

232

Overton

Main, Riverfront

16

26

N. Main/Overton Avenue

Main, Riverfront

97

655

N. Parkway

Main, Riverfront

441

25

Jefferson

Main

68

47

Pyramid Stop

Riverfront

0

0

Riverfront-Jefferson

Riverfront

51

20

St. Louis-SF

Riverfront

19

8

Beale Street Landing

Riverfront

6

4

187

237

95

61

100

37

Madison/Danny Thomas

Madison

96

111

Madison/Hospital

Madison

24

24

Madison/N. Pauline

Madison

54

27

Madison/Cleveland

Madison

198

93

Madison/Dunlap

Madison

54

26

Madison/Orleans

Madison

34

19

Madison/Stadium Court

Madison

Total

41

102

3,240

2,770

These results are also depicted visually in Figure 75, where one sees that not only do
the Madison corridor stops report low boarding numbers, but so do the segment of the
Riverfront Line that borders the Mississippi River. It is apparent that the larger building
footprint area, and most probably a higher level of economic activity that characterizes
the Main Street/Riverfront corridor, results in significantly higher boarding activity at stops
located along this central downtown corridor. Also suggested in the figure is the less builtout nature of the environment around the Madison Avenue Line. This could explain in
part the lower ridership levels of this line. The low boarding and alighting activity along
the Mississippi River segment of the Riverfront Line is most probably due to the tourism
function of this part of the streetcar system, which serves more as a contemplative ride
rather than a utilitarian urban transit service.
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Figure 75 registers the spatial relationship between Special Activity Centers (SAC) and
stop-level boardings. The spatial pattern suggests that proximity to SACs tends to result
in relatively higher stop-level boarding counts along Main Street and Madison Avenue.
For example, see higher ridership values adjacent to the Convention Center, Beale Street
National Historic Conservation District, Emporium Shopping Center, and the two Health
Complexes located at the middle and East End of the Madison corridor. This particular
relationship for streetcar systems was also noted in Ramos and Brown’s statistical
exploration of stop-level ridership factors for streetcar systems in the U.S.238 The North
End Terminal and the Main and Madison Line stops report significantly high boarding
counts but are not located in close proximity to SACs. However, these stops serve as
important transfer points for bus routes, in the case of the former stop, and between the
two Trolley lines, in the case of the latter stop. This inconsistent pattern is discussed in the
next paragraph. The Great American Pyramid station reports zero boardings, as this large
sports facility had been inactive for several years at the time of the study.

Figure 75. Special Activity Centers and Stop-Level Trolley Boardings in
Memphis (2012)239
Figure 76 reports the relationship between stop-level boarding counts and bus connectivity,
as represented by the number of bus connections available at the stop. The figure also
indicates which stations offer Park & Ride facilities. The literature suggests that the number
of bus route connections at a stop, a stop’s terminal or transfer-hub function, and/or the
presence of Park & Ride facilities at a stop are positively associated with higher boarding
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activity at a stop. These relationships seem to be present in Memphis’ Trolley system and
may help explain the inconsistency noted above in relation to the significantly high boarding
counts for the North End Terminal stop and the Main/Madison stop, given the absence of
nearby SACs. Not only does the North End Station stop function as a terminus for the Main
Street Line, but it also offers Park & Ride spaces and features connections to 28 different
bus routes. The Main/Madison stop functions as a transfer point between the Main and
Madison Lines. It is also located in one the busiest intersections of downtown Memphis,
which is characterized by significant high-rise office and residential development.

Figure 76. Bus Connectivity and Stop-Level Trolley Boardings in Memphis (2012)240

INSIGHTS FROM KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS
In addition to collecting and analyzing quantitative data and documentary evidence, the
authors conducted one-hour semi-structured telephone interviews with key informants
in the Memphis region who were able to provide their perspective on streetcar goals,
performance, and future prospects. Informants represented a diverse set of perspectives,
including transit planning, economic development, and the downtown business community.
These informants were identified through documents or were suggested by other
interviewees as pertinent informants given the nature of the questions the authors hoped
to address.
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The authors sought to use the interviews to complement the insights developed from
our quantitative assessment discussed earlier and to identify hard-to-quantify phenomena
that might impact people’s perceptions of the streetcar and impact its performance. Each
informant was provided a set of 12-24 questions in advance of the interviews, including
a set of questions asked of all informants and specific questions asked of that individual,
given the role they play in the community. A set of typical interview questions can be found
in Appendix F.
For Memphis, the authors conducted three semi-structured interviews with four key
informants. Several key themes emerged from the interviews, including the streetcar’s role
as a downtown development “amenity,” its use in development promotion, and the role of
the City of Memphis as the key driving force behind streetcar implementation. The four key
informants include a senior-level streetcar planner and a senior-level transit planner, who
were interviewed together, a long-time business and economic development official, and
a downtown business community leader (Table 39). Each individual is identified by his or
her role within the narrative that follows.

Table 39. Key Informants Interviewed for Memphis Study
Informant

Role

1

Transit Planner

2

Streetcar Planner

3

Economic Development

4

Business Community

Key Organizations and Individuals in Streetcar Development
The key informants identified several organizations or individuals who had played roles
either directly or indirectly in streetcar-related issues in Memphis, although most informants
agreed that the streetcar initiative was primarily driven by the city and elected officials.
Most of the other actors who were identified focus on business and development concerns.
Among these other actors were the Bell family, which financed one of the streetcar stops
and has been engaged in redevelopment in the Beale Street area (including of the historic
Peabody Hotel), Henry Turley, who has invested in a number of developments near and
around the streetcar line, the Downtown Memphis Commission (DMC), which is the
business improvement district responsible for promoting and enhancing the development
of the Central Business District, the South Main Association of local businesses, and St.
Jude’s Hospital, which plays an important role in the downtown as a major institutional
actor. The first four of these actors seemed to be more engaged in issues that are related in
some way to the streetcar and its role in the community than the latter actor, with the DMC
playing a particularly important role by virtue of its status as a public-private partnership
with the ability to facilitate private development projects through loans, tax freezes, and
other financial incentives. DMC is most interested in attracting people to the downtown
and increasing downtown property values, and its leadership regards the streetcar lines
(the Trolley) as important assets in their efforts. The South Main Association has frequently
partnered with the DMC due to their shared interest in revitalizing downtown Memphis.
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Goals of Streetcar Implementation
The key informant interviews emphasized the primacy of development-related goals for
streetcar implementation in Memphis, whose downtown had been in serious decline for
many years prior to the opening of the Main Street Line in the early 1990s. The transit
planning and streetcar planning informants recalled the origins of the Main Street Line
in the effort to revitalize a failed pedestrian mall; the streetcar was selected to provide
better access to the mall. It was financed using federal interstate substitution funds. This
line’s primary function, in their view, was to serve as a downtown circulator that would
provide access to development. The subsequent Riverfront Line was implemented to
strengthen the connection between the downtown, the Riverfront area, and Mud Island.
The City of Memphis owned land under a railroad track (i.e., the right-of-way) and acquired
the remaining three-quarter mile [1.21 kilometer] of right-of-way needed to provide this
connection between these areas of the city. The informants noted that the later Madison
Avenue Line was built to connect the downtown area with the Medical District, which was
a major employment node with between 40,000 and 45,000 jobs. The informants noted
that this line was designed with modern light rail vehicles in mind but that vintage trolleys
were ultimately selected for it due to cost considerations.
The informants described a bleak picture of conditions in downtown Memphis that the
streetcar implementation was supposed to help turn around. The streetcar planning
informant characterized the area as a “ghost town.” The economic development informant
agreed that downtown had been decline, and he further noted that its present turnaround
began about 15-20 years ago.
The transit planning and streetcar planning informants spoke of the streetcar and
related efforts to encourage downtown revitalization. These informants spoke about the
implementation of new zoning and parking regulations, a new form-based development
code, and a new complete streets policy as being part of a package of policy changes,
along with the streetcar, to encourage new development in downtown. These changes are
characterized as much more “friendly” toward transit. Generally, these informants pointed
to positive developments in the area since streetcar implementation. These included the
renovation of the Peabody Hotel and construction of Peabody office tower, the development
of the Mud Island New Urbanist community by Henry Turley, and a number of residential,
hotel, and restaurant investments in the area near the streetcar lines. However, one
informant noted that the departure of a major hospital from the Madison Avenue Line area
had a negative effect on the area and subsequently on streetcar ridership as well.
The economic development informant also spoke of the streetcar’s role in development
efforts in downtown Memphis. He observed that the streetcar lines run through mixed-use
areas that are very desirable locations for development. These areas are walkable with
good land values, and they are desirable “hot” development because of their attractiveness
as locations for tourists and visitors. This informant emphasized Memphis’ role as a cultural
and entertainment center for the region and the streetcar’s location in the center of most of
these locations within the city. The informant also noted the streetcar’s role as an anchor
for other activities, including the development of the Main to Main multimodal project that
will provide bicycle and pedestrian connections between Memphis and West Memphis,
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Arkansas across the Mississippi River, and a number of local development projects
involving both commercial and residential properties.

Assessment of Streetcar Goals
The key informants generally view the streetcar as having been successful at attaining the
development-related goals the city had for its implementation. The informants pointed to
redevelopment activity of various types as evidence for this judgment about its performance.
The transit planning informant and streetcar planning informant offered their assessments
of each of the three streetcar lines in turn. With respect to the original Main Street Line,
they both characterized the line as a success as a circulator service within the downtown
and by virtue of its “synergistic” relationship with redevelopment at various locations along
its alignment. They pointed specifically to the Pyramid Arena (subsequently closed), a
police station, new condos and retail at one stop, and the development of the South
Main Arts District at south end of the line. More recently, they reported that there is some
redevelopment at the Pyramid Arena location (a Bass Pro shop) and new signs of life
on the pedestrian mall, as well. In addition, there is the Fed Ex Forum on South Beale
Street and some hotel redevelopment. They offered similarly positive, if less detailed,
assessments of the Riverfront Line as well. However, the transit planning informant and
streetcar planning informant had less favorable views of the Madison Avenue Line, which
was negatively affected by the relocation of a major hospital.
Overall, the transit planning informant and streetcar planning informant characterized the
streetcar as “pretty successful” in attaining its goals. They observed that the streetcar
lines are now an important part of the city’s identity. Although they pointed out that the
lines have not met their ridership projections or overall land development objectives, they
emphasized that this is largely due to the dire circumstances of the downtown when the
streetcar was first implemented.
The economic development informant noted that he would grade the streetcar lines
positively. He said that his organization views the lines as an amenity and asset that
is important for development. He further noted that tourists and residents seem to like
it. While he conceded that service quality is not consistent or reliable enough for it to
serve utilitarian trips such as commuting, he believed that it was quite adequate in serving
casual and visitor trips. He noted that it provides “character” and “activates the street”
within which it operates by encouraging more pedestrian street activity. He further noted
his impression that developers do consider it as one of the amenity factors when they
make development decisions, along with more traditional economic factors.
He noted there were opportunities to improve the service, for example, by introducing
modern cars and running them on a more reliable and predictable schedule that would
increase its attractiveness for utilitarian trips. But he characterized this as a relatively
minor issue given that the streetcar serves other purposes well.
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The business community leader spoke of the streetcar’s value in giving an identity, a
“persona,” to the South Main area, which had lacked one prior to its implementation. This
individual noted that it gave an “emotional connection” or a “unique feel” to the area, and
that it has become an icon of the larger city that is frequently seen on television coverage
of locally-hosted events. This informant spoke a great deal about the “theatrical” nature
of the streetcar with its clanging bells, creaky tracks, and vintage cars, and how other
modes of transit can’t provide the same sense of place. This individual pointed to the
streetcar’s importance for local businesses and noted that he likely would not have located
his business in the area if the streetcar had not been present.

Rider Markets and Ridership Trends
The key informant interviews noted a diversity of rider markets taking advantage of
the streetcar, with some variation in market by line and location. The transit planning
and streetcar planning informants noted the roles of Special Activity Centers, such as
Beale Street, the Peabody Place retail center, and the hospitals, as important ridership
generators. These two informants noted that the north end terminal also sees significant
transfer activity between bus and streetcar, due to the presence of a large number of
bus connections, although these connections are not coordinated through the schedule.
Nevertheless, the connections tend to result in significant use of the streetcar by transitdependent riders. The informants also reported significant transit-dependent ridership on
the Madison Avenue Line. By contrast, they report a largely tourist ridership on the Main
Street and especially the Riverfront Lines.
The ridership data presented earlier in the profile reported an approximately 40 percent
ridership increase between 2011 and 2012. The transit planning informant attributed
this as likely a combination of a number of factors, including resurgence in tourism and
convention activity, greater attendance at downtown sporting events, better enforcement
of parking regulations, improved service levels, and a general improvement to the local
economy’s tourism sector. This increase in streetcar use came at the same time as bus
ridership was in decline due to a decline in bus service levels. This study year is 2012, but
informants later reported that since 2012 the budget issues that led to bus service cuts
have also affected the streetcar. These cuts have led to a 25 percent decline in service
and a 20 percent decline in ridership as of 2014, although the transit planning informant
and streetcar planning informant insist that significant demand remains for streetcar trips.

Other Transit Issues
The transit planning informant and streetcar planning informant spoke about several other
transit-related streetcar issues, including potential future expansion plans and financial
issues. The two informants reported that there are presently no plans to expand the
streetcar system, although MATA is working on a Midtown alternatives analysis for future
transit improvements. The informants reported that bus service improvements (timedtransfers, bus rapid transit) are the focus of this analysis, although expended streetcar
service was one of the considered alternatives.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix B: Profile of River Rail in Memphis, Tennessee

145

The primary reason for the lack of serious consideration of rail expansion is financial.
Memphis has no special assessment district for the streetcar. Instead, the city has used
general obligation bonds and other local funds to finance the streetcar. The city also
provides operating support from its general revenues. The transit planning and streetcar
planning informants noted that the city is not planning to implement any transportationfocused assessment districts in the near term.

Challenges for the Streetcar
The key informant interviews with the transit planning and streetcar planning informants
pointed to two key challenges facing the streetcar in Memphis. By far the most significant
challenge is the financial one, which has necessitated a 25 percent service reduction and
resulted in a 20 percent ridership decline on the streetcar lines. The informants agreed that
new resources are needed to improve service to tap into what they regard as unserved
demand for streetcar service.
The second challenge noted by the transit planning and streetcar planning informants
results from the selection of the vintage streetcar vehicles for Memphis. The vintage
vehicles were selected for nostalgic reasons and are seen as “cool,” but they also pose
significant challenges for operation and maintenance. The vehicles are more difficult for
disabled people to access than low-floor modern vehicles. They noted a recent reduction
in ridership due to the 25 percent service drop. They are subject to frequent breakdowns. It
is often difficult and expensive to obtain replacement parts for the vehicles. The unintended
consequences of selecting vintage vehicles were also noted in other communities in this
study. The business community leader conceded that the vintage cars have their problems
but noted that it is important to keep them because the people of Memphis know and like
them. They provide a unique sense of place to the area in which they operate. If the city
had to replace them, then this individual prefers that they do so with new cars designed to
look vintage (i.e., replica historic vehicles).

Advice for Other Communities
The business community leader offered a few words of advice to other communities.
These words also serve as this individual’s final impressions of the Memphis experience.
His advice was largely related to the streetcar’s iconic role as a “signature” for a city.
This informant insisted that the streetcar revived downtown Memphis, brought in new
investment and residents to the area, and has been an asset for tourism promotion and
new development marketing. He suggested that Memphis “turned the corner” after the
streetcar was built. Therefore, he suggested that it was important to balance development
and transit objectives when deciding to make such an investment. However, despite his
insistence that the streetcar had positive development outcomes, he suggested that other
communities shouldn’t look at it as an investment that would provide a tangible return, but
he alluded to it being more of an investment to create an amenity, icon, or “unique feel”
within the community in which it might operate.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Memphis Trolley emerges as a mid-level transit performer among the five streetcar
cases considered in this study. Its ridership is second to that of Portland, and its cost
effectiveness ranks first among the five cities. It also possesses the second-longest
alignment and the largest number of lines operated. The Trolley suffers from relatively low
service productivity, which means a great deal of the provided service is underutilized.
In fact, the Trolley’s service productivity is only about two-thirds that of the average bus
operated by MATA. The Trolley’s slow speed and the location of its alignment undoubtedly
help explain these performance results, as they reduce its attractiveness for utilitarian trips
and lead to a more tourist rider profile.
The interviews emphasized that the primary rationale for the Trolley’s implementation
was to stimulate redevelopment in downtown Memphis, and the informants offer a highly
positive assessment of its role in this regard, despite the lack of any specific studies of
these development effects. The informants believe that the Trolley has played a catalytic
role in downtown redevelopment, by virtue of its role as an amenity and a potential anchor
for development activity. Further, the informants highlighted the role it plays as an icon or
symbol of Memphis.
Despite their generally upbeat assessment, the informants recognize that significant
challenges face the streetcar system, particularly financially. The vintage cars are
expensive to operate and maintain, and financial pressures have led to significant
service reductions recently. Ridership has fallen as a result. Additional resources would
be necessary to restore these service cuts, but obtaining these additional resources
appears to be problematic at present.
In summary, the Trolley emerges from the study as a mediocre transit performer but as a
service that seems to enjoy a significant level of local support due to its role in promoting
other local objectives related to development and tourism promotion.
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APPENDIX C: PROFILE OF STREETCAR LINES IN
PORTLAND, OREGON
The streetcar system in Portland is perhaps the exemplary case among the modern-era
streetcar systems operating in the U.S. The Portland streetcar lines are frequently pointed
out for their strong role in promoting adjacent urban development, their relatively high
ridership, and their relatively strong service performance.241 Most observers focus primarily
on their role as urban development tools and point to hundreds of millions of dollars of
development activity for which the streetcar is assigned a large responsibility.242 According
to transit consultant John Smatlak, the streetcars in Portland are seen as “a unique public/
private strategy to link investment in high-quality transit service with major development”243
(Figure 77).

Figure 77. A Streetcar in Portland244

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STREETCAR SERVICE
Portland’s streetcar system consists of two lines: the original north-south (NS) line through
downtown Portland on the west side of the Willamette River and the central loop line (CL)
(Figure 78). The original NS line dates to 2001, while the CL line is a late-2012 addition
to the system. The now 7.35-mile [11.83 kilometer] double-track alignment (14.7 miles
[23.66 kilometers] of single track) cost more than $250 million to build, operates primarily
in mixed-traffic operation, and includes 76 stops (Table 40).
Streetcars provide relatively frequent service during peak and off-peak travel periods, and
the services operate during most of the day on weekdays and weekends (Table 41). The
Portland streetcar system is operated by Portland Streetcar Inc., which is a non-profit
organization. However, service is actually provided by employees of Tri-Met, the primary
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local transit agency in the region, under contract. Because of this institutional arrangement,
passengers are permitted to transfer between the streetcar and local buses without paying
an additional fare during a two-hour time window. A complete listing of fares is provided in
Table 42. Prior to fall 2012, streetcar rides were free within Portland’s fare-less square in
the downtown, but this fare-free zone was abolished at that time.

Figure 78. Map of Streetcar Lines in Portland, Oregon245
In 2005, Tri-Met conducted a detailed rider survey that allowed the agency to break out
streetcar riders from its general ridership to develop a profile of these individuals.246
Although the survey is now nearly ten years old, and it predates the recent opening of
the CL line, it still provides an interesting snapshot of the streetcar users. The results also
enable a comparison between streetcar riders and Tri-Met users as a larger group. The
survey results are shown in Table 43. Streetcar riders tend to be similar to Tri-Met riders
as a group with respect to age, while streetcar riders include more very low-income and
very-high income riders than the transit system as whole. Its riders are less likely to use
the service for home-to-work trips and more likely to have accessed the service by walking
than their counterparts in the larger transit system. These differences are undoubtedly a
function of the original NS line’s downtown Portland location.
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Table 40. Physical Characteristics of Streetcar System in Portland247
Characteristic

Value

Year Open (line 1 NS, line 2 CL)

2001, 2012

Capital Cost (unadjusted dollars)

$251,420,000

Number of Lines

2 (North-South, Central Loop)

Number of Vehicles

11*

Number of Stations

76

Length

7.35 miles** (11.83 km)

Alignment Type

Exclusive

0.15 miles

Mixed Traffic

7.20 miles**

Notes:
* They operate eleven vehicles with a total inventory of 12 at present, but plan to increase the number in operation to
14 by September 2015, which requires an inventory of 17 vehicles. (email communication with Rick Gustafson on
February 5, 2014).
** The alignment is 7.35 miles of double track, or 14.7 miles of single track. (email communication with Rick Gustafson
on February 5, 2014).

Table 41. Service Characteristics of Streetcar System in Portland248
Characteristic

Value

Headways
Weekday Peak

14-17 min

Weekday Off-Peak

15-22 min

Weekend Average

17 min

Hours of Service
Monday-Friday

18 hr

Saturday

16 hr

Sunday

15 hr

Table 42. Fare and Transfer Policy for Transit Services in Portland249
Characteristic

Type

Fare Type

Streetcar fare

$1.00

TriMet All Day Fare

$5.00

TriMet Falt Fare

$2.50

TriMet Honored Citizen Fare

$1.00

TriMet Youth Fare

$1.65

Pass Type

Streetcar Only Annual Pass

Transfer Fee

Bus/Streetcar

Cost ($)

$200.00
--

Note: TriMet Fares will be valid on Streetcar and TriMet for 2 hours; Adult: 18-64; Honored Citizen: 65+, and people
on medicare and people with a disability; Youth: age 7-17 and students in high school or pursuing a GED.

As noted earlier, Portland’s streetcar lines are operated under the aegis of Portland
Streetcar, Inc. (PSI), although employees of Tri-Met, Portland’s primary transit agency,
actually handle day-to-day operations under contract. The two streetcar lines are thus part
of a multimodal transit system consisting of bus, light rail, and streetcar services. Tri-Met’s
multimodal transit system is shown in Figure 79. The streetcar lines lie at the core of the
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transit system, operating on both sides of the Willamette River since the fall 2012 opening
of the CL line. The downtown area is also served by numerous bus routes and light rail
transit, which provide connecting service at a number of streetcar stops (Figure 80). The
system appears to be well integrated.
Table 43. Customer Profile, Tri-Met, Portland250
TriMet System (%)
Age

19 or under

9

19 - 24

19

21

27

33

35 - 44

17

14

45 - 54

16

13

55 - 64

7

8

over 65
Under $10,000

Trip Purpose

5

7

100

100

17

22

$10,000 to $19,000

14

13

$20,000 to $29,000

14

13

$30,000 to $39,000

12

13

$40,000 to $49,000

6

7

$50,000 to $59,000

4

5

$60,000 to $69,000

17

3

$70,000 or more

7

17

Don’t know

9

7

Total
Access Mode

4

25 - 34

Total
Income

Streetcar (%)

100

100

Walked

76

88

Automobile

10

4

Transit Transfer

12

7

Other

2

1

Total

100

100

Home-based Trips

82

68

Work

45

21

School

11

15

Recreation

3

9

Personal Business

8

8

Shopping

5

9

Visiting friends/relatives

4

2

Medical

2

3

Other
Non-home-based Trips
Total

4

1

18

32

100

100

Note: Categories reported as defined in source materials.
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Figure 80. Map of Transit System in Downtown Portland, Oregon252
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SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT FOR STREETCAR SERVICE
The Portland streetcar lines operate within the downtown area on both sides of the
Willamette River. The authors examined the socioeconomic characteristics and built
environment contexts within which the streetcar lines operate as part of the study, given
the importance of these factors for transit ridership in other communities. The authors
believed that a consideration of these factors would provide some explanation for the
level of ridership on the streetcar lines and the particular rider markets being served. A
discussion of these issues follows in the next several pages.
At the time of the 2010 Census, the city of Portland, Oregon had a population of just under
584,000 people within a metropolitan area whose population totaled about 2.2 million.253 The
city’s median household income was just over $51,000 per year, while about 17 percent of the
population lived below the poverty line. The city population was more than 75 percent white,
with a 6 percent black population and small but growing Asian and Hispanic populations
(7 percent and 9 percent, respectively).
As transit ridership is closely related to population (trip productions or origins) and
employment (trip attractions or destinations), the authors began by mapping the spatial
distribution of population and employment in Portland. As the streetcar lines, and the
Tri-Met transit system within which they are situated, are constrained within the Oregon
counties that make up the Portland-Vancouver metropolitan area, the maps depict the
Oregon side of the Columbia River, with a focus on the city of Portland itself.
Figures 81 and 82 display city-scale population and population density, both by census
block group, at the time of the 2010 Census. The maps indicate that within the city of
Portland, population totals by block group are much higher in the outer areas than within
the inner parts of the city. However, the shift to population density in the second map
points to some high population concentrations in inner area neighborhoods, including in
the downtown area served by the streetcar lines on the west side of the Willamette River.
This pattern becomes even clearer when one examines the larger scale maps focused
on downtown Portland (Figures 83 and 84). The block groups within the streetcar service
area on the west side of the river have moderate to high densities, particularly in the
northern section, while densities are much lower on the east side of the river, where the
recent streetcar line extension opened in fall 2012.
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Figure 81. Population by Block Group in Portland (2010)254

Figure 82. Population Density by Block Group in Portland (2010)255
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Figure 83. Population by Block Group in Core of Portland (2010)256
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Figure 84. Population Density by Block Group in Core of Portland (2010)257
Employment represents potential attractors for trips. Figures 85 and 86 depict the spatial
distribution of employment and employment density, respectively, on a city scale. The
employment pattern is quite dispersed, with a number of employment clusters visible on the
maps. The employment density map is the most telling, as it clearly depicts the downtown
as a high density center, as well as several higher density centers on the east side of the
river but not along its shoreline, where the new streetcar line is in service. Figures 87
and 88 serve as downtown-focused counterparts to the prior two maps, focusing on the
areas in the immediate vicinity of the two streetcar lines. These maps clearly point to the
moderate to high densities of employment along the older line on the west side of the river,
in Portland’s downtown, particularly to the northwest of the streetcar alignment. Much
lower densities are shown along the east side of the river, which is a focal point of current
local redevelopment efforts.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix C: Profile of Streetcar Lines in Portland, Oregon

Figure 85. Employment by Block Group in Portland (2010)258

Figure 86. Employment Density by Block Group in Portland (2010)259
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Figure 87. Employment by Block Group in Core of Portland (2010)260

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

157

Appendix C: Profile of Streetcar Lines in Portland, Oregon

158

Figure 88. Employment Density by Block Group in Core of Portland (2010)
Earlier it was noted that Portland is an overwhelmingly white city but one with growing
minority populations. The next several figures depict the spatial distribution of the city’s
different racial and ethnic groups. Figures 89 and 90 focus on the black population, which
is smaller than either the Hispanic or Asian populations in the city. The figures clearly
indicate larger black populations in the city’s northern areas, particularly on the east side
of the Willamette River. Larger black populations also are situated within the downtown
area, on both sides of the river, and in scattered locations throughout the community.
However, compared with the other racial and ethnic groups, the actual sizes of these
communities, in numbers of people, tend to be relatively modest.
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Figure 89. Black Population by Block Group in Portland (2010)261

Figure 90. Black Population by Block Group in Core of Portland (2010)262
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The spatial distribution of the white population, which represents the largest group in the
city, is shown in Figures 91 and 92. This population is present in large numbers throughout
the city, but it is greatest in the center of the city and in areas to the southwest of the
downtown core. Most block groups in the downtown areas served by the streetcar lines
have very large white population shares.

Figure 91. White Population by Block Group in Portland (2010)263

Figure 92. White Population by Block Group in Core of Portland (2010)264
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The various exhibits suggest that among the different racial or ethnic groups, the spatial
distribution of the Hispanic population is most dispersed (Figures 93 and 94). Hispanics
are present in significant numbers across different parts of the city, although slightly higher
Hispanic population shares exist in the eastern portions of the city and on the east side of
the Willamette River in northwest Portland. The Asian population share is highest in the
block groups in northwest Portland and in the city’s eastern sections (Figures 95 and 96).

Figure 93. Hispanic Population by Block Group in Portland (2010)265

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix C: Profile of Streetcar Lines in Portland, Oregon

162

Figure 94. Hispanic Population by Block Group in Core of Portland (2010)266
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Figure 95. Asian Population by Block Group in Portland (2010)267

Figure 96. Asian Population by Block Group in Core of Portland (2010)268
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The literature suggests that transit use is closely tied to household income and vehicle
access, which are also related to one another.269 The spatial pattern of median household
income for Portland is shown in Figures 97 and 98. The pattern of household income is
strikingly similar to the spatial distributions of white and Asian population shares seen in
preceding maps. In general, block groups with high white and/or Asian population shares
tend to have high incomes. The center of eastern Portland has a cluster of higher income
block groups, and a long string of higher income block groups is situated along the city’s
western boundary. The core areas served by the streetcar lines fall into the lower median
household income categories, although higher income zones appear in the northern and
southern reaches of the line on the west side of the river.

Figure 97. Median Household Income by Block Group in Portland (2010)270
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Figure 98. Median Household Income by Block Group in Core of Portland (2010)271
A general correspondence tends to appear between the spatial distribution of household
income and that of vehicle access, with lower income block groups generally tending to
have lower levels of vehicle access per housing unit. Indeed, the outer areas and western
areas, with higher household incomes, tend to have higher levels of vehicle access
(Figures 99 and 100). The downtown areas around the streetcar lines are almost entirely
in the lowest category on vehicles per housing unit, which suggests they are promising
locations from which to attract transit users.
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Figure 99. Vehicles per Housing Unit by Block Group in Portland (2010)272

Figure 100. Vehicles per Housing Unit by Block Group in Core of Portland (2010)273
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The final set of socioeconomic maps depicts the spatial pattern of transit commute mode
share by block group in Portland (Figures 101 and 102). The maps indicate that the transit
share is highest in the core areas, including in the area served by the streetcar line, and
in scattered locations elsewhere in the city. It should be emphasized that the mode share
reflects use of any transit mode for commuting only, and it is not clear whether trips are
being made by bus or one of the rail modes, including streetcar. Nevertheless, it is apparent
from this map that many residents in different parts of the city are taking advantage of the
well-regarded local transit system to serve their work trips, and undoubtedly to serve other
types of trips also. The authors focus on ridership patterns in much more detail later in the
profile section.

Figure 101. Transit Commute Share by Block Group in Portland (2010)274
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Figure 102. Transit Commute Share by Bock Group in Core of Portland (2010)275

Summarizing across the set of socioeconomic maps, Portland’s downtown areas,
and particularly those on the west side of the Willamette River, emerge as promising
locations to produce and attract transit trips. Population and employment are present in
large numbers. Household incomes and/or levels of vehicle access tend to be lower than
elsewhere in the city. The area is well served by the entire multi-modal transit system
consisting of bus, light rail, and streetcar, and there are relatively high transit commute
shares as a result. It is perhaps not surprising then that Portland emerges as by far the
most successful modern-era streetcar system when assessed on purely ridership and
other transit performance measures. In addition, the city is well known for its transitsupportive land use and development policies. The authors briefly describe the local land
use and development context for the streetcar lines in the section that follows.
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LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT FOR STREETCAR SERVICE
Portland is well known for its transit-supportive land use policies, and one would suspect
the area in which the streetcar operates to be zoned in such a way as to support transit use.
As shown in Figure 103, the downtown core features a mixture of uses, but it is primarily
commercial and employment in its land use designation. The employment density maps
shown earlier suggest that high intensity developments are located within these land use
categories, but with a notable difference in density between the west and east sides of the
Willamette River where the NS Line and the CL Line operate, respectively. The west side
of the river, Portland’s downtown and adjacent areas, exhibits much higher employment
and population densities than the east side of the river. This pattern is also visible in the
higher average stop-level boarding counts for stops on the west side of the river.
All of this indicates that the downtown area on the west side of the river is already a major
trip destination for transit and other trips, whether by residents or community visitors,
and the east side is an area that might become a major center for trip attraction if higherintensity employment and residential development were to occur. The downtown is also
a heavily built-up area, as shown in Figure 104. This map depicts the streetcar alignment
and stops against the building footprint. Also depicted on this map are special activity
centers such as universities, museums, hospitals, libraries, transit centers, and other
important destinations likely to attract disproportionate numbers of trips by all modes.
Many of these kinds of locations are either along the NS Line or easily accessible via a
short walk or connecting bus ride. Figure 105 indicates that many such uses are located
along the NS Line near stops with large numbers of daily boardings. The presence of
hospitals and educational centers in promoting higher boarding is particularly salient in
Portland’s streetcar system.
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Figure 103. Zoning Around Streetcar in Portland276
On the other hand, the areas around the CL Line have fewer special activity centers,
and the streetcar stops register lower boarding levels. Employment and residential landuse intensity is also much lower on the east side of the river than on the west side, a
characteristic that reduces the relative potential for trip generation and attraction along the
CL Line. However, the lower ridership level on this line may also be a result of fact that the
CL Line only opened in 2012, while the older NS Line has been in operation since 2001.
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Figure 104. Special Activity Centers Around Streetcar in Portland277
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Figure 105. Special Activity Centers and Streetcar Boardings in Portland (2012)278
Portland’s streetcar system traverses a set of diverse urban landscapes characterized by
traditional orthogonal street networks but with distinct land-use compositions, development
intensities, functions, and building typologies. Figure 106 reports the location and building
footprint of the eight neighborhoods within which the streetcar lines operate: Northwest
District, Pearl District, Old Town, Downtown Portland, PSU (Portland State University),
Lloyd District, Central Eastside Industrial District, and South Waterfront. The Northwest
District and Central Eastside Industrial District are the two neighborhoods in which the
total built area appears to be smaller when compared with the other districts. Mid-rise and
low-rise structures primarily populate these districts, and the average block sizes within
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a 400-meter [one quarter mile] radius of streetcar stops are 2.58 acres [1.04 hectares] in
Northwest district and 1.42 acres [0.57 hectares] in Central Eastside Industrial District.
Another difference between these two districts is the combined population plus employment
densities, which are much higher in the Northwest district than in the other district.
These differences in density reflect the different functions these areas perform within
the overall metropolitan structure and their different histories, in which the Northwest
accommodates a significant number of residents and employment along the streetcar
corridor, and the Central Eastside Industrial District historically accommodates more lightindustrial activities and less resident population. According to the regional transit planner
informant, this latter district, however, has been targeted by the city administration to
accommodate more mixed-use developments. As part of a comprehensive Complete
Streets program in Portland, both areas are provided sidewalks and pedestrian facilities.
In part as a result of these key land-use and development-intensity differences, total stoplevel boardings in the Northwest district are substantially higher than those in the Central
Eastside Industrial district.

Figure 106. Neighborhoods Around Portland’s Streetcar Corridors279
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The Lloyd District is the most heterogeneous area when compared with the other seven
neighborhoods. A variety of activities are in the area, along with a notable presence of large
assembly building typologies including the Oregon Convention Center, the Mode Center
(home of the Portland Trail Blazers), and the Veterans Memorial Coliseum. In contrast with
the other neighborhoods that compose the streetcar service area in Portland, a notable
number of parcels in the Lloyd District are vacant and/or presently used as parking facilities
for local businesses and some high-rise office buildings. Combined employment plus
population densities register low values as compared with other neighborhoods served by
the streetcar, and the average block size in areas surrounding streetcar stops is 2.17 acres
[0.88 hectares], which is in the medium range of values for all the neighborhoods. Despite
the presence of several large assembly occupancy buildings, stop-level boarding counts
in this district are low, probably reflecting the low population and employment densities
and the ample supply of parking throughout the district.
The Downtown Portland district represents one of the highest intensity areas populated
by high-rise office buildings and a diversity of cultural, retail, and institutional destinations.
It reports a relatively high combined population plus employment density and the lowest
average block size value among all the neighborhoods. Stop-level ridership is high when
compared with the CL Line corridor but within the medium-high range for the NS Line.
In addition to the Northwest district, the PSU (Portland State University) district and the
Pearl district report the highest combined average population plus employment density
among the different neighborhoods and very similar average block size. However, they
perform distinct functions within the larger city structure. PSU is eminently an educational
and cultural complex with a significant number of residents, students, and faculty. The
Pearl district is a relatively recent development from the 1990s that grew together with
the first NS streetcar line and is characterized by mixed-use and high-rise condominiums.
These land-use and development intensity characteristics are considered conducive for
transit patronage. These two areas also report high stop-level boardings when compared
with the CL Line and other modern-era streetcar systems in the U.S.
The South Waterfront district is a new mixed-use high-rise development on the edge of the
Willamette River and somewhat geographically detached from the other districts. It is located
in a relatively narrow strip of land between the Willamette River and Highway 5. Despite
the presence of some high-rise investments, it currently reports a low combined average
population plus employment density and the largest average block size. As this district is
currently undergoing redevelopment, and significant portions are still underdeveloped, this
area can be considered in a transitional stage in which higher densities could be expected
in the future. As such, it currently reports some of the lowest stop-level ridership counts on
the NS Line, with the exception of the South Aerial Tram Station, which links to the nearby
Oregon Health Sciences University (OHSU) complex. Interestingly, this station reports the
highest boarding of all NS Line stops (762), undoubtedly due to significant transfer activity
between the streetcar and the aerial tram.
In summary, the locations served by the streetcar lines are diverse in terms of their land uses,
development levels, roles they play in the city, and even to an extent their socioeconomic
characteristics and demographics. However, those areas located on the west side of the
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Willamette River tend to possess many of the attributes traditionally associated with higher
transit use, and the stop-level boarding counts are undoubtedly higher in these areas as
a result. The authors consider streetcar ridership and performance in more detail later in
the narrative.

HISTORIC BACKGROUND ON STREETCAR DEVELOPMENT
Portland’s first streetcar line was a horse-powered system that began operating down First
Avenue in 1872. The two-mile line was built and operated by the Portland Street Railway
Company founded by Ben Holladay. The streetcar quickly became a popular transportation
service in the area, and by 1888, Holladay had expanded his line, and at least four other
companies began operating their own lines. This expansion of the horse-powered Portland
streetcar system was quite strenuous on the horses that drew the streetcars, and quite
expensive as well. As a result, Willamette Bridge Railway began operating the first electric
streetcar in 1889. In 1890, the Portland Cable Railway Company introduced its first steampowered cable car system.280
As the streetcar system continued to evolve and expand because of the increased
capabilities of the new electric streetcar technology, many Portland suburbs, such as
Council Crest, Hawthorne, and Irvington, began to rapidly develop along the lines outside
of the city center. During the start of the 1890s, many struggling streetcar companies
began mergers that resulted in the Portland Consolidated Street Railway Company, the
largest western streetcar company at the time. In 1893, the “first interurban railway” was
developed between Oregon City and Portland.281
By the early 1900s, the majority of streetcar lines had been converted to electric overhead
systems. Most of the larger streetcar companies struggled financially due to their heavy
debt burdens. This led to several buyouts and a final consolidation of the systems under
the Portland Railway, Light and Power Company.282
Between 1906 and 1920, Portland Railway, Light and Power Company “operated 40 lines
over 300 miles [482.80 kilometers] of track with 583 streetcars.”283 Although ridership
levels were high and many streetcar improvements and investments occurred, streetcar
line expansion soon stopped almost entirely. After World War I, there were few changes
to the lines, and by the start of the Great Depression, the streetcar had begun to give way
to the bus and personal automobile. The last Portland streetcar to begin operation was
purchased in 1932. Despite a brief comeback of streetcar transit caused by World War
II gasoline rationing, many streetcar lines were converted to bus routes, and the cars
themselves were used for scrap metal. The last intra-city electric streetcar operation was
shut down in 1950, and the last interurban streetcar service was halted in 1958. At this
time, the Oregon Electric Railway Historical Society was organized and commissioned to
preserve the handful of remaining streetcars and their history.284
It was almost 30 years before electric rail ran through Portland again, but this time it was in
the form of a regional light-rail system called MAX (Metropolitan Area Express) that made
stops throughout downtown Portland. At the same time, in 1987, Vintage Trolley Inc. was
established to pursue the development of a vintage streetcar system. In 1991, Vintage
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Trolley succeeded in its mission and began providing a privately-funded heritage streetcar
service from downtown Portland to the Lloyd Center shopping mall on the east side of the
Willamette River. The system utilized pre-existing MAX tracks and operated four Council
Crest replica trolleys that ran on weekends, holidays, and special event days. The Oregon
Electric Railway Historical Society started operating a tourist-oriented Willamette Shore
Trolley service running down the old Jefferson Street Line to Lake Oswego. At about
this time, the City of Portland began discussing plans to develop a new, more modern
downtown streetcar line.285
The idea for a new modern streetcar was first introduced in Portland’s 1988 Central City
Plan.286 The streetcar was originally planned to help bring development to the downtown
area, which expected to see significant population growth in the next half-century.287 Also,
with increasing population densities and housing development in the downtown area, there
was a need for more transportation options that did not require use of the automobile.288 In
1990 city officials started a Streetcar Feasibility Study and created the Streetcar Citizens
Advisory Committee.289 However, progress was slow on these efforts. At the beginning of
1994, in the midst of further light-rail system development, Portland City Council and city
planners began preliminary engineering and data gathering for the streetcar project that
they believed “could [pull] together inner-city neighborhoods and [foster] new business
and housing development along its way.”290
More than a year later, in April 1995, the city finally called for design bids for a line that
ran from Northwest Portland, through downtown, to Portland State University (PSU).
Estimated construction costs were approximately $30 million, and the goal for completion
was in September 1997.291 Unfortunately investors and developers weren’t confident in
the city’s backing of the service, and the city received only one incomplete bid. It wasn’t
until July 1996 that funding for the streetcar was again considered. The city of Portland
and Tri-Met, the Portland metro area’s mass transit provider, included a $6 million request
along with its light-rail appropriations request to the U.S. Congress.292
It was a at a U.S. Senate meeting in July 1996 that streetcar development took off when
$6 million in funding was approved. By August, preliminary engineering for a 2.1-mile
[3.38 kilometer] line was completed, and Portland Streetcar, Inc. had developed a plan
to fund the estimated $42 million project through a mix of private investment, local funds,
and federal grants.293 At year’s end, the streetcar project made another stride forward
when the City Council agreed to re-allocate $5 million of Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) funds to Tri-Met for what was to be called the Central City Streetcar.294 As
momentum was picking up, Portland City Commissioner Charlie Hales proposed a more
expanded streetcar system that would consist of six streetcar lines. However, this idea
was considered too ambitious, and it was shelved until the original line’s issues, such as
lack of operating funds, were addressed.295
On July 30, 1997, Portland City Council approved the use of a $5 million grant and
another $1 million from city parking facility reserves to pay for further engineering of the
newly-dubbed Portland Streetcar. The Council was persuaded by a presentation that
suggested the streetcar was cheaper and easier to build than light rail.296 Nearly a year
later, the City Council convened again to consider streetcar issues, this time approving

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix C: Profile of Streetcar Lines in Portland, Oregon

177

the proposed 2.4-mile [3.86 kilometer] design and budget plan of the Portland Streetcar.
Included in this plan was a property tax increase for property owners along the line route
and issuance of $27 million in city bonds, along with several other minor fundraising
activities and the previously mentioned financing options.297 Furthermore, Tri-Met agreed
to cover the estimated $1.6 million of annual operating costs.298 Although the Portland
Streetcar had attracted significant support, there was still some opposition to streetcar
development. This resistance stemmed from the proposed increases in parking fees and
suspected parking troubles in general, as well as from property owners located in the
new taxing district.299
By September 1998, Portland awarded contracts to M.F Wirth Rail Corp for the tracks and
Stacy & Witbeck for construction.300 By the beginning of 1999, a streetcar manufacturer
was selected from the Czech Republic to provide five streetcars for a total of $12 million.301
Crews began groundbreaking on April 5, 1999 and construction in May.302 While construction
was underway, plans for expanding the line were already being discussed. Some of the
proposed expansions included bus and light-rail connections and an extension of one-anda-half miles of track from PSU.303 Ideas to connect the Portland Streetcar to the Willamette
Shore Trolley were also presented.304 By August 2000, nearly 90 percent of the streetcar
track construction and utility relocation was completed. A maintenance facility, which had
minor connectivity issues, was also coming close to completion. Construction was pegged
to finish in May 2001, and opening date was set for July 20.305
The Portland Streetcar ran into only minor issues during its construction period. Some of
these issues included Tri-Met contract disputes for providing service, the ordering of two
more streetcars, complications at MAX line crossings, and a dispute with consultants over
released information.306 On April 5, 2001, the first streetcar, sponsored by PSU, arrived in
Portland.307 Throughout May and June, the remaining four streetcars arrived, and testing/
training ensued. On July 20, 2001, Portland Streetcar service between Legacy Good
Samaritan Hospital and PSU began.308
Over the next decade, the Portland Streetcar system experienced four major expansions.
The first two extension projects had been proposed back in December 1999, more than
a year before the original line was complete.309 The plans originated from the desire of
the city to connect the streetcar to Portland’s waterfront and spur development in the
area along the Willamette River.310 After receiving little federal aid for either project, the
City Council approved the use of $15.6 million in local funds for the first expansion.311
Construction on the 0.6-mile [0.97 kilometer] extension, which ran from PSU southeast
to the neighborhood of Riverplace, began January 2004.312 On March 11, 2005, the line
extension opened for service.313
The second streetcar line expansion continued on from Riverplace south to South
Waterfront and an urban renewal district (North Macadam), where it could potentially
service Oregon Health and Science University via an aerial tram. This projected $15.5
million plan utilizing old right-of-way was approved in August 2004.314 As with the first
extension, local funds were used with nearly one-third of them coming from Portland
Metro’s Metropolitan Transportation Improvement Program.315
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Track construction began early in 2005 and was completed by August. However, the new
streetcars’ arrival had been delayed, pushing back opening day to October 20, 2006.316
Plans for the next extension, that would bring the streetcar line to the southern part of
the South Waterfront District, were approved by the City Council in July 2006. Council
members hoped the streetcar would encourage redevelopment as it had been perceived
to have done in previous projects. Half of the funding for the $14.5 million loop extension
was to come from property owners and a state grant.317 Construction on what was being
called the Lowell Extension started a month after the City Council vote and was completed
in December 2006.318 A year after construction began, in August of 2007, the extension
became an operating part of the streetcar line.
Lobbying for the biggest of the four Portland Streetcar extensions, which would cross the
Willamette and serve the eastside area, had been going on since at least 2000. The first
prospective plans for the loop were presented in June 2003 and included estimated costs
of upwards of $100 million. The plan called for a streetcar bridge crossing from Northwest
Portland to the Lloyd District, track running south through the Central Eastside Industrial
District to the Oregon Museum of Science and Industry, and another crossing over another
bridge where it would connect to the original line near South Waterfront.319 The 3.3 mile
project was expected to calm traffic, make streets safer, and entice development in the
area.320 Funding for the extension, unlike the previous ones, was to use a mix of federal
and local funding- with local funds coming from “property owners on the route, state lottery
proceeds and urban renewal money.”321 Another main funding source was expected to be
a grant from the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) Small Starts program.322
In October 2009, two months after the official ground-breaking, the Portland Streetcar
Loop Project, estimated to cost $150 million, received a pre-approved grant of $75 million
from the FTA.323 Track work began at the start of 2010.324 As construction moved along,
problems regarding the streetcars themselves arose. Part of the grant agreement required
the streetcars be made locally, and new streetcar manufacturer Oregon Iron Works was
having difficulty engineering the propulsion system. As a result, date of completion for the
streetcar was set back to late 2012, and the number of streetcars was reduced to five.325
Although the track was mostly completed at the end of 2011, it wasn’t until September 22,
2012 that the Portland Streetcar Central Loop Line began operating.
The track extensions were not the not the only major changes to the Portland Streetcar
system; the fare system also went through a significant transformation. Prior to September
2012, most rides on the streetcar were free, and there was minimal monitoring to ensure
tickets were purchased when necessary. Originally, Tri-Met, with Portland Streetcar piggybacking, had utilized a “Free Rail Zone” in which riders did not have to pay a fare for either
the MAX or Portland Streetcar while riding in this area.326 Considering the vast majority
of streetcar rides happened within this zone, only $179,000 in fare revenue was being
generated, with most revenue coming from riders traveling from just outside the northwest
part of the zone who had to purchase $2.10 all day streetcar passes. A 2011 proposal to end
the fare-free zone and begin charging an additional smaller fare instead had faced resistance
from several parties including the Downtown Neighborhood Association and PSU.327
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However, in June 2012, Tri-Met officially ended the Free Rail Zone.328 And by September,
Portland Streetcar followed suit and also began charging what was known as a streetcar
circulator fare. Although customers could still buy the all day passes, which were also
valid for two hours on other Tri-Met transit systems, this new $1 fare would be valid for two
hours on the streetcar with no transfer included. This fare was targeted to riders traveling
within the old Free Rail Zone who did not wish to purchase the more expensive day pass.
Annual streetcar-only passes were raised from $100 to $250 as well. The revenues from
this fare increase were estimated to bring in nearly $1 million annually and help reduce
budget deficits.329 Subsequently, a slew of new ticket machines were set up at streetcar
stations to make it easier for riders to buy tickets, as opposed to buying them upon entering
the streetcar as before. To appease constituents at PSU who felt the fare would not be
affordable for some riders, Portland Streetcar agreed to a five-year contract that would allow
students and faculty to ride the streetcar for free in exchange for a monetary sponsorship.330

STREETCAR RIDERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE
Among the modern-era streetcar systems in the U.S., the Portland streetcar system is
by far the most successful transit investment, as the authors discuss in the sections that
follow. The authors first examined ridership trends in Portland at the modal level on an
annual basis from the opening of the first line in 2001 through 2012, the primary year of
analysis in this study. All the data are presented here with the caution that prior to 2011,
streetcar data were combined with light rail data for National Transit Database reporting
purposes. Therefore, it is more difficult to identify longer-term trends for many measures
for Portland than for the other cases in which there was no light rail operation in existence,
and Portland’s light rail data pre-2011 actually reflect streetcar statistics.
Table 44 reports the annual ridership data for Portland for streetcar, light rail, bus, and
the total fixed-route services operated by Tri-Met. Ridership data are reported, when
available, on an unlinked passenger trip (boardings) and passenger miles basis. The table
reports that streetcar ridership has increased steadily, as has light rail ridership, while
bus ridership has fallen. Streetcar ridership accounts for about three percent of Tri-Met
boardings versus more than 40 percent for light rail, and the remainder for bus. Dividing
the passenger miles column by the unlinked passenger trips column results in an average
trip length of a little over one mile for streetcar riders, which indicates the system’s function
as a downtown circulator. By contrast, the average bus trip is just under four miles and the
average light rail trip just over five miles.
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Table 44. Annual Ridership by Mode in Portland (2001-2012)331
Unlinked Passenger Trips
Year

Streetcar

2001

Unlinked Passenger Miles

Bus

Light Rail

Total

65,427,872

24,976,610

90,404,482

not available 216,054,689 144,023,605 360,078,294

Streetcar

Bus

Light Rail

Total

1,467,228

71,120,321

28,253,547 100,841,096

not available 239,044,998 167,554,612 406,599,610

2003

1,787,202

66,434,912

31,149,038

99,371,152

not available 237,345,046 169,571,618 406,916,664

2004

1,935,653

65,938,456

31,516,208

99,390,317

not available 241,598,358 181,760,354 423,358,712

2005

2,517,310

68,764,832

34,755,147 106,307,289

not available 245,065,287 178,499,147 423,564,434

2006

2,733,856

65,933,541

34,591,510

34,591,510

not available 247,565,590 179,875,394 427,440,984

2007

3,375,699

63,430,058

36,123,810 102,929,567

not available 223,265,805 186,540,535 409,806,340

2008

3,880,079

64,114,973

38,931,646 106,926,698

not available 222,676,178 193,574,421 416,250,599

2009

3,785,553

68,033,035

39,306,691

111,125,279

not available 252,790,287 206,106,550 458,896,837

2010

3,950,860

60,508,249

42,452,640 106,911,749

not available 231,580,852 208,779,167 440,360,019

2011

3,788,400

58,248,403

41,172,344 103,209,147

3,652,854 219,728,219 215,384,677 438,765,750

2012

3,664,538

59,509,235

42,227,665 105,401,438

3,732,743 233,601,992 223,788,159 461,122,894
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Ridership does not exhibit any strong seasonal pattern (Table 45). Monthly unlinked
passenger trips data for all modes seem to follow a generally consistent pattern, with
weather and perhaps differences in the number of days in a month responsible for much
of the variation from one month to another.

Table 45. Monthly Unlinked Passenger Trips by Mode in Portland (2012)332
Unlinked Passenger Trips
Month

Streetcar

Bus

Light Rail

Total

January

275,340

4,993,600

3,258,900

8,527,840

February

264,540

4,956,600

3,266,400

8,487,540

March

334,810

5,113,200

3,502,200

8,950,210

April

318,980

5,202,300

3,579,100

9,100,380

May

330,530

5,392,600

3,753,000

9,476,130

June

308,650

4,943,000

3,605,480

8,857,130

July

312,300

4,847,900

3,721,500

8,881,700

August

320,100

4,947,200

3,720,100

8,987,400

September

315,680

4,796,200

3,188,400

8,300,280

October

338,040

5,570,600

3,457,600

9,366,240

November

322,000

4,983,700

3,016,600

8,322,300

December

294,750

4,636,200

2,805,700

7,736,650

Annual service statistics for vehicle revenue miles and vehicle revenue hours are reported
in Table 46. Streetcar statistics are available only from 2008, as prior to that time they were
folded into the light rail statistics. Looking at streetcar service from 2008 to 2012, one notes
the decline in service in 2010 and the increase in service in the two years since then. While
streetcar service increased during this time, service on light rail and bus declined. One can
divide vehicle revenue miles by vehicle revenue hours to calculate average modal speed.
For 2012, the resulting values are 5.7 miles [9.17 kilometers] per hour (streetcar), 11.8 miles
[18.99 kilometers] per hour (bus), and 14.6 miles [23.50 kilometers] per hour (light rail). The
slower streetcar speeds are the result of its downtown location and predominantly mixedtraffic operating environment.
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Table 46. Annual Service Characteristics by Mode in Portland (2001-2012)333
Vehicle Revenue Miles

Vehicle Revenue Hours

Streetcar

Bus

Light Rail

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Light Rail

Total

not available

22,957,607

5,051,406

28,009,013

not available

1,856,166

286,115

2,142,281

2002

not available

23,576,663

5,664,277

29,240,940

not available

1,879,205

337,073

2,216,278

2003

not available

23,776,175

5,823,757

29,599,932

not available

1,882,890

351,764

2,234,654

2004

not available

24,013,628

6,023,056

30,036,684

not available

1,887,608

356,708

2,244,316

2005

not available

23,980,719

6,671,716

30,652,435

not available

1,873,568

415,713

2,289,281

2006

not available

23,137,816

6,377,513

29,515,329

not available

1,800,848

408,715

2,209,563

2007

not available

22,535,520

6,564,411

29,099,931

not available

1,830,709

428,990

2,259,699

2008

216,308

22,518,199

6,658,955

29,393,462

38,047

1,843,670

416,565

2,298,282

2009

210,362

22,669,862

7,111,025

29,991,249

37,001

1,878,880

453,871

2,369,752

2010

173,714

21,187,725

7,971,861

29,333,300

30,555

1,778,961

535,728

2,345,244

2011

199,075

19,396,640

7,808,150

27,403,865

35,241

1,636,603

533,157

2,205,001

2012

209,283

19,169,232

7,744,290

27,122,805

36,739

1,625,650

529,180

2,191,569

Annual operating expenses by mode are reported in Table 47. Looking at the inflation-adjusted dollars columns, one sees steady
increases in operating costs that appear to be a function of increased service, in some cases, increasing unit costs, and the opening
of the newer CL line in Portland. In 2012, the primary focus of the authors’ inquiry, streetcar accounted for about 3.5 percent of total
transit operating expenses in the community.
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Table 47. Annual Operating Expense by Mode in Portland (2001-2012)334
Streetcar

Bus

Light Rail

Total

Year

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

2001

not available

not available

$153,860,151

$199,470,868

$40,035,484

$30,881,029

$193,895,635

$251,374,578

2002

not available

not available

$170,037,154

$217,012,399

$56,257,767

$44,080,019

$226,294,921

$288,812,195

not available

not available

$171,402,358

$213,880,334

$55,295,890

$44,313,779

$226,698,248

$282,879,988

not available

not available

$183,577,437

$223,130,649

$56,965,750

$46,867,727

$240,543,187

$292,370,120

2005

not available

not available

$200,999,113

$236,300,032

$67,590,404

$57,493,057

$268,589,517

$315,761,153
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2006

not available

not available

$203,266,221

$231,497,641

$69,990,063

$61,454,689

$273,256,284

$311,208,543

2007

not available

not available

$207,701,265

$230,044,431

$73,656,174

$66,502,286

$281,357,439

$311,624,062

2008

not available

not available

$223,177,624

$237,997,531

$84,120,139

$78,882,048

$307,297,763

$327,703,592

2009

not available

not available

$230,412,162

$246,589,784

$96,777,187

$90,428,081

$327,189,349

$350,161,858

2010

not available

not available

$239,080,000

$251,737,022

$106,374,746

$101,026,357

$345,454,746

$363,743,303

2011

$7,695,125

$7,854,577

$222,887,559

$227,506,051

$93,399,347

$91,503,291

$323,982,031

$330,695,319

2012

$11,868,085

$11,868,085

$230,726,059

$230,726,059

$99,710,015

$99,710,015

$342,304,159

$342,304,159

Note: Prior to 2011, streetcar expense data were reported as part of light rail data.
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The authors combined the ridership, service, and operating expense data to develop
two measures of service performance: cost effectiveness and service productivity. Both
measures are reported on an annual modal-basis in Table 48, with the caution that prior
to 2011 streetcar and light rail statistics for many of the input measures are combined,
making the ratios unavailable for streetcar. In the most recent years, both streetcar and
light rail have become less cost effective and bus slightly more cost effective. With respect
to service productivity, light rail and bus have improved in recent years, while streetcar has
deteriorated, perhaps as a result of the recent line expansion in 2012.

Table 48. Service Performance by Mode in Portland (2001-2012)
Cost Effectiveness

Service Productivity

(Operating Expense per Passenger Trip, 2012$)

(Passenger Miles per Vehicle Mile)

Year

Streetcar

Bus

Light Rail

Streetcar

Bus

Light Rail

2001

not available

$3.05

$1.60

2002

not available

$3.05

$1.99

not available

9.41

28.51

not available

10.14

29.58

2003

not available

$3.22

$1.78

not available

9.98

29.12

2004

not available

2005

not available

$3.38

$1.81

not available

10.06

30.18

$3.44

$1.94

not available

10.22

26.75

2006
2007

not available

$3.51

$2.02

not available

10.70

28.20

not available

$3.63

$2.04

not available

9.91

28.42

2008

not available

$3.71

$2.16

not available

9.89

29.07

2009

not available

$3.62

$2.46

not available

11.15

28.98

2010

not available

$4.16

$2.51

not available

10.93

26.19

2011

$2.07

$3.91

$2.27

18.35

11.33

27.58

2012

$3.24

$3.88

$2.36

17.84

12.19

28.90

Notes: Prior to 2011, streetcar expense data were reported as part of light rail data.Values calculated from Tables C-5,
C-7, and C-8.

Tables 49 and 50 compile the streetcar-only mode-level statistics on an annual basis for
2001-2012 and on a monthly basis for 2012 only, respectively. As noted earlier, Portland’s
streetcar ridership is much higher, certainly on an unlinked passenger trip basis, than any
of the other cities.

Table 49. Summary of Streetcar Ridership, Service, and Performance by Year in
Portland (2001-2012)335
Year

Unlinked Passenger
Trips

Passenger
Miles

Vehicle Revenue
Miles

Vehicle Revenue
Hours

2001

not available

not available

not available

not available

2002

1,467,228

not available

not available

not available

2003

1,787,202

not available

not available

not available

2004

1,935,653

not available

not available

not available

2005

2,517,310

not available

not available

not available

2006

2,733,856

not available

not available

not available

2007

3,375,699

not available

not available

not available
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Year

Unlinked Passenger
Trips

Passenger
Miles

Vehicle Revenue
Miles

Vehicle Revenue
Hours

2008

3,880,079

not available

not available

not available

2009

3,785,553

not available

not available

not available

2010

3,950,860

not available

not available

not available

2011

3,788,400

3,652,854

199,075

35,241

2012

3,664,538

3,732,743

209,283

36,739

Year

Productivity
(PM/VM)

Cost Effectiveness
(2012$)

Speed
(VRM/VRH)

Average Trip Length
(PM/UPT)

2001

not available

not available

not available

not available

2002

not available

not available

not available

not available

2003

not available

not available

not available

not available

2004

not available

not available

not available

not available

2005

not available

not available

not available

not available

2006

not available

not available

not available

not available

2007

not available

not available

not available

not available

2008

not available

not available

not available

not available

2009

not available

not available

not available

not available

2010

not available

not available

not available

not available

2011

18.35

$2.07

5.65

0.96

2012

17.84

$3.24

5.70

1.02

Note: Prior to 2011, streetcar data were reported as part of light rail data.

Table 50. Summary of Streetcar Ridership, Service, and Performance by Month in
Portland (2012)336
Month

Unlinked Passenger Trips

Vehicle Revenue Miles

Vehicle Revenue Hours

January

74,306

17,628

3,086

February

83,680

16,605

2,923

140,217

17,748

3,124

April

136,711

17,067

3,005

May

182,956

17,666

3,110

March

June

154,976

17,149

3,019

July

157,432

17,611

3,100

August

150,602

17,804

3,135

September

114,425

22,489

3,793

October

118,069

29,620

4,894

November

93,205

28,378

4,679

December

85,262

29,007

4,774

Source: Federal Transit Administration. 2013. “National Transit Database: Monthly Module Adjusted Data Release for
May 2013.” http://www.ntdprogram.gov/ntdprogram/pubs/MonthlyData/May_2013_Adjusted_Database.xls
(Accessed July 29, 2013).

Table 51 reports average stop-level average weekday boarding counts separated for
Portland’s NS Line and CL Line. The NS Line reports significantly higher total average
weekday boarding counts than the CL Line (8537 vs 3192). There is also a noticeable

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix C: Profile of Streetcar Lines in Portland, Oregon

186

variability between stop-level boarding in which the NS Line registers an average 186
boardings per stop, and the CL Line reports an average 69 boardings per stop. As mentioned
earlier in the narrative, differences in land-use patterns and development intensities, plus
the relative newness of the CL Line, might explain some of the differences in boarding
counts between both lines.
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Table 51. Streetcar Stop Level Average Weekday Boardings (by Line) in Portland (2012)337
Stop

Line
NS Line

NW Lovejory & 22nd
Art Museum
NW 23rd & Marshall

Alightings Stop

Line

Direction Boardings

Alightings

59

SE Grand & E Burnside

CL Line

N

63

44

208

70

NE Grand & Hoyt

CL Line

N

23

29

365

237

SE Grand & Mill

CL Line

N

47

0

445

0

NE Grand & Pacific

CL Line

N

21

145

E

171

NS Line

E

NS Line

N

NS Line

S

NW 23rd & Marshall

NS Line

S

0

635

NE M L King & E Burnside

CL Line

S

41

38

SW 11th & Alder

NS Line

S

281

510

NE M L King & Hoyt

CL Line

S

28

13
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SW 11th & Taylor

NS Line

S

355

381

NW Lovejoy & 18th

NS Line

E

203

42

NW Lovejoy & 13th

NS Line

E

321

118

SE M L King & Mill

CL Line

S

1

51

Art Museum

CL Line

N

155

34

NE Grand & Multnomah

CL Line

N

46

23

NW 11th & Johnson

NS Line

S

338

56

SW 11th & Alder

CL Line

S

131

193

NW 11th & Glisan

NS Line

S

170

55

SW 11th & Taylor

CL Line

S

104

137

NW 11th & Everett

NS Line

S

216

75

NW 11th & Johnson

CL Line

S

206

26

NW 11th & Couch

NS Line

S

454

214

NW 11th & Glisan

CL Line

S

130

33

SW 11th & Jefferson

NS Line

S

148

387

NW 11th & Everett

CL Line

S

110

31

SW 11th & Clay

NS Line

S

102

261

NW 11th & Couch

CL Line

S

199

90

NS Line

E

74

207

SW 11th & Jefferson

CL Line

S

54

238

NS Line

S

155

238

SW 11th & Clay

CL Line

S

58

209

PSU Urban Center

NS Line

N

578

326

SW 10th & Clay

CL Line

N

0

267

SW 10th & Clay

NS Line

N

163

151

SW 10th & Clay

CL Line

N

195

0

SW Park & Mill

NS Line

W

406

127

Central Library

CL Line

N

164

84

Central Library

NS Line

N

355

463

SW 10th & Alder

CL Line

N

155

65

SW 10th & Alder

NS Line

N

321

179

SW 10th & Stark

CL Line

N

65

42

SW 10th & Stark

NS Line

N

130

99

NW 10th & Couch

CL Line

N

92

132

NW 10th & Couch

NS Line

N

199

352

NW 10th & Everett

CL Line

N

45

61

NW 10th & Everett

NS Line

N

76

148

NW 10th & Gilsan

CL Line

N

38

74

NW 10th & Gilsan

NS Line

N

89

178

NW 10th & Johnson

CL Line

N

66

125

NW 10th & Johnson

NS Line

N

103

309

SE Grand & Taylor

CL Line

N

45

10

NW Northrup & 14th

NS Line

W

107

127

SE Grand & Belmont

CL Line

N

76

11

NW Northrup & 18th

NS Line

W

20

193

SE M L King & Morrison

CL Line

S

4

30

NW Northrup & 21st

NS Line

W

73

247

SE M L King & Taylor

CL Line

S

3

35
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SW 5th & Market
SW 5th & Montgomery
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NW Lovejoy & 21st

Direction Boardings

Stop

Line

Direction Boardings

Alightings Stop

Line

Direction Boardings
86

Alightings

NW Northrup & 22nd

NS Line

W

40

191

SE Grand & Stark

CL Line

N

SW Park & Market

NS Line

E

154

365

NW 10th & Northrup

CL Line

N

23

97

SW 3rd & Harrison

NS Line

E

120

263

NW 9th & Lovejoy

CL Line

E

182

93

SW 1st & Harrison

NS Line

E

46

41

N Weidler & Ross

CL Line

E

8

63

NS Line

S

3

15

NS Line

E

53

164

NE Weidler 7 2nd (Streetcar)

CL Line

E

4

44

NE Weidler & Grand

CL Line

E

12

67

SW River Pkwy & Moody

NS Line

W

206

42

NE 7th & Halsey

CL Line

S

37

60

SW Harrison Street

NS Line

N

44

23

NE 7th & Holladay

CL Line

S

55

83

SW 1st & Harrison

NS Line

W

85

54

NE Oregon & Grand

CL Line

W

18

8
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SW 3rd & Harrison

NS Line

W

160

82

SE M L King & Stark

CL Line

S

8

48

SW Moody & Gibbs

NS Line

S

6

196

SE M L King & Hawthorne

CL Line

S

4

71

NW 12th & Northrup

NS Line

W

64

107

SE Water/OMSI (Streetcar)

CL Line

S

70

0

SW Moody & Gaines

NS Line

S

0

164

SE Water/OMSI (Streetcar)

CL Line

S

0

83

SW Lowell & Bond

NS Line

E

0

114

SE Grand & Hawthorne

CL Line

N

102

6

SW Lowell & Bond

NS Line

E

50

0

NE Grand & Broadway

CL Line

N

92

69

SW Bond & Lane

NS Line

N

47

10

NE Broadway & 2nd (Streetcar)

CL Line

W

47

20

OHSU Commons

NS Line

N

762

71

NE Broadway & Ross (Streetcar)

CL Line

W

29

30

NW 10th & Northrup

NS Line

N

NW 11th & Marshall

CL Line

S

50

61

Total

71

130

11,729

11,677

Table 52 aggregates the boarding totals by stop, and thus accounts for the fact that many stops are served by both streetcar
lines. The table shows that the highest boarding count of 762 belongs to the OHSU Commons station of the NS Line in the South
Waterfront district, where the streetcar connects to the South Aerial Tram Station.
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Table 52. Streetcar Stop Level Average Weekday Boardings and Alightings (Aggregated by Station) in
Portland, Oregon (2012)338
Line

Boardings

Alightings

Air Museum

Stop

NS, CL

Line

Boardings
520

Alightings Stop
271

SW Lowell & Bond

NS

50

114

Central Library

NS, CL

519

547

SW Moody & Gaines

NS

0

164

NS, CL

291

484

SW Moody & Gibbs

NS

6

196

NS, CL

121

209

SW Park & Market

NS

154

365

NW 10th & Glisan

NS, CL

127

252

SW Park & Mill

NS

406

127
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NW 10th & Johnson

NS, CL

169

434

SW River Pkwy & Moody

NS

259

206

NW 11th & Couch

NS, CL

653

304

SE Grand & E Burnside

NS

63

44

NW 11th & Everett

NS, CL

326

106

NE Grand & Hoyte (Convention Center)

CL

23

29

NW 11th & Glisan

NS, CL

300

88

SE Grand & Mill

CL

47

0

NW 11th & Johnson

NS, CL

544

82

NE Grand & Pacific

CL

21

145

NW 12th & Northrup

NS

64

107

NE M L King & E Burnside (Couch)

CL

41

38

NW 23rd & Marshall

NS

445

635

NE M L King & Hoyte (Convention Center)

CL

28

13

NW Lovejoy & 13th

NS

321

118

SE M L King & Mill

CL

1

51

NW Lovejoy & 18th

NS

203

42

NE Grand & Multnomah

CL

46

23

NW Lovejoy & 21st

NS

171

59

SE Grand & Taylor

CL

45

10

NW Lovejoy & 22nd

NS

208

70

SE Grand & Belmont

CL

76

11

NW Northrup & 14th

NS

107

127

SE M L King & Morrison

CL

4

30

NW Northrup & 18th

NS

20

193

SE M L King & Taylor

CL

3

35

NW Northrup & 21st

NS

73

247

SE Grand & Stark

CL

86

28

NW Northrup & 22nd

NS

40

191

OHSU Commons

NS

762

71

NW 10th & Northrup

CL

94

227

NW 9th & Lovejoy

CL

182

93

PSU Urban Center

NS

578

326

N Weidler & Ross (Larabee)

CL

8

63

SW 10th & Alder

NS, CL

476

244

NE Weidler & 2nd (Streetcar)

CL

4

44

SW 10th & Clay

NS, CL

358

418

NE Weidler & Grand

CL

12

67

SW 10th & Stark

NS, CL

195

141

NE 7th & Halsey (Clackamas)

CL

37

60

SW 11th & Alder

NS, CL

412

703

NE 7th & Holladay

CL

55

83

SW 11th & Clay

NS, CL

160

470

NE Oregon & Grand

CL

18

8

NS, CL

202

625

SE M L King & Stark

CL

8

48

NS

459

518

SE M L King & Hawthorne

CL

4

71

189

SW 11th & Jefferson
SW 11th & Taylor
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NW 10th & Couch
NW 10th & Everett

Stop
SW 1st & Harrison

Line

Boardings

NS

131

Alightings Stop
95

SE Water/OMSI (Streetcar)

Line

Boardings

Alightings

CL

70

83

SW 3rd & Harrison

NS

280

345

SE Grand & Hawthorne

CL

102

6

SW 5th & Market

NS

74

207

NE Broadway & 2nd (Streetcar)

CL

47

20

SW 5th & Montgomery

NS

155

238

NE Broadway & Ross (Streetcar)

CL

29

30

NS

47

10

NE Grand & Broadway

CL

92

69

NS

47

38

NW 11th (10th) & Marshall

CL

50

61

11,729

11,677

Total
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SW Harrison Street
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Figure 107 shows the relationship between the location of Special Activities Centers (SACs)
and streetcar stop ridership levels. In a recent study, SACs were found to have a significant
effect on streetcar stop-level ridership, multiplying ridership several times what would
otherwise be expected at the stop.339 Thus, the higher number of SACs and their proximity
to NS Line stops on the west side of the Willamette River is likely related to the higher
boarding levels reported. The east side of the River, where the CL Line primarily operates,
is much less populated by SACs, and it reports lower boarding levels. Interestingly, despite
the large assembly facilities in the Lloyd district on the East side, the CL Line streetcar
stops most proximate to them do not report significantly higher ridership. Also apparent
from the Figure, hospitals and educational facilities proportionately dominate along the
NS Line, together with other institutional, tourism, and cultural destinations. The stops
with the highest numbers of boardings in the Northwest district terminal and in the South
Waterfront district are located near health care and health research/educational facilities.
The other dominant SAC is the PSU campus, where stops also have high numbers of
boardings.

Figure 107. Stop-Level Average Weekday Boarding and Special Activity Centers
(SACs) in Portland (2012)340
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Figure 108 displays the number of bus routes (depicted as graduated grey circles) located
in proximity to or directly linked to streetcar stops and stop-level boardings (depicted as
graduated hollow circles). No discernible pattern emerges from the figure other than the
clustering of bus services in the PSU district and adjacent areas. That is, high stop-level
ridership counts occur at stops with high levels of bus connectivity and at stops with low
levels of bus connectivity. The lack of any discernible relationship would seem to suggest
that many streetcar riders do not use local bus transit services.
Figure 109 displays the relationship between streetcar stops and stops for the light rail
and aerial tram systems. The figure suggests that where a connection exists between the
streetcar and the light rail/tram systems (represented with grey circles), relatively high
ridership counts occur. This is particularly true in the case of the South Waterfront Tram
Terminal and at the stops where the MAX light-rail systems and streetcar overlap in the
PSU district. This figure suggests the possibility of transfer activity between the various
rail systems and a combination of potential riders, including light-rail commuters and nonresident riders using the streetcar as a “last-mile” transportation service to the City, or
vice-versa, and/or Portland residents using the streetcar to connect to light-rail to access
peripheral suburban destinations and possible “reverse” commuting.
The Portland streetcar stands out among the case studies as the streetcar with the highest
ridership. Given the relative short length of average streetcar trips (1 mile; 1.6km), it
seems to function primarily as a downtown circulator. The average speed of Portland’s
streetcars is relatively low compared with bus and light-rail, but its downtown location,
close stop spacing, and mixed-traffic operating environment undoubtedly help to explain
the low speed. However, Portland’s streetcar reports better cost effectiveness (operating
expenses/passenger trip) and higher service productivity (passenger miles/vehicle miles)
than the average bus route in the transit system (as shown earlier in Table 48). Light-rail
transit has stronger performance than either bus or streetcar.
The fact that Portland’s NS Line operates in a downtown context characterized by high
intensity mixed-use development, serves nearby special activity centers such as hospitals
and a university campus, provides long service hours and relatively short headways, and
appears to be well connected to other transit modes undoubtedly help to explain its relatively
strong performance, particularly compared with the other streetcar cities. The city also
has a history of strong land use regulation, coordinated transportation-land use planning,
and making public investments to support non-automobile travel that also aid transit
ridership in general and streetcar use in particular. The attention that local officials pay to
the combination of land use planning, urban design, and streetcar supportive automobile
parking policies undoubtedly contribute to the overall performance of Portland’s streetcar.
These topics are further discussed in the Key Informants Interviews section that follows.
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Figure 108. Stop-Level Average Weekday Boardings and Bus Connections by
Stop in Portland (2012)341

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix C: Profile of Streetcar Lines in Portland, Oregon

194

Figure 109. Stop-Level Average Weekday Boarding and Light-Rail/aerial Tram
Connections in Portland (2012)342
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INSIGHTS FROM KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS
In addition to collecting and analyzing quantitative data and documentary evidence,
the authors conducted one-hour semi-structured telephone interviews with several key
informants in the Portland region who provided their perspectives on streetcar goals,
performance, and future prospects in the region. Informants representing a diverse set of
perspectives, including the local business community, local land use and transportation
planning, the streetcar operator, and regional transit organizations, participated in the
interviews. These informants were identified through documents or were suggested by
other interviewees as pertinent informants, given the nature of the questions the authors
hoped to address.
The authors sought to use the interviews to complement the insights developed from our
quantitative assessment discussed earlier, and to identify hard-to-quantify phenomena
that might impact people’s perceptions of the streetcar and impact its performance. Each
informant was provided a set of 12-24 questions in advance of the interviews, including
a set of questions asked of all informants and specific questions asked of that individual,
given the role they play in the community. A set of typical interview questions can be found
in Appendix F.
For Portland, the authors conducted four semi-structured interviews with five key
informants. The authors interviewed the local land use planning and local transportation
planning informants during the same interview. Several key themes emerged from the
interviews, including: the role of private sector actors, the importance of supportive land
use and transportation policies, the importance of institutional relationships, the use of
the streetcar as a development tool and a marketing tool, and the role of the streetcar
within the larger transportation system. The five key informants include individuals whose
involvement with streetcar-related issues predates the implementation of the original
North-South Line service (Table 53). These individuals included: a senior representative
of the streetcar managing entity who has also been a development consultant and elected
official, a senior-level regional transit planner, a local transportation planner, a local land use
planner, and a business community leader with a long history of engagement in streetcar
issues in Portland. Each individual is identified by his or her role in the community within
the narrative that follows.

Table 53. Roster of Key Informants Interviewed for Portland Study
Informant

Role

1

Local Transportation Planner

2

Local Land Use Planner

3

Regional Transit Planner

4

Streetcar Manager

5

Business Leader
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Streetcar Goals
The key informants emphasized the primacy of development goals in the creation of
the first streetcar line in Portland. The streetcar manager noted that prior to streetcar
implementation, the City of Portland’s strategic plan had called for the redevelopment of
the central city as a top local planning goal, and that streetcar service was used to facilitate
redevelopment of the center city. This informant stressed that the streetcar was seen by
the city planners as a tool that would allow them to bring as many as 30,000 residents
into the central city over the planning time horizon. It was seen as a fixed, permanent
amenity that could attract developers, residents, and businesses. This informant noted
that the original planning goals were for 10,000 residential units and 3.5 million square
feet [325,160 square meters] of retail in the areas around the proposed streetcar line, and
for the line to carry 10,000 riders per day. He emphasized that they have exceeded these
goals in all respects, with more than 12,000 residential units and nearly 17,000 riders per
day on the streetcar lines.
The business community leader referred to the streetcar as a “tool to assist development.”
He emphasized that Portland was growing and that the streetcar was viewed as an
“important catalyst” for growth in the areas it served. He noted signs of a rising real-estate
market, and it was thought that the streetcar was a good catalyst for change in decayed
and/or underdeveloped inner-city areas. The streetcar was seen as being different from
the light-rail system that served commuters and focused on mobility goals. He observed
that developers loved the streetcar because it ran on a track, which meant it was perceived
as a “permanent commitment” by the city, as opposed to buses which were not seen as
permanent. He stressed that 50 percent of new development has occurred within one
block of streetcar alignment, with an average 92 percent floor-to-area ratio compared
with 45 percent for the downtown as a whole. He observed that this result reflects the
confidence of developers to develop to the maximum density allowed, and it supports the
city’s density and transit ridership goals.
The regional transit informant agreed that development objectives were the primary goals
of the original streetcar line. This informant noted that the key public sector participants
(City of Portland and Tri-Met) viewed the first streetcar line (North-South Line) as a land
use project rather than a transit project. He noted that this was particularly true with
respect to service within the Pearl District, where the City of Portland had a high-density
vision for the community that led to a specific view of the streetcar as a “facilitator” of this
vision. Speaking from the transit perspective, he noted that Tri-Met was initially skeptical
of implementing a streetcar—he stated that their default option was typically to increase
bus service—but that the “permanence” of the streetcar as a symbol of public investment
and commitment really took hold.
The regional transit planner informant also observed that the newer Central Loop (CL)
Line has had similar land use and development goals as the North South (NS) Line. The
CL Line was designed to connect major trip attractors such as the high-rise Lloyd District,
convention center, and arena on the east side of the Willamette River with the downtown
on the river’s west side. The City of Portland hopes to use the streetcar to help shape
development that maintains the mixed-use character of this “funky urban area” and not to
turn it into another high-rise Pearl District.
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The informants disagreed on the importance of transportation goals in streetcar development
in Portland. The business leader informant stated that the “(streetcar was) never primarily
a transportation tool.” He differentiated the land development goals of the City of Portland,
which he viewed as the principal public sector driver of streetcar development, from that
of Tri-Met, the regional transit agency, whose goals revolved around transportation. As a
participant in the key local groups that advocated for the streetcar during the 1990s, he noted
that the main goals for these groups was assisting and reviving local neighborhoods and
that their interest in the streetcar was its potential use to encourage intercity development.
He recognized that the streetcar was “always a transportation device,” and he observed
that the streetcar is now intensively used during peak times, but he still emphasizes the
primacy of development as the driver in streetcar development in the city.
While the regional transit planner informant agreed on the centrality of development
goals, he also stressed Tri-Met’s view of it as “not a toy, but a real transportation system.”
He emphasized that this view affected Tri-Met’s decision to operate modern vehicles as
opposed to “toy-like” vintage vehicles, and to make decisions about streetcar service with
a view to its role in the larger transit network. He noted that as the alignment lengthened,
the streetcar took on more of a transit role in the community, and that it is now part of TriMet’s frequent-service transit network.
The local land use planning and local transportation planning informants emphasized
development and transportation goals. The local land use planning informant characterized
the streetcar goals as “shaping growth and facilitating place making.” But he also
emphasized its important role in supporting the city’s climate action plan by serving as a
pedestrian extender in the downtown area that allows more people to shift to combined
streetcar-walk trips instead of using automobiles.
The local transportation planning informant also emphasized these dual goals. He
characterized the streetcar as a combination transportation service and development
tool. He noted that with the original NS Line, the city purposely connected two key trip
generators, Portland State University and a major hospital. The area between them was
seen as having land development and ridership potential, which the informants viewed as
having been achieved to a significant degree. The informant emphasized that as the line
was extended, it continued to have this dual function.

Land Use Planning and Development Outcomes
Given the centrality of land development goals in the implementation of Portland’s streetcar,
the authors asked the informants for their assessments of these outcomes. As background
to their assessments, it is important to note that Portland has land use regulations and
development incentives in place to encourage its desired land development outcomes.
The area served by the streetcar is characterized by transit-supportive attributes such as
relatively high population and employment densities, small average block sizes (indicative
of good street network connectivity for all travelers), and a complete-streets initiative that
emphasizes walkability in all aspects of road infrastructure design. Much of this is the result
of active planning by the city working in partnership with the development community.
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The key informants tended to agree that the streetcar has been successful in achieving
the land development goals that were part of its original plan. The informants didn’t quite
state that the streetcar’s presence was the most important factor, or the principal causal
factor, although some came close to doing so. The business community leader informant
answered, “Yes absolutely” in response to our question about goal achievement. He
noted that the “Pearl District is almost full,” and he pointed to the streetcar’s role as a
development “catalyst” in the South Waterfront area and on the east side with the more
recent CL Line. He said the streetcar has “proven to be an agent of change” with respect to
land development in the city. The local land use planning and local transportation planning
informants agreed with this assessment, particularly with respect to the NS Line and the
Pearl District, although they were more cautious about the possible effects of the CL Line,
given that it remains, as of the time of the report, an incomplete loop across the Willamette
River that does not directly connect all key destinations. Nevertheless, in general, both
informants characterized the streetcar as an “amenity” that had helped serve as an “anchor
of development,” given its permanent, fixed nature.
The streetcar manager informant characterized the streetcar as a “catalyst” but “not the
cause” of the development that occurred. He noted the importance of the signals its presence
sent developers about the city’s permanent commitment to the areas it served, which
reassured them when they made their own investment decisions. But he also emphasized
the place of the streetcar within a package of strategies that included: supportive zoning,
design regulations that encouraged the creation of an active urban environment with many
people on the streets, and some financial incentives targeting certain kinds of projects,
such as promoting affordable housing development. He said the primary idea had been to
create good, shared public spaces and plazas, and to promote compact and mixed-use
development. Developers then responded to market signals to create more mixed-use
urban living opportunities in the area than people had earlier predicted.
The informants agreed that market forces and other planning initiatives beyond the
streetcar played critical roles in development outcomes thus far achieved. The local land
use planning and local transportation planning informants pointed to the importance of a
“convergence of public investments,” although they also stated that the streetcar has been
responsible for an “increment of development activity.” They are presently working to try
to model the specific contributions of the streetcar to this activity, given the various other
policy initiatives that were also in place. The streetcar manager informant emphasized the
“alignment of factors” that allowed them to exceed their development goals. Particularly
important in his view was a comprehensive, system-wide view to planning the area and a
well-aligned public sector working together.

Transportation Role
Most of the informants agreed that the streetcar has become more of a transportation asset
as the lines have been extended. The business community leader informant noted that
from his perspective it appears that Tri-Met officials now view the streetcar as an integral
piece of their larger public transportation strategy. The regional transit planner informant
agreed by noting its role in the Tri-Met frequent service network. This transportation role has
emerged despite what the business community leader informant characterized as earlier
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Tri-Met opposition, particularly from the mid-level managers responsible for operating
transit services, to the idea of a streetcar as the selected mode. This same informant
stressed the more supportive position taken by Tri-Met senior management at the time.
The authors queried the informants about the reasons a streetcar had been selected rather
than another transportation mode. The business leader informant, who has participated
in streetcar issues for more than 30 years, observed that the streetcar was the chosen
mode because there was “no other (transportation) option.” He recalled that bus service
was considered unattractive to the middle class market they hoped to attract, the streetcar
fit well within the local vision for a walkable urban environment, and the streetcar was less
intrusive, as well as less expensive, than light rail transit. Other informants’ recollections
supported these views.
Presently, the streetcar operates as a complement to other transit services, rather than
as a substitute for them. While the business community leader informant thought that
Tri-Met had removed buses when the original line was implemented, the regional transit
planning informant reported that they actually did not make major service changes when
either of the streetcar lines opened, because of sensitivity to community concerns about
loss of local bus service. This informant noted that there are presently short overlaps of
service between bus and streetcar on the NS Line, and a lengthier service overlap on the
CL Line, but he did not think there have been negative effects on ridership for other either
mode. This informant believes that the modes are serving different travel markets, a view
supported by the rider profile discussed earlier in this narrative.
The streetcar manager informant agrees that the modes are serving different rider markets.
He reported double the percent of non-home-based trips taken on the streetcar when
compared with buses. He observed that the streetcar serves many short distance trips due
to its role as a “walk trip extender,” with many of these being used for lunch trips, running
errands, and some visitor trips due to its role as a circulator. He reported that the peak
ridership on the streetcar is from 11 a.m. to 7 p.m. during weekdays, and Saturday use is
as strong as weekday use. He reports many disabled riders (about 9 percent of riders), a
large number of Portland State University (PSU) students, and some tourists, although not
as large a proportion as on the systems in the other cities the authors examined. PSU is an
important destination due to its size, while the South Waterfront area is important due to its
aerial tram connection to the campus of Oregon Health Sciences University (OHSU). The
regional transit planning informant also agreed that PSU and the South Waterfront aerial
tram connection were key destinations for streetcar riders.

Public Attitudes
The informants generally agreed that public and policymaker attitudes toward the streetcar
are positive, although one informant noted that some individuals from outlying areas are less
supportive than those who reside or work in areas near the streetcar lines. The business
community leader informant characterized the attitude of the business community as
“positive.” He mentioned the work of the various agencies and organizations in making sure
that the public has the opportunity to have their voices heard whenever there are proposals
for changes involving the streetcar. He noted that occasionally “mostly elderly” absentee
property owners will complain at public meetings, but he said they are usually “talked around.”
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This informant emphasized the work of the streetcar advocacy group as being particularly
important for keeping a favorable view in the community, as they are always careful to start
early with an advisory committee and business community stakeholders, open houses
for the public, and charrettes to explain, communicate, and educate key stakeholders
and the larger community about any proposal. Neighborhood associations, business
organizations, and the chamber of commerce have also been engaged and tend to be
very supportive. This informant noted an earlier disagreement about possible business
disruptions during streetcar construction with wholesalers, but he emphasized how they
were brought around when it was made clear that the city had heard their concerns and
was doing all it could to address them. This informant emphasized that whenever any
possible disagreements seem about to emerge, he “explains the economics” to business
owners or property owners, about possible additional customers attracted to the business
or about potential gains in property values, and they soon come on board. He observed
that “business people are not idiots.”
The local land use planning and local transportation planning informants did point to some
polarization of attitudes toward the streetcar. These informants noted that many people
who reside in outlying areas have been vocal critics of spending public money on the
streetcar rather than on other projects (such as sidewalks) in their own neighborhoods.
The two informants observed that many of these people “love to hate” the streetcar. But
the informants also noted that many of the funding sources used to support the streetcar
(federal capital grant money, stimulus dollars, or money from downtown parking meters)
would not have been available for other projects, so the concerns of these groups can be
countered. These same informants also noted that some bicycle and bus advocates are
critical of the streetcar because they’d rather see money used for their modes. But the
informants observed that these same critics also complain about spending on the light rail
system. On balance, these informants tended to view the critics as a small minority within
the community.

Role of Private Sector
Several of the informants pointed to the strong role taken by private actors in the original
development of the streetcar and in its ongoing activities. The informants pointed to
the roles of Portland Streetcar, Inc. and the business and development communities,
the role of landowners in the Pearl District and South Waterfront areas, and the use of
private sector funds, through an assessment district, to finance the service. The business
community leader informant emphasized the “bottom up” approach to building support
for the streetcar, which this individual viewed as an important reason for its successful
implementation.
The business community leader informant was one of the early key private actors in the
development of the first streetcar line. He recalled reading a newspaper article about
a group that was putting together a transportation proposal for downtown Portland and
noticing that the alignment bordered his business. He was concerned that the city might
be “trying to put me out of business” because he worried about possible negative impacts
during construction leading to business interruptions and declining sales, based on prior
experience during construction of Portland’s light rail system. So he called the streetcar

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix C: Profile of Streetcar Lines in Portland, Oregon

201

advocacy group for a meeting, and they informally invited him to join the group. He noted
that they convinced him of the benefits of the streetcar, and he decided to join the group
and help to convince other business owners that the streetcar project would not be as
disruptive as the earlier LRT project had been. This informant noted that he had worked
to convince other property and business owners of the significant financial benefits that
could accrue to them because of streetcar implementation, principally a large increase
in land values, which estimated had reached a four-fold increase from pre-streetcar
conditions. The role of the private sector was thus critical in building support among key
local constituencies.
The business community leader informant emphasized that once business and property
owners recognized the potential benefits of the streetcar on customer traffic and land
values, they supported the project and became willing to tax themselves to help finance it.
He pointed specifically to the creation of a local improvement district (LID) that used property
tax money to help finance the project. The streetcar manager informant also emphasized
the role of developers, pointing specifically to “well informed” developers such as Homer
Williams (owner of the Hoyt Street Yards), who agreed to a special assessment on his
40-acre property, and John Carroll, who was a “leader in understanding the relationship
of quality access to the success of his projects.” The same informant characterized the
River District Association (of property owners), resident-based organizations such as
the Downtown Community Association and Northwest Neighborhood Association, key
institutions such as PSU, OHSU, and local hospitals, and the downtown banking community
as being actively engaged in the effort to implement streetcar service.
The local land use planning and local transportation planning informants also emphasized
the key roles of property owners in developing the streetcar and adjacent developments.
They noted that the City of Portland worked hard to come to agreements with major property
owners on development packages to encourage higher-density development around the
streetcar line, particularly in the Pearl District.
The city negotiated land use planning packages that included a package of public
investments plus increased-density development. The informants noted that this
collaborative public-private approach was used to help transform the Pearl District from
an area of townhouses to condo towers.

Finance
As was true for each of the other case-study cities, the key informant interviews
emphasized the importance of having an identified, stable source of funding to cover the
capital expenses associated with streetcar implementation and the expenses of operating
the service. The streetcar manager and the business leader informants emphasized the
use of “creative financing” approaches as a critical part of the successful implementation
of Portland’s streetcar and its continued operation.
The streetcar manager informant recalled that the money used for the planning and
construction of the NS Line came from a combination of LID funds, based on local property
tax assessments, city general funds, federal grants, and state grants. Approximately half
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the funding came from local funding sources. Additionally, the city raised parking rates
in the downtown area and bonded the revenue stream to use it for streetcar investment.
Portland officials are now discussing expanding paid parking in the central city over a
wider area as part of an overall parking management strategy. Parking meter revenues
also help support streetcar operations.
The same informant observed that finding operating funding had proven more challenging,
particularly initially. This informant recalled that when streetcar proponents approached
the regional transportation entities to help with funds, they were informed that the regional
actors did not think of the streetcar as a regionally important project because of its limited
system extent. He observed that he has seen similar issues in other cities, including
Minneapolis. With time, however, this informant noted that Portland’s regional transportation
officials now understand that the streetcar provides regional benefits because it reduces
and shortens vehicle trips. Vehicle trip reductions represent a vehicle “trip not taken,”
which thus has positive effects on congestion and emissions in the Portland region.
The streetcar manager informant noted that as of 2012, under a master agreement
between Portland Streetcar, Inc. (PSI), the City of Portland, and Tri-Met, the City provides
50 percent of capital funds and 50 percent of operational funds, while Tri-Met provides
the other 50 percent for operational funds. The informant also explained that as the city’s
development goals are achieved and mobility becomes more important as a streetcar
goal, Tri-Met is expected to support up to 85 percent of streetcar operating expenses.
The local transportation planner and the local land use planner pointed out that the City
of Portland relies on a transportation general fund to cover its financial responsibility for
streetcar operations and that it uses payroll tax, not sales tax, as the major funding source.
These informants believe that a sales tax would provide a more stable source for longterm operating funds, given their observations of other communities’ experiences with
these transportation revenue sources.
The business community leader informant offered a good summary of the critical financial
decisions taken in Portland. This informant noted the importance of “creative financing” for
capital and operations, along with the benefits of using parking fees, implemented through
“progressive” parking policies, to support the streetcar because of their utility as a revenue
source for transit and as a disincentive to automobile use.

Institutional Relationships
Portland’s streetcar service directly involves three organizations (PSI, Tri-Met, and the City
of Portland), and the informants emphasized the importance of having clear delineations of
responsibilities and good working relationships to allow this complex structure to succeed.
By and large, the informants viewed the institutional arrangements as operating smoothly
and successfully. Informants also pointed to good working relationships with the private
sector-led Streetcar Committee. One informant characterized working with these private
actors as a “very satisfactory and enriching experience” because the people in that group
“…are brilliant about strategy. Smart people like Mr. Gustafson (of PSI), very strategic
in both public and private sectors. Easy people to be with; most are like that.” Indeed,
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most informants had positive recollections of the relationships among all the key actors,
particularly between Tri-Met and the City of Portland.
The regional transit planning informant pointed to a good long-term relationship between
Tri-Met and the City of Portland as two critical organizational actors. He noted that under
the institutional arrangements made between Tri-Met and City of Portland, the City makes
decisions about streetcar level of service and covers operating costs of streetcar. He
observed that the city has an operations manager for the streetcar and that its transportation
bureau also engages in streetcar operational issues, including streetcar signal timing. He
recalled that during planning of the NS Line, there were questions about how much of the
operating cost would be covered by Tri-Met. Initially, he recalled that one-third of operating
costs were covered by Portland and the remainder from city contributions. However,
the city worked with Tri-Met to develop a signal priority system for buses. Based on the
rationale that this system had saved Tri-Met some operating expense, Tri-Met officials
agreed to cover another one-third of the streetcar operating cost. The informant recalled
that the operating cost total was about $2.4 million, so Tri-Met covered $1.6 million. TriMet’s policy justification for covering these operating costs is that the streetcar is now
seen as a piece of the frequent service network along with the bus routes. Tri-Met then
continued its two-thirds contribution to operating expenses as extensions were made to the
NS Line. However, when the recession arrived, Tri-Met reduced bus service and reduced
its contribution to streetcar operations. With the recent opening of the CL Line, Tri-Met
renegotiated its contribution to 50 percent of the streetcar system total operating cost, with
a potential to increase to 85 percent if certain development and ridership benchmarks are
met (as alluded to earlier in the narrative). The informant’s recollection of these negotiations
was a favorable one that pointed to a good working relationship among individuals with the
key organizations involved.
The informant noted that under the 2012 Master Agreement, the City of Portland and
Tri-Met have worked very closely as partners in the streetcar. The informant stressed
the importance of the partnership to a successful outcome. He said Tri-Met commits the
time and resources necessary to actively engage with the city, and vice versa. The city
and Tri-Met now work closely on planning decisions around streetcar extensions. As
part of the new master agreement, the city has agreed to take on all capital costs for
streetcar construction and infrastructure replacement in exchange for Tri-Met’s increasing
contributions to operating costs. The informant noted that the city is taking some of its prior
operating cost contribution to develop a capital investment fund.
The business community leader informant suggested that the positive views of the
streetcar within these two organizations have not always been present. He noted that TriMet’s attitude tends to change as the organization’s top leadership changes. He recalled
that initially the agency leadership thought of the streetcar in very unfavorable terms as
a “donkey trolley,” and that within the agency there have been conflicts among streetcar,
light rail, and bus advocates for their shares of the agency’s budget. Despite these issues,
the informant recalled a history of good working relationships with Tri-Met staff over the
years. The same informant characterized the City of Portland as a much stronger and
consistent supporter of the streetcar.
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The streetcar manager informant reflected on relationships among Tri-Met, the City of
Portland, and PSI. He observed that PSI is in overall charge of the streetcar but that
the City of Portland manages the operators and mechanics, who actually are Tri-Met
contract employees, and Tri-Met handles scheduling. PSI coordinates the different actors.
Thus, good working relationships are an absolute necessity, as are clear delineations of
responsibility. The informant characterized the relationships as good ones and emphasized
that the streetcar service runs seamlessly from the rider perspective.

Other Policy Decisions
The Key Informant interviews identified a number of other public policies that Portland
has embraced that undoubtedly support transit ridership, including by streetcar. Several
informants reported that the City of Portland has increased public parking rates and
implemented metered parking throughout the downtown area. Revenue raised from
parking charges is then used to support the streetcar. Local employers have implemented
transit-use incentive programs to encourage employees to commute by transit, whether
by bus, light-rail and/or streetcar. The business leader informant implemented this policy in
his downtown business. The streetcar manager informants observed that local developers
offer residential units with lower parking supplies near the streetcar and use proximity to
the streetcar alignment as a key marketing attribute.
The transit informants also noted the critical decision to use modern streetcar vehicles
versus restored legacy vehicles. One informant noted that modern vehicles have better
performance and reliability and lower recurrent maintenance costs than legacy vehicles;
replacement parts are also easier to obtain. The importance of the decision about vehicles
was noted in several other cities as well.

Streetcar Challenges
The Key Informant interviews noted several challenges to streetcar operation in Portland.
The most important of these challenges is funding, which was also identified as an
important challenge in the other case cities. Several informants noted the importance
of taking a creative approach to funding and finance, given the limitations of traditional
finance instruments. In Portland, local officials decided that parking would be an important
source of local streetcar funding. The completion of the CL loop will require an increase
in operational funding, and the transit informants emphasized the need to be even more
creative to find new funding sources to cover these expenses. The transit informants noted
that the use of value capture from the increased value of property in the area served by the
streetcar might be a strategy to consider.
Public attitudes continue to be a challenge, particularly among those who live or do business
away from the streetcar lines. One informant mentioned the concern about spending on
the streetcar versus on other projects that might serve residents in outlying areas. Another
informant mentioned the slow speed of the streetcar as a criticism by people who note that
they are able to “walk faster than the streetcar” travels. However, our informants said that
these types of attitudes seemed to be a minority and that there is widespread community
and business support for the streetcar.
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Advice to Other Cities
The key informants offered several suggestions to other cities that might be considering a
streetcar in their communities. The first piece of advice was to focus on the importance of
relationship building and management among key stakeholders. The informants believe
this was a critical component of what they saw as Portland’s success. They also believed
that obtaining early buy-in from key stakeholders, especially private sector actors such as
developers and business leaders, was particularly important, as these stakeholders could
become major advocates who would also take a “sense of ownership” in the project.
A second piece of advice was to think about the streetcar investment as part of a package
that included streetscape improvements, bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure, parks, and
other amenities. The informants thought a comprehensive strategy that involved urban
design and land use-transportation planning coordination was critical.
A third piece of advice was to focus on the transportation aspect of the streetcar. The
informants emphasized the importance of considering stop spacing, signal prioritization,
headways, and connections to other parts of the transportation system.
A fourth piece of advice was to pay close attention to the financial arrangements for
streetcar operations. The informants emphasized the importance of having a stable, longterm funding source that provided predictability in revenues and was not as sensitive to
the fluctuations of the economy as some of the instruments used in Portland. For example,
the informants noted that reliance on a broad-based sales tax would likely bring significant
funding stability to Portland, which presently lacks one.

CONCLUSIONS
The streetcar in Portland is by far the most successful of the cases considered in this study.
The streetcar’s ridership is far higher than in any of the other cities, and its performance
measures (service productivity and cost effectiveness) also ranked among the best
performers of the cases considered. Portland has also been widely heralded for what many
regard as the successful land development outcomes associated with its streetcar lines.
The Key Informant interviews suggest that an important reason for Portland’s success is
the fact that early on, the streetcar was seen as a development tool and as a piece of transit
infrastructure, and that local decisions were driven by both objectives. Portland’s widelynoted comprehensive approach to integrated transportation and land use planning, its protransit public policies, and a favorable location all combined to contribute to the streetcar’s
performance. In short, Portland’s performance as a standout among the cases is due to a
combination of smart planning and policy and a favorable economic environment. Some
attributes that underlie Portland’s experience are potentially transferrable, including the
active engagement of stakeholders in the planning process, the planning of the streetcar
as a transit investment as well as a land use one, and the focus on transit-supportive
streetscape and other investments, while others might be less easy to transfer, such as
the especially close coordination of land use and transportation planning.
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APPENDIX D: PROFILE OF SOUTH LAKE UNION STREETCAR
IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
The South Lake Union (SLU) streetcar line in Seattle has the shortest alignment of the
five cases considered in this study (Figure 110). Despite its short alignment, it has the
third-highest ridership of the five cases. This is due in part to its proximity to a highly
developed and growing core area of Seattle, although its northern section primarily
traverses a transitional zone in which large employers have recently relocated and new
public investments in the form of parks and infrastructure are being made. The role and
initiative of the private sector and its collaboration with the public sector is a salient theme
in this case. Streetcar ridership and productivity in Seattle have increased in recent years
even as bus ridership and productivity have declined.

Figure 110. A Streetcar in Seattle343

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STREETCAR SERVICE
The streetcar system in Seattle, Washington presently consists of one line, South Lake
Union (SLU), with a round-trip length of 2.6 miles [4.18 kilometers], of which two miles
[3.22 kilometers] of the alignment are in mixed-traffic operation and 0.6 mile [0.96
kilometers] is in exclusive right-of-way (Table 54). The $53.1 million line, which opened in
late 2007, features three vehicles serving 11 stops (Figure 111). The streetcar is operated
by King County Metro, which also operates other local transit services in Seattle.
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Table 54. Physical Characteristics of Streetcar System in Seattle344
Characteritic

Value

Year Open

2007

Capital Cost (unadjusted dollars)

$53,100,000

Number of Lines

1

Number of Vehicles

3

Number of Stations

11
2.6 miles*
(4.18 km)

Length
Alignment Type

Exclusive
Mixed Traffic

0.6 miles
2 miles

*Note: Alignment length is for round trip. (Email communicatin from Rob Coughlin and Ethan Melone on
February 4, 2014).

Figure 111. Map of Streetcar Line in Seattle345
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The SLU streetcar line can be seen in relation to the larger transit network (including bus
routes and ferries) in Figure 112, at a city scale, and in Figure 113, which focuses on the
streetcar, its stops, and the bus routes in its near vicinity. The latter map also displays
building footprints in the area, giving an indication of the very urban, built-up nature of
this part of Seattle. The areas surrounding the southern section of the line are much more
developed and denser than those areas surrounding the northern section of the line. The
SLU streetcar connects the downtown retail area around Westlake Center to the South Lake
Union neighborhood and its biotech campus, which the city has designated as an urban
center that should absorb jobs and housing otherwise destined to other neighborhoods.346

Figure 112. Map of Transit System in Seattle347
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Figure 113. Large-Scale Map of South Lake Union Streetcar and Local Buses in
the Core of Seattle348
The SLU streetcar line provides relatively frequent service during much of the day, every day
of the week. Peak-period service frequencies are not much different from those available
during the off-peak period and on weekends (Table 55). The base fare is relatively high,
particularly given the short length of the alignment, although the fare structure includes
discounts for children and elderly riders (Table 56). While fare policy permits free transfers
between streetcars and buses, it is not clear the extent to which such transfers are made,
as King County Metro staff has not conducted streetcar rider surveys.
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Table 55. Service Characteristics of Streetcar System in Seattle349
Characteristic

Value

Headways
Weekday Peak

10 min

Weekday Off-Peak

15 min

Weekend Average

12.5 min

Hours of Service
Monday-Thursday

15 hr

Friday

17 hr

Saturday

17 hr

Sunday

9 hr

Table 56. Fare and Transfer Policy for Transit Services in Seattle350
Characteristic

Type

Fare Type

Base fare

$2.50

Youth (ages 6-17)

$1.25

Children 5 and under

$0.00

*Reduced fare

$0.75

Transfer Fee

Bus/Streetcar

Cost ($)

--

Note: *Senior 65 years and older and people with disabilities receive fares at a reduced price.

SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT FOR STREETCAR SERVICE
The SLU streetcar line operates just outside downtown Seattle in the South Lake Union
area, which is a growing employment center featuring biotech firms and the new Amazon
facilities. The authors examined the socioeconomic characteristics and built environment
contexts within which the streetcar line operates as part of the study, given the importance
of these factors for transit ridership in other communities. The authors believed that a
consideration of these factors would provide some explanation for the level of ridership on
the streetcar line and the particular rider market being served. A discussion of these issues
follows in the next several pages.
At the time of the 2010 Census, the city of Seattle, Washington had a population of just
under 609,000 people within a metropolitan area whose population totaled 3.4 million
people.351 The city’s median household income was $63,470 per year, with just over 13
percent of the population living below the poverty line. Seattle’s household income is higher
than the national average, while its poverty rate is lower than the national average. The city’s
population was nearly 70 percent white, with Asians accounting for just under 14 percent of
the population, blacks about 8 percent of the population, and Latinos for nearly 7 percent of
the population.
Figures 114 and 115 display city-scale population and population density, both by block
group, at the time of the 2010 Census. Of these two maps, the latter map, which indicates
people per square kilometer, is the most informative. It indicates that the population
densities in Seattle tend to be highest near the water bodies and other edges of the city.
Population thus tends to be relatively scattered throughout the city.
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Figures 116 and 117 depict population and population density in the core area immediately
surrounding the South Lake Union streetcar line. The maps clearly indicate that the area
is at the lower end of population densities in the city, suggesting that this is more of an
employment center than a residential one. The population densities in the area, taken
without consideration of employment densities, tend to be lower than those generally
recommended for the deployment of cost-effective transit service.352 The South Lake
Union urban village area exhibits lower population counts and densities compared with
the adjacent downtown core located just to the south.

Figure 114. Population by Block Group in Seattle (2010)353
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Figure 115. Population Density by Block Group in Seattle (2010)354
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Figure 116. Population by Block Group in Core of Seattle355
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Figure 117. Population Density by Block Group in Core of Seattle (2010)356
Employment and employment density (jobs per square kilometer) are indicated for the city
in Figures 118 and 119, respectively. The former map suggests a scattering of employment
throughout many different sections of the city, while the latter map clearly points to the
existence of several major employment clusters in the city.
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Figure 118. Employment by Block Group in Seattle (2010)357
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Figure 119. Employment Density by Block Group in Seattle (2010)358
The maps displayed in Figures 120 and 121 focus on employment and employment density,
respectively, in the area immediately adjacent to the streetcar line. There are census block
groups with high numbers of jobs near the streetcar, but many of the block groups through
which the line actually passes are not those with the highest densities of jobs.
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Figure 120. Employment by Block Group in Core of Seattle (2010)359
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Figure 121. Employment Density by Block Group in Core of Seattle (2010)360
The combination of population and employment represents the set of possible trip origins
and destinations in a community such as Seattle. The authors decided to produce a series
of maps that combine population and employment to identify areas that might be most
likely to produce or attract large numbers of trips, and to determine whether the SLU
streetcar is located in parts of the community that might produce the most transit riders.
Figure 122 maps the combination of population plus employment by block group at a cityscale, while Figure 123 is a density map for this same set of phenomena. Figures 124
and 125 map the same phenomena at a larger scale for the core of Seattle. The first pair

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix D: Profile of South Lake Union Streetcar in Seattle, Washington

219

of figures clearly points to the somewhat dispersed, multi-centered nature of activities in
Seattle. The second pair of maps emphasizes that while the area immediately around
the South Lake Union streetcar has large numbers of population plus employment, the
densities of activities, as of the 2010 Census, fell in the low range amongst block groups in
Seattle. These maps suggest the area as more one of transit trip production and attraction
potential, assuming urban redevelopment occurs in the area, rather than an area with
already established significant trip production and attraction characteristics.

Figure 122. Population plus Employment by Block Group in Seattle361
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Figure 123. Density of Population plus Employment by Block Group in Seattle362
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Figure 124. Population plus Employment by Block Group in Core of Seattle363
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Figure 125. Density of Population plus Employment by Block Group in Core
of Seattle364
As noted earlier, Seattle is primarily a white community, although it has significant Asian,
Latino, and Black populations as well. Figures 126 and 127 depict the spatial distribution of
the Black population at a city-scale and in the area around the streetcar line, respectively.
The ranges of values for the legends of the two maps indicate that the percentage of Black
population in Seattle is much lower than those of the other racial and ethnic groups, and
the Black population is not growing as fast as either the Latino or Asian populations. The
Black population tends to be located in larger numbers to the south and southeast of the
area served by the streetcar line. Within the immediate vicinity of the streetcar line, the
percentage Black population is in the low range of values (1-3 percent).
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The spatial distribution of the majority white population is shown at a city-scale in Figure 128
and at a local scale for the core area of Seattle in Figure 129. The first map points to the
stronger presence of the white population in the northern and western parts of the city.
Much smaller white population shares are in the south and particularly southeast parts of
the city. The white population represents a majority of the population in most of the block
groups located near the streetcar line in Seattle’s core.
Seattle has growing Hispanic (or Latino) and Asian populations. The spatial distribution
of the Hispanic population is shown in Figure 130 at a city scale and in Figure 131 for
the core of Seattle. The Hispanic population is spread throughout the city and is present
in moderate numbers in the areas immediately surrounding the streetcar line. The Asian
population is depicted in Figures 132 and 133. Sizable Asian populations are in the block
groups located to the southeast of the streetcar line in Seattle’s core.

Figure 126. Black Population by Block Group in Seattle (2010)365
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Figure 127. Black Population by Block Group in Core of Seattle (2010)366
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Figure 128. White Population by Block Group in Seattle (2010)367
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Figure 129. White Population by Block Group in Core of Seattle (2010)368
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Figure 130. Hispanic Population by Block Group in Seattle (2010)369

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

227

Appendix D: Profile of South Lake Union Streetcar in Seattle, Washington

228

Figure 131. Hispanic Population by Block Group in Core of Seattle (2010)370
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Figure 132. Asian Population by Block Group in Seattle (2010)371
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Figure 133. Asian Population by Block Group in Core of Seattle (2010)372
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The authors next turn to examine the spatial distributions of attributes related to income,
vehicle access, and transit use. First, the authors consider the distribution of household
incomes in Seattle to identify the wealthier and lower-income sections of the city. The transit
literature suggests that lower-income individuals are more likely to be transit users. Figure 134
depicts median household income at a city scale, and Figure 135 maps the same
phenomenon at a local scale for the block groups immediately surrounding the streetcar
line. Concentrations of higher-income block groups are situated along the shorelines and
in the northern part of the city. Two block groups directly served by the streetcar line have
very high median household incomes, while adjoining block groups in all directions other
than to the north of the line have somewhat lower median household incomes.
The spatial pattern of household vehicle access is shown in Figures 136 and 137. The
maps show that vehicle access is higher in census tracts in the outer parts, and lower in
the core areas of the city. The areas around the streetcar line have very low numbers of
vehicles per household. And finally, the spatial pattern of transit commute mode share is
shown in Figures 138 and 139. The two figures indicate considerable variation in transit
mode shares across the city, with high values in the areas located immediately to the west
and south of the city’s core. The areas around the lake tend to be in the more moderate
range of values. The areas immediately adjacent to the streetcar line have a wide range of
values, with the area directly served by the line in the lower range and those adjacent to
it in the higher range of values. Taken as a group, these variables suggest that while the
area served by the line is not the most promising area in the city for transit, from a purely
socioeconomic or travel behavior standpoint, it does tend to fall in the middle range of
values on most socioeconomic indicators and thus is an area with attributes that indicate
high transit ridership potential.
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Figure 134. Median Household Income by Block Group in Seattle (2010)373
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Figure 135. Median Household Income by Block Group in Core of Seattle (2010)374
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Figure 136. Vehicles per Housing Unit by Census Tract in Seattle (2010)375
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Figure 137. Vehicles per Housing Unit by Census Tract in Core of Seattle (2010)376
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Figure 138. Transit Commute Share by Block Group in Seattle (2010)377
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Figure 139. Transit Commute Share by Block Group in Core of Seattle (2010)378
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LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT FOR STREETCAR SERVICE
In addition to exploring the socioeconomic context in Seattle within which the SLU streetcar
line is situated, the authors also obtained data from the local planning department to better
understand land use patterns and the nature of the built environment within the area served
by the streetcar line, given the connections between the built environment and transit
usage cited in the transit literature.379 The first map in this series depicts land uses in the
area served by the streetcar (Figure 140). The map indicates that the streetcar serves a
predominantly mixed-use area in Seattle’s core. Commercial land use zoning is in the area
at the northern end of the line, and downtown office and retail zoning are at the southern
end of the line. All of these areas feature high-density zoning, with land use patterns that
would support transit use. It is not surprising, given the line’s downtown location, that land
values are high, indeed among the highest in the city, in the area served by the streetcar
line (Figures 141 and 142). This again suggests land market tendencies toward more
intensive uses of the land that would be more likely to support transit use.
As noted earlier, the area around the streetcar line has experienced higher intensity
development, although not as high as that located in the downtown core, as shown in
Figure 143. Some empty spaces are occupied by parking lots and other non-built uses,
particularly in the blocks immediately south of Lake Union Park. The figure depicts the
streetcar lines, building footprints for existing structures, and a 400-meter (one-quarter
mile) buffer around the streetcar stops that indicates typical maximum walking distances
to access the service.
Special Activity Centers are those that would generate above average boarding counts,
as they tend to attract large numbers of users. For example, large health-care and/or
research institutions, college campuses, schools, museums, sports arenas, and tourism
attractions are some of these types of land uses. Previous research has identified these
locations as significant factors in generating above average boarding counts in modern
streetcars in the U.S.380 As such, they are considered an important component for modern
streetcar landscapes.
Figure 144 illustrates that the majority of land uses and features that could be described
as Special Activity Generators in Seattle are clustered in the Denny Triangle and the
Commercial Core urban neighborhood, as well as along the West South-West waterfront.
The Westlake & Olive Way streetcar terminal station, which serves as a gateway from and
to Seattle’s Commercial Core, registers the largest boarding count for the system. Not only
are potential Special Activity Centers and landmarks clustered in this area, but also the
station is well served by more than five bus routes, and it is just one block away from the
Link light-rail station and adjacent to the monorail.
Other Special Activity Centers exists to the north along the streetcar area of influence but
are less clustered when compared to the rest of the city. Some of these are the South
Lake Union Park and the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, which seems to have
some influence on the ridership level at the Fairview Avenue & Aloha Street station. Also
the biomedical research complex and Group Health Cooperative in the South Lake Union
neighborhood seems to influence ridership level at the Westlake Avenue & Harrison Street
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station (Figure 144). It appears that the presence of the Amazon Campus does not exert
significant influence on boarding at the two stops at Terry Avenue. The relative higher
boarding count at the Mercer/Westlake stop in the absence of a special activity center
may be explained by the presence of several large parking lots. As such, this location
may function as a park-and-ride facility for the stop and thus facilitate higher numbers of
automobile-streetcar mode transfers.
Interestingly the South Lake Union Park and nearby Museum of History and Industry do
not seem to exert significant influence on the stop located on the Valley Street avenue.
This may be due to the vacant status of adjacent lots to the south and the possibility
of undergoing construction/improvement work at the South Lake Union Park and Valley
Street-Boulevard improvements during the year ridership was documented.

Figure 140. Land Use Map for Core of Seattle381
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Figure 141. Land Values in Seattle ($ per square meter)382
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Figure 142. Land Values in Core of Seattle ($ per square meter)383
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Figure 143. Building Footprints around Streetcar Line384
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Figure 144. Special Activity Centers Around Streetcar Line385
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON STREETCAR DEVELOPMENT1
Seattle’s first downtown horse-powered streetcar system started operations along Second
Avenue on September 23, 1884. The horses, however, had a difficult time navigating the
hilly Seattle landscape, and soon, in 1887, cable cars were introduced to the city. Frank
Osgood, the owner of the original horse-drawn streetcar, began operating the first electric
streetcar in 1889. Horse-drawn streetcars quickly became obsolete, and Seattle became
the first city to have an all-electric streetcar system on the West Coast.386
As in many cities in the late 19th and early 20th century, new streetcar lines soon emerged in
conjunction with many new housing developments outside Seattle’s city center. At one point
in the 1890’s Seattle had over 22 distinct streetcar lines connecting the city center to outlying
areas. In 1898, Seattle Electric Railway Company, subsidiary to the company called Stone
& Webster, began a consolidation of Seattle streetcar companies under its ownership. By
1900, Stone & Webster received a 35-year streetcar franchise from the city.387
All was not well for the streetcar business though, either in Seattle or the rest of the United
States. Not only had the first automobile arrived in the Seattle area, but Stone & Webster
had been running a deficit due to high debt servicing charges. To get out from under the
financial burden, the company sold the streetcar lines to the City of Seattle in 1918 for
$15 million. However, what became the Municipal Street Railway was troubled from the
start. Lack of maintenance funding, along with the emerging popularity of the automobile
and bus, led local officials to shift their priorities to serving motorized modes of transport.
Despite popular demand and some resistance, future transportation development did not
include streetcar infrastructure, and by 1940, the Seattle streetcar line began to be broken
down and its components sold off. On April 13, 1941, Seattle ended its streetcar service.388
Just a decade after the removal of the streetcar, the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle
(Metro) began discussions for a transit system to “combat traffic congestion and suburban
sprawl.”389 Metro’s many proposals, which included a Monorail running from Seattle to
Tacoma and several other rail transit options, were rejected as the public did not consider
congestion a major issue and favored other transportation projects, particularly highways.
The expansion of the local highway system, in combination with growing vehicle ownership,
led to an erosion of transit patronage. In the early 1970’s, transit provider Seattle Transit
System began experiencing financial difficulties as a result of these larger trends; Metro
was given authority to operate Seattle’s bus-only transit system in 1972. Metro remained
an advocate of rail transit during this period, although its efforts rarely enjoyed any
significant political support. One notable exception came in 1974 when a City Councilman
proposed a new streetcar line. The proposal did not receive backing from the rest of the
City Council.390
However, despite running into various barriers and political resistance, Metro remained
committed to rail transit. In May 1982 a two-mile [3.20 kilometer] Waterfront Streetcar
began operations. The system included five vintage streetcars that ran on old freight track
to destinations such as Seattle’s transit tunnel, an Amtrak station, and Safeco Field, the
home of the Seattle Mariners.391 Sixteen years after operations began, the streetcar system
was thoroughly renovated. Starting in the early 2000s, major problems began to arise
1

The historic narrative section was researched and written by Chris Stansbury.
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for the George Benson Waterfront Streetcar, named after the councilman responsible for
the development of the project, when the maintenance facility was demolished before a
suitable replacement was ready. Although plans were approved to briefly close the streetcar
system while a new facility was established, the Waterfront Streetcar never reopened
after it was closed in November 2005. The shutdown was highly controversial, and it was
rumored that this unintentional shutdown stemmed from previous political opposition to
the streetcar.392
Meanwhile, Paul Allen, co-founder of Microsoft Corporation and chairman of the investment
firm Vulcan Inc., was circulating an idea for a new streetcar line that ran through downtown
Seattle to the South Lake Union neighborhood, where he owned a majority of the land.
The idea was first pitched in 2002 at real estate industry meeting. The presentation
included design sketches, pointed to relatively low per-mile costs compared with other
transit projects then on the table for the local transit agency, and mentioned Portland’s
new streetcar as a model for successful use of a streetcar as an urban development tool.
This was part of a larger plan to develop South Lake Union into a more pedestrian-friendly
biotechnology center.393
After months of lobbying, Seattle’s mayor Greg Nickels announced plans to move on
with Allen’s streetcar project. Original plans called for a 2.5-mile [4.02 kilometer] line, with
an estimated cost of $40 million, to begin operating in mid-2004. The primary source of
funding was to be from a local improvement district tax. About 50 percent of the funds
were predicted to come from Allen and property owners in the area. Other forecasts
included the generation of 20,000 jobs in South Lake Union over 20 years. City officials
were still unsure where the remaining $20 million would come from, but they believed it
could be procured from federal, state, or regional funding sources. Early opposition to the
proposal focused on parking issues, problems with congestion, possible delays for other
transportation projects, and most importantly the lack of funding. Nevertheless, in January
2003, King County Metro officially added the streetcar to a project list that was to be
presented to acquire funding, and the city hired Shiels Obletz Johnsen, Inc., the consulting
firm for Portland’s streetcar development, to direct the Seattle streetcar project.394
In June 2003, the City Council approved a plan for developing the South Lake Union area.
At the same time, the Washington State Legislature appropriated $3 million for the streetcar
project.395 But, still unsure of the wisdom of streetcar development and its level of local
support, the City Council did not allocate the full $3 million and instead approved $295,000
to be used for further streetcar studies.396 For the next year, supporters and opponents
mobilized for further conflict. The main theme for supporters was the possibility of growth
and private investment in the area resulting from a permanent transit development. On
the other hand, opposition believed the area would grow regardless of whether or not a
streetcar was built, pointing to the large investment and development already taking place.
Other opponents pointed to $500 million of other transportation projects that could be
neglected if public focus shifted to building a streetcar.397 The President of the North
Seattle Industrial Association presented this view when he asked, “Why is a city with so
little money for basic transportation need, spending on this?” and, “We don’t have enough
police officers, we can’t fix streets, but still we are going into the streetcar business.”398

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix D: Profile of South Lake Union Streetcar in Seattle, Washington

246

In July 2004 the city released one of its studies that forecasted $1.4 million in annual
operating costs along with $45 million in total capital costs for a streetcar. The study also
proposed that $25 million of funding would come from taxes on property owners along the
track, $8.5 million from “secured state and federal grants,” “$9 million from pending federal
grants,” and $2 million from unknown sources.399 Forecasts projected the redevelopment
of South Lake Union (SLU) as a whole would generate from $166 million to $333 million in
additional tax revenues by 2025.400
Streetcar development took a big step forward in August 2004 when the City Council, after
putting a ban on spending for the project, finally released $2.4 million to begin the streetcar
design and engineering.401 As the design process progressed, the updated track, now
costing $47.5 million, was planned to be a 2.6-mile loop that ran from the Fred Hutchinson
Cancer Research Center to the Westlake Center shopping area.402
In mid-May 2005, more studies were released, stirring up more controversy. One of the
first releases from the study estimated property values along the line would grow by
$70-80 million to nearly $5 billion.403 Annual ridership estimates of 330,000 emerged
along with the plan to cover operating costs with fares and advertisement/naming sales.
Doubters criticized the accuracy of the ridership projections stating they were below the
ridership numbers of the already-existing Waterfront Streetcar, and they also did not
believe enough advertisement sales could be generated to fund the cars.404
On June 27, 2005, despite some intense public opposition, the Seattle City Council
approved the streetcar plan and granted the money to pay for beginning construction. With
completion set for late 2007, critics still were unsure if enough funding would be found. A
councilman who voted against the plan stated, “in this case, it [the streetcar] is a luxury. I
am not sure that we have seen the final price tag” and, “We need to deal with basic needs
before we invest in a luxury system.”405 Just four months later, the City Council convened
again and approved the implementation of a taxing district along the streetcar line.406
By March 2006, projected costs spiked up again to $50 million. Worried that the SLU
streetcar project would have a funding shortfall, one councilman proposed the increase be
offset with a tax increase in the improvement district, as the city could not afford to cover
these extra costs. However, other councilmen, along with the mayor, were assured that
the funds could be raised through pending grants and the sale of government land.407 Late
that March, the City Council met again for one final vote to move on with the streetcar
construction. After finalizing details concerning the improvement district tax and determining
an operating costs plan (75 percent King County Metro, 25 percent the city), the City
Council gave its approval to continue with streetcar development.408 Groundbreaking for
the city-owned streetcar line happened on July 7, 2006.409
With construction halfway completed in May 2007, the streetcar, as feared, began
experiencing financial problems. First, realized operating costs were higher than expected
(about $2 million a year). Also, the advertisements were not selling as quickly as necessary.
Mayor Nickels resorted to asking the City Council to approve a $3 million credit to finish
the streetcar.410 At the same time, skeptics raised questions about the streetcar’s service
characteristics, pointing to the slowness and shortness of the streetcar system. Many
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critics observe that the bus was a cheaper option that would take them to their destinations
equally as fast as or faster than a streetcar, considering that the streetcar would be stuck
in the same traffic as any other mode. Many critics also could not imagine themselves
using the streetcar for short-distance trips.411 These concerns, however, were voiced too
late to have any bearing on streetcar development.
On December 12, 2007, with construction complete, the SLU line of the Seattle Streetcar,
operated by King County Metro, began service.412 Initial ridership levels were higher than
expected. Early issues included several accidents along the streetcar line, accessibility
problems on Mercer Street, and increased danger for bicyclists, as the streetcar ran on
the outer road lanes on which cyclists traveled.413 Despite these issues, city officials began
discussing system expansion shortly following the opening of the SLU line. In February
2008, the Seattle City Council approved a study to determine the feasibility of adding up to
six more streetcar lines.414 However, many observers urged delay to see how successful
the SLU streetcar line was before using public resources to expand the streetcar line –
funds that could be used instead to expand less expensive bus services. There was a
direct trade-off between streetcar and bus development, as the available funding was the
same for both.415
By May 2008, the Seattle Streetcar had impressed the Seattle Department of Transportation
enough for them to create a list of possible streetcar route extensions. At the same time,
Seattle Streetcar Alliance began a campaign to promote further streetcar development.416
Supporters praised the SLU line’s success and argued that further streetcar development
could be financed in similar fashion as previous streetcar financing. Skeptics, including
Seattle Councilman Nick Licata, were worried about using resources that could be
devoted to other transportation projects that they viewed as more important investments.417
Nevertheless, in November 2008, transit agency Sound Transit approved $120 million for
a new streetcar line in the First Hill neighborhood.
In December 2008, the city’s transportation committee approved a $600 million plan to
expand the Seattle Streetcar, including the $120 million First Hill plan.418 Less than a
week later, the full City Council approved the plan with stipulations that there must “be
proof of committed funding” and “proof that the streetcar network will provide measurable
improvement to transit” without affecting other transit services. The First Hill and Capitol
Hill neighborhood lines were prioritized.419 The performance of the SLU streetcar bolstered
the efforts of streetcar supporters to pursue these new projects. At the end of its first year,
SLU ridership exceeded expectations with approximately 100,000 more rider trips than
were predicted.420
Throughout 2009, the City Council worked to make the First Hill streetcar line a reality. It
would connect the International District and Capitol Hill rail stations. In early May 2010,
the Council approved the proposed two-mile [3.2 kilometer], ten-stop First Hill streetcar
line plan, with construction starting in 2011 and service starting in 2013.421 The line would
be two-way and run in mixed traffic. The primary reasoning for developing a line in this
particular area was that First Hill was a dense neighborhood with three hospitals and
two schools. The line would also stop near Qwest Field, making it a possible choice for
those traveling to a Seattle Mariners or Seahawks game.422 The city was responsible
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for building and operating the system, and Sound Transit, despite budget shortfalls,
assumed responsibility for up to $132 million for construction and $5.2 million annually for
operating.423 Opponents believed the money should be spent expanding bus services.
Shortly after the approval of the First Hill line, cyclists who claimed to have been injured
by riding over the SLU streetcar tracks sued the city of Seattle. In the lawsuit, the litigants
claimed that Seattle officials had known about the dangers the tracks would have on
cyclists, but nothing had been done to mitigate them. A judge of the King County Superior
Court dismissed the lawsuit.424 With the lawsuit behind them, the city finally started work
on the First Hill line by making preparations for construction in early January 2011.425
In the meantime, the SLU line was deemed a success due to increased ridership. This
led to more support for the streetcar, including a $65,000 contribution from local business
leaders, such as Amazon, to add a third streetcar and increase service frequency.426 In
return for building permissions, Amazon would later offer the city $5.5 million to buy a fourth
streetcar, pay for its operating costs, and develop more bike lanes near its headquarters.427
By mid-2011, two more streetcar lines were proposed. One would run from the Ballard
neighborhood toward SLU, and the other, the First Avenue line, would connect the SLU
line with the not-yet-completed First Hill line.428 Opposition quickly responded, again, citing
the high costs as a primary problem and pointing to the many other transportation issues
the city needed to address. These issues included insufficient bus service, along with
deteriorating roads and bridges.429 In an article by Susan Kelleher, it was revealed that
an estimated 400 miles of Seattle’s roads needed repair, which could cost approximately
$578 million (2011). Other opponents expressed concern about increasing costs of living,
particularly near streetcar lines, loss of parking spaces, worse congestion, and the fact
that the SLU line was operating at a financial loss.430 However, proponents of expanding
the streetcar system secured a $900,000 grant in late 2011 to begin studies and design
work on the First Avenue line.431
On April 23, 2012, groundbreaking on the First Hill line commenced. This time, the city
made sure to better accommodate bicyclists by planning to add a dedicated one-mile bike
lane.432 As construction moved forward on the First Hill line, Mayor Mike McGinn and the
City Council continued to push the issue of expanding the streetcar service by constructing
a Center City Connector running through downtown from SLU to First Hill, a.k.a. the First
Avenue Line.433 As of early January 2014, the Seattle Department of Transportation was
developing a preferred route plan to send for approval.434 At the same time, the First Hill
Line was still under construction with an opening operation date set for some time after
mid-2014. Also at this time, the city “secured funding to plan and design the First Hill
Streetcar Line’s Broadway Extension.”435

STREETCAR RIDERSHIP AND SERVICE PERFORMANCE
The SLU streetcar is operated by King County Metro, which also operates Seattle’s bus
services. Since the streetcar line’s opening at the end of 2007, streetcar ridership has
increased steadily even as bus ridership has declined (Table 57). In 2012, streetcar
ridership was about 80 percent higher than it was in 2008. Over this time period, the
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average streetcar trip length was less than one mile [1.6 kilometer], while the average
bus trip length was about 4.7 miles [7.56 kilometers]. Ridership does not appear to have a
seasonal pattern on either streetcar or bus services in Seattle (Table 58).

Table 57. Annual Ridership by Mode in Seattle (2008-2012)436
Unlinked Passenger Trips

Unlinked Passenger Miles

Year

Streetcar

Bus

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Total

2008

413,253

118,278,626

118,691,879

378,221

655,592,456

544,970,677

2009

451,203

111,067,940

111,519,143

414,617

495,943,360

496,357,977

2010

520,933

109,008,892

109,529,825

471,587

458,606,273

459,077,860

2011

714,461

111,995,623

112,710,084

631,655

479,295,487

479,927,142

2012

750,866

95,592,084

96,342,950

650,023

458,098,243

458,748,266

Table 58. Monthly Unlinked Passenger Trips by Mode in Seattle (2012)437
Unlinked Passenger Trips
Month

Streetcar

Bus

Total

January

52,257

8,761,707

8,813,964

February

53,828

9,369,439

9,423,267

March

59,118

9,763,630

9,822,748

April

59,778

9,689,969

9,749,747

May

64,337

10,264,842

10,329,179

June

66,623

9,696,258

9,762,881

July

73,888

9,568,878

9,642,766

August

72,004

9,796,624

9,868,628

September

64,966

9,155,137

9,220,103

October

66,392

10,560,455

10,626,847

November

60,077

9,466,179

9,526,256

December

57,620

8,469,567

8,527,187

Streetcar service has increased steadily since its opening in late 2007, as shown in Table 59.
Revenue miles have increased by about 10 percent between 2008 and 2012. Bus service
was relatively stable until 2011, but it declined between 2011 and 2012. Bus service levels
in 2012 were lower than in 2008. Average streetcar speeds (vehicle revenue miles divide
by vehicle revenue hours) increased slightly from just less than 5 miles per hour in 2008 to
about 5.3 miles [8.53 kilometers] per hour in 2012. Average bus speeds increased slightly
from about 11.3 miles [18.19 kilometers] per hour to about 12 miles [19.31 kilometers] per
hour over this same time period. Slower streetcar speeds are at least partially a function
of the highly urban environment within which the streetcar operates. Inflation-adjusted
streetcar operating expenses have increased slightly over time even as inflation-adjusted
bus operating expenses have declined by about 18 percent (Table 60).
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Table 59. Annual Service Characteristics by Mode in Seattle (2008-2012)438
Vehicle Revenue Miles

Vehicle Revenue Hours

Year

Streetcar

Bus

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Total

2008

56,613

34,984,800

35,041,413

11,399

3,084,952

3,096,351

2009

60,150

35,493,795

35,553,945

11,207

3,135,871

3,147,078

2010

59,964

35,185,385

35,245,349

11,178

3,110,588

3,121,766

2011

61,727

35,866,855

35,928,582

11,509

3,105,924

3,117,433

2012

62,522

33,317,426

33,379,948

11,736

2,768,315

2,780,051

Table 60. Annual Operating Expense by Mode in Seattle (2008-2012)439
Streetcar

Bus

Total

Year

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

2008

$2,459,635

$2,622,965

$477,108,134

$508,790,066

$479,567,769

$511,413,031

2009

$2,366,620

$2,532,784

$480,410,833

$514,141,278

$482,777,453

$516,674,062

2010

$2,318,808

$2,441,567

$490,457,567

$516,422,650

$492,776,375

$518,864,217

2011

$2,396,642

$2,446,303

$457,207,387

$466,681,260

$459,604,029

$469,127,564

2012

$2,794,211

$2,794,211

$430,144,035

$430,144,035

$432,938,246

$432,938,246

Combining data on ridership, service, and operating expense, the authors developed two
performance indicators shown in Table 61. The left panel reports cost effectiveness, and
the right panel reports service productivity. The table indicates significantly increased
streetcar cost effectiveness (declining operating expense per unlinked passenger trip)
and significantly increased streetcar service productivity (passenger miles per vehicle
revenue mile). The streetcar has become a more effective transit mode over the years
since it opened. For buses, the trends are much more mixed. Both measures have seen
deteriorating performance for bus since 2008, although there have been some positive
signs over the intervening years.

Table 61. Service Performance by Mode in Seattle (2008-2012)
Cost Effectivness

Service Productivity

(Operating Expense per Passenger Trip, 2012 $)

(Passenger Miles per Vehicle Mile)

Year

Streetcar

Bus

Streetcar

Bus

2008

$6.35

$4.30

6.68

15.57

2009

$5.61

$4.63

6.89

13.97

2010

$4.69

$4.74

7.86

13.03

2011

$3.42

$4.17

10.23

13.36

2012

$3.72

$4.50

10.40

13.75

Note: Values calculated from Tables D-4, D-6, and D-7.

Summarizing streetcar annual mode-level performance, ridership and service have
increased since 2008, with the increased ridership exceeding the increases in service
and operating expenses (Table 62). The net result is increased productivity and improved
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cost effectiveness. The streetcar’s average operating speed is slightly higher in 2012
than in 2008, while the average trip length is relatively unchanged at just under 0.9 miles
[1.45 kilometers] per trip. The streetcar operates year-round service, and there does not
seem to be a seasonal pattern to either its ridership or service levels, based on the 2012
monthly ridership and service statistics summarized in Table 63.

Table 62. Summary of Streetcar Ridership, Service, and Performance by Year in
Seattle (2008-2012)440
Year

Unlinked Passenger Trips

Passenger Miles

Vehicle Revenue Miles

Vehicle Revenue Hours

2008

413,253

378,221

56,613

11,399

2009

451,203

414,617

60,150

11,207

2010

520,933

471,587

59,964

11,178

2011

714,461

631,655

61,727

11,509

2012

750,866

650,023

62,522

11,736

Year

Productivity
(PM/VM)

Cost Effectiveness
(2012$)

Speed
(VRM/VRH)

Average Trip Length
(PM/UPT)

2008

6.68

$6.35

4.97

0.92

2009

6.89

$5.61

5.37

0.92

2010

7.86

$4.69

5.36

0.91

2011

10.23

$3.42

5.36

0.88

2012

10.40

$3.72

5.33

0.87

Table 63. Summary of Streetcar Ridership and Service by Month in Seattle (2012)441
Month

Unlinked Passenger Trips

Vehicle Revenue Miles

Vehicle Revenue Hours

January

52,257

5,117

960

February

53,828

4,462

894

March

59,118

5,140

965

April

59,778

5,120

961

May

64,337

5,370

1,008

June

66,623

5,271

989

July

73,888

5,303

995

August

72,004

5,193

975

September

64,966

5,126

962

October

66,392

5,508

1,035

November

60,077

5,317

998

December

57,620

5,295

994

Table 64 reports station-level average weekday boarding counts for the SLU Line. On
average the SLU Line reports a ridership of 2,560 per average weekday, which places
Seattle third among the cities studied for this report (behind only Portland and Memphis,
each of which operates multiple lines). Two stops, Westlake Hub located at the commercial
core of downtown and Westlake/Thomas = in the SLU urban village bio-med complex
report the highest average weekday ridership counts (887 and 574 respectively). These
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areas are characterized by high employment concentrations and proximity to Special
Activity Centers (SAC). The third-highest ridership is registered for the Fairview/Campus
Drive stop, which is located adjacent to the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center,
one of the most notable SACs in the area. The rest of the stops exhibit lower ridership
values and variability. This pattern suggests the importance of key employment centers
for this particular line and reinforces previous studies that indicate the predominant role of
SACs for modern streetcar patronage.442

Table 64. Streetcar Station Level Average Weekday Boardings and Alightings in
Seattle (2012)443
Station

Line

Direction

Westlake Hub

SLU

Northbound

Boardings
887

Westlake & 7th (NB)

SLU

Northbound

74

Westlake & Denny

SLU

Northbound

120

Terry & Thomas

SLU

Northbound

60

Terry & Mercer

SLU

Northbound

29

Fairview & Campus Drive

SLU

Southbound

311

Lake Union Park

SLU

Southbound

97

Westlake & Mercer

SLU

Southbound

209

Westlake & Thomas

SLU

Southbound

574

Westlake & 9th

SLU

Southbound

181

Westlake & 7th (SB)

SLU

Southbound

Total

18
2,560

Note: Reflects a typical weekday in November 2012.

Figure 145 reports the level of connectivity of the SLU streetcar line with local bus
routes and other rail transit services within a 400 meter (one-quarter mile) buffer zone.
The graduated grey shaded circles represent the number of bus connections at or near
the streetcar stops. These are shown with ridership levels represented by non-shaded
concentric circles. A noticeable pattern emerges in which a higher number of bus route
connections at a stop appears to correlate with relatively higher ridership counts at the
stop. This is particularly salient at the Westlake Hub (McGraw Plaza) and at the Fairview/
Campus Drive stop (Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center), where 19 and five bus
connections occur, respectively. This pattern strongly suggests that some transfer of riders
from bus to streetcar might be happening, although data are unavailable to confirm this.
This reinforcing relationship had also been identified in previous studies related to stationlevel ridership for various rail transit modes. Where this pattern is inconsistent, as in the
Westlake/Harrison stop, the clustering of employment in proximity of the stop might better
explain the relatively higher level of ridership. It also appears that one or several bus
routes operate on the same street as the streetcar (Westlake Street). According to one of
the interviewees from Seattle’s transit agency, this has had no negative impacts on either
mode, as both report rising ridership trends. It seems there is sufficient demand in this
area to support both modes at this time.
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Rail connectivity could also be playing a role in promoting higher ridership levels at
streetcar stops, especially at the Westlake Hub. As also shown in Figure 146, the monorail
and the light-rail lines have stations in close proximity to this streetcar terminal. In addition
to the 19 bus connections, the added monorail and light-rail connections could potentially
be contributing to the significantly higher boarding counts at this location, which could be
operating as a multimodal hub providing regional links to the other parts of the region as
well as serving multiple trip types such as commuters, visitors, and local trips.

Figure 145. Bus Connectivity to SLU Streetcar Line in Seattle (2012)444
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Figure 146. Rail/Monorail Connectivity to SLU Streetcar Line in Seattle (2012)445
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INSIGHTS FROM KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS
In addition to collecting and analyzing quantitative data and documentary evidence,
the authors conducted one-hour semi-structured telephone interviews with several key
informants in the Seattle region who were able to provide their perspectives on streetcar
goals, performance, and future prospects. Informants represented a diverse set of
perspectives, including those of two land developers, an economic development specialist,
a transit planner, and a local land use planner. These informants were identified through
documents or were suggested by other interviewees as pertinent informants, given the
nature of the questions the authors hoped to address.
The authors sought to use the interviews to complement the insights developed from their
quantitative assessments discussed earlier, and to identify hard-to-quantify phenomena
that might impact people’s perceptions of the streetcar and impact its performance. Each
informant was provided a set of 12-24 questions in advance of the interviews, including
a set of questions asked of all informants and specific questions asked of that individual,
given the role he or she plays in the community. A set of typical interview questions can be
found in Appendix F.
For Seattle, the authors conducted four semi-structured interviews with five key informants.
They interviewed the two private land development informants during the same interview.
Several key themes emerged from the interviews, including: the role of key private sector
actors, the perception of the streetcar as a development catalyst, the importance of funding
stability, and the challenges of coordinating transportation and land use planning. The
five key informants included multiple individuals whose involvement with streetcar-related
issues predates the implementation of the South Lake Union streetcar line (Table 65). These
five individuals included: an experienced local transit planner, a land use planner focused
on sustainable community issues, an economic development organization representative
who has also been a long-time streetcar advocate, and two representatives from a key
major private land development firm. Each individual is identified by his or her role in the
community within the narrative that follows.

Table 65. Roster of Key Informants Interviewed for Seattle Study
Informant

Role

1

Transit Planner

2

Land Use Planner

3

Economic Development Specialist

4

Private Land Developer 1

5

Private Land Developer 2

Streetcar Goals
Every informant who was interviewed emphasized the development goals of the SLU line.
They used terms such as “catalyst” or phrases such as “economic development asset”
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when they discussed the streetcar. Two informants also mentioned the transportation role
that the streetcar was designed to play with phrases such as “last mile transit link” and
“capacity for serving additional trips.” There also seemed to be agreement that the goals
of the SLU Line are different from those of the First Hill Line now being built in the city.
The land use planner informant stated that the SLU is both a local transit investment and
development tool whose implementation was spurred by a desire to better connect the
SLU area, which was beginning to experience a real estate boom, with downtown Seattle.
This informant noted that the area was then not well served by transit. The streetcar was
selected as the transit investment to serve as a connector that would also support the
development momentum of the “vibrant, upcoming” SLU area with its biotech cluster and
the new Amazon development. This informant emphasized that the streetcar was seen as
a “permanent” investment that indicated a “long-term commitment” to the SLU area. The
informant did not see the streetcar as a critical part of the city’s overall transit strategy. The
line was not built as part of a larger system. The alignment is quite short, and the streetcar
operating speeds are slow enough to reduce its utility for commuters.
The economic development specialist informant has also served as a longtime streetcar
advocate and member of the local streetcar coalition. This informant noted that the SLU
streetcar line was implemented to support development goals and connect neighborhoods.
He used the word “catalyst” when discussing the streetcar’s relationship to development
objectives. This informant pointed to Portland as having been a model for what was sought
in Seattle.
The transit planner informant characterized the streetcar as both an economic development
asset and a transit investment. He noted that the streetcar serves a “last mile” role in the
transit system, and that it serves as a circulator that provides additional capacity for trips
within the city.

Assessment of Development Goals
The informants regarded the SLU streetcar as having been successful, particularly with
respect to achieving its development goals. Multiple informants conceded that the SLU area
was growing prior to streetcar implementation, and thus it is hard to attribute development
activity directly to the streetcar’s presence. Nevertheless, they viewed it as having been a
contributor. One informant noted the interest and excitement about development in SLU
that the streetcar helped to generate.
The transit planning informant observed that the SLU area had previously been
underdeveloped with some employment in the area where the streetcar line now begins
(Westlake Hub) and the area where it ends (near the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research
Center) but little in between. The informant pointed to major redevelopment activity now
occurring in that intermediate area. This arrangement mimics that of Portland’s first NS Line,
in which the streetcar line terminals serve a large university campus at one end, a health
complex on the other end, and an underdeveloped but emerging middle section. He also
noted that this redevelopment activity is also expected to have a positive effect on streetcar
ridership at the adjacent stops, which presently have low ridership.
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The two private land development informants pointed to a large number of major
international development firms being active in the SLU area now, whereas their firm was
“really the only active developer” in SLU in earlier years. They pointed to the area’s strong
real estate market, the presence of new retail and restaurant development in the area,
and an overall increase in activity. They also pointed to the relocation of Amazon to the
SLU area, and to the close link between the streetcar and the development of its facilities.
The economic development specialist concurred with the view that the SLU Line had
supported business and commercial activity in SLU.
The land use planner expressed a more cautious assessment. He noted that it was hard
to give a good assessment of the streetcar’s development role because SLU had been
rapidly changing anyway. He thought the streetcar had likely helped to boost land values
along its spine, and that it provided good public relations. He thought it had been most
successful in generating interest and excitement about development in SLU. He noted
that because it was a high-profile investment, it received a great deal of of media attention
that tended to focus on its attractiveness, its ease of use, and the support it received from
large employers. Likewise, this informant noted that it drew some criticism from sectors
of the community as well. He reported that some critics thought that public monies would
be better spent on bus service and road improvements. Other critics were concerned that
the investment disproportionately benefitted one major developer and might have been
implemented at his behest.

Assessment of Streetcar’s Transportation Performance
While the informants tended to have similar views of the streetcar’s role with respect to
development in SLU, there was some disagreement about its transportation performance.
In fact, one informant was quite negative about it. Others were more cautious. Informant
comments focused on the short SLU alignment, the lack of integration with the larger
transit system, and future streetcar development that might make it part of a more effective
streetcar network.
The land use planning informant was the most pessimistic about the streetcar’s performance
as transportation. He characterized the transportation aspect as the least successful part
of the streetcar. He stated that it was likely “not a good transit performer,” despite its higher
than expected ridership. He noted that he personally would never use the streetcar due
to its slow speed and the lack of investment in signal timing or other strategies that might
allow it to run at higher speed. He pointed to it being more like a shuttle and commercial
connector. He said that it did not serve a very large area due to its short alignment. Finally,
he noted what he perceived as the lack of integration between the streetcar and the rest of
the transportation network. He thought the SLU line had been driven by local perspectives
and issues as opposed to city or regional ones. Nevertheless, he sees future lines such as
First Hill as providing an opportunity to transform the investment into more of a transit one
that serves more residential areas.
The other informants focused many of their comments on the First Hill Line and other
potential streetcar extensions that they believe will increase the streetcar’s utility as a
transit investment. The land developer informants noted that the ultimate objective is a
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network of streetcars in Seattle. They noted that SLU is one of three pieces in what is
envisioned as a connected system. The second piece is the First Hill Line, which will
run through a business center, and the final piece is the center city connector that would
connect the other two pieces. Mayor Murray wants to operate that connector in its own
right-of-way along First Avenue. The economic development informant and transit planning
informant made similar statements.
The authors also asked the informants about the rider market for the SLU Line. The transit
planning informant observed that he did not consider tourists to be an important rider
market to the same degree in Seattle as they are on many other streetcar systems. He
agreed that there is an increase in ridership during summer that may include more tourists
and visitors, but he also noted the small number of tourist-oriented destinations along the
SLU alignment. He said that the Natural History Museum and the lakefront park are two
visitor destinations, but that much of the alignment is underdeveloped or in the early stages
of redevelopment. He thought that workers are the primary users of the line, due to the
presence of Amazon and other major employers. The economic development specialist
informant concurred with this view.
The informants thought that the new First Hill Line is likely to have more visitor riders due
to its location. The economic development specialist noted that he expects a 50:50 mix
of visitors and tourists on that line due to his observations of the customer profile at the
nearby Pike Place Market. Both the land developer informants and the transit planning
informant agree that because of the uses along this line, there are likely to be many more
visitor riders than use the SLU Line.
As a piece of transportation infrastructure, the SLU Line is managed and operated by a
public transportation entity. While the City of Seattle planned, designed, and managed the
construction of the streetcar line, King County Metro’s rail division, which also operates
light rail service, operates and maintains the SLU Line. King County Metro also operates
bus service. The possibility of service coordination thus exists, although the transit planning
consultant reported that there is no service coordination between the streetcar and other
modes due to the inconsistent headways. This same informant was also not aware of any
major service changes to bus routes due to streetcar implementation, save for the shifting
of a bus route onto the same street as the streetcar when it was expanded from a one-way
street to a two-way street. The lack of coordination with respect to scheduling or planning
definitely suggests that the SLU Line is not viewed primarily as a piece of the local transit
system, which makes Seattle different from Portland, its inspiration for building the line.

Public Attitudes
The informants noted that public attitudes toward the streetcar depend on where the
individual resides or works in relation to the SLU streetcar. They noted that those who are
close in proximity to SLU tend to view the streetcar as a positive asset, while residents
from elsewhere in the larger Seattle region often question whether the streetcar was the
best public investment. Most of the informants shared these views.
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The transit planning informant characterized the public within the city of Seattle as tending
to support transit, while suburbanites tend to be less supportive of transit. He pointed to a
recent local vote to provide financial support for transit that had strong support in the city
but failed on a county basis in King County, of which Seattle is a part. He said that within the
city there is a belief that transit is critical to the economy. He observed that many people in
the city use transit or other non-single-occupant automobile modes, including 50 percent of
travelers to downtown Seattle.
The private land developer informants emphasized strong local support as well. They
noted that non-motorized mode advocates within the city, such as the Cascade Bicycle
Club, support the streetcar because of the ability to carry bicycles on the vehicles. They
observed that local retailers within the SLU neighborhood support the streetcar and use it
in their marketing. They like the “permanence” of a line that is not going away. They also
noted that firms such as Amazon that have moved into the SLU neighborhood have become
very supportive. Amazon purchased a streetcar to improve the line’s service frequency,
and it is one of a number of employers who pay to provide additional peak period service.
The land use planning informant emphasized that when speaking of public attitudes, there
are two different “publics.” He noted that the local people living and working in SLU tend to
be very positive toward the streetcar. They think it is a good asset for the community. The
informant noted that these individuals were quite positive from the beginning, and they
have become even more supportive now. However, he also noted that among the larger
population, there is a sense that the streetcar represents a large financial giveaway to
major developers and is not an effective transportation tool. The informant noted a sense
among many of these individuals that the SLU area was destined to thrive even without
the streetcar.
The land use planning informant noted that policymakers’ views tend to be similarly mixed.
He characterized a sense of happiness that the streetcar has achieved its development
purpose. At the same time, there are questions about whether investing in the streetcar
was the best way to address the city’s larger transportation needs. He noted that some
policymakers wonder whether a bus rapid transit or light rail investment might have been a
better use of money, and whether such investments might have allowed the city to create
a better transit system.

Private Sector Role
More so than in any of the other cities, although Portland might be a close second, private
sector actors have played a major role in the origins, development, and ongoing operation
of the streetcar in Seattle. Our informants noted the involvement of landowners in providing
momentum early on that culminated in the SLU Line. They pointed to the roles of major
firms such as Vulcan Properties and Amazon in providing public and financial support.
They also spoke to the role of biotech firms, the hospitals, and other major institutional
actors as supporters of the streetcar.
Vulcan, the firm founded by former Microsoft executive Paul Allen, has been a particularly
important participant in the discussions around the streetcar in Seattle. The land developer
informants spoke at great length about Vulcan’s role. They noted that Vulcan tended to
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work with many other groups on streetcar issues, such as the Cascade Neighborhood
Council, which consists of resident-based groups in the area. The Council and Vulcan
are members of an organization called South Lake Union Friends and Neighborhoods
(SLUFAN), composed of residents, business people, and developers that the city engages
to raise the visibility of different issues in the larger community.
The land developer informants recalled that in the early stages of the effort to promote
streetcar development, Vulcan and other major firms, such as Vance Corporation (a real
estate and property management firm), provided leadership for the Build the Streetcar
Committee. At this time, one of the informants was engaged in outreach to the business
community to provide information for a proposed local improvement district that would
help finance the streetcar. This informant characterized their efforts as “like a political
campaign,” as they included a website, brochures, and personal contact with key individuals
and organizations in the community. This individual noted that site visits to Portland and
Vancouver to view streetcar and light rail in those cities ultimately led to the selection
of modern streetcar technology in Seattle as the preferred technology and helped to
consolidate political support for the streetcar among city council members. The informant
noted the belief that the streetcar would be a permanent investment, as opposed to a bus,
and seemed to best fit the SLU area.
The two land developer informants characterized Vulcan as being interested in the streetcar
because of a “diversity of possible benefits” that might flow from development in the area
to the wider city. They recalled that former Mayor Nickels had identified the SLU area as a
major bio-tech life sciences center, although it was then largely zoned industrial and had
many vacant warehouses, parking lots, and small businesses. The transit service in SLU
was not good, and they recalled that the streetcar was selected to be a key rail spine for
an area that was “in need of an urban transformation.” The selected alignment connected
the Fred Hutchison Cancer Research Center at one terminus and the Westlake Center,
with its connections to LRT and rubber-tire transit, at the other end.
Development possibilities were certainly a key driving factor in the involvement of private
sector actors such as Vulcan. The land developer informants emphasized the significant
development effects, which had been anticipated in SLU because of Portland’s experience
with a streetcar. They recalled that the city had commissioned an appraiser to study the
value of new development along the Portland streetcar line with an eye toward estimating
development outcomes as well as potential land development tax revenue for a Seattle
streetcar line. The informants recalled that the study estimated $155 million in new tax
revenue for the city, with 75 percent of that figure consisting of recurring income that could
be used to help finance the investment. They felt the study was important in building local
support for the streetcar.
The other informants also pointed to the important roles played by Vulcan and other private
actors. The transit planner informant agreed that there had been strong private sector
involvement in the push to build the streetcar, including from Vulcan Properties, Amazon,
and the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Institute for the SLU Line and from Seattle
University and Swedish Medical Center for the First Hill Line. This informant observed that
major property owning firms had representatives who co-chaired the Build the Streetcar
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Coalition, which helped to build support among other business and property owners in the
area. This same informant noted that some private entities continue to be engaged in the
streetcar, including financially. Amazon provided funding to add another streetcar vehicle
and provide additional service. Institutional actors like the Medical School and biotech
firms have also provided funding for additional service. The informant pointed to a history
of major employer support for transit and other transportation demand management
strategies in Seattle.
The economic development specialist informant also pointed to the financial partnerships
with Amazon and other key firms to fund streetcar service. This individual also mentioned
conversations with the Museum of History and Industry (MOHAI) for some type of
financial contribution to the streetcar. This contribution might fund some legacy vehicles
and establish an express service targeting visitors who are seeking to reach key tourist
destinations. This informant noted that some modifications of stops will be required if this
idea moves forward, as the boarding level for legacy vehicles is higher than the level for
modern streetcar vehicles.
The land developer informants conceded that the involvement of high-visibility private actors,
such as Paul Allen’s Vulcan firm, had drawn some criticism. They noted that Mr. Allen’s status
as a local billionaire had fed some criticism that the streetcar was “just a toy for Vulcan.”
However, these informants insisted that site visits to Portland to see what had happened
there represented a real turning point in debates about the streetcar, including among local
council members. They noted that the attendees had seen firsthand the investment that had
occurred along the Portland line and had recognized that the streetcar could be of great
benefit in Seattle as well.

Finance
The informants pointed to the importance of stable funding in enabling what they largely
perceived as a successful streetcar project. The transit planner informant noted that the
capital funding for the SLU line came 50 percent from a local improvement district funded
by assessments on property located within three blocks of the line, 25 percent from federal
grants, and 25 percent from local and city funds. This informant emphasized the key early
role of the Build the Streetcar Coalition in building consensus among the affected property
owners in favor of the assessment. He recalled that they voted (with votes weighted
by assessed value) 98 percent in favor of creating the local improvement district. The
assessment district contributed $26 million from the estimated $67 million assessed
value increment attributed to the streetcar. The informant believes increases in property
values are now much higher. The same informant said operations were initially funded by
redistributing bus service hours to the streetcar, obtaining a financial commitment from the
city, and receiving support from major entities such as Amazon for increases in vehicles
and service hours.
The informants as a whole characterized the streetcar’s funding arrangements as stable,
which they contrasted with bus service for King County Metro. The transit planning informant
noted that King County Metro’s current budget difficulties might necessitate bus service
cuts of up to 30 percent. The relative certainty and permanence of streetcar service stood
out a great deal when contrasted with the extreme uncertainty of the bus service situation.
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Transportation and Land Development Policy
Two informants spoke of supportive public policies in transportation and land development
that assist the streetcar. Transportation policies include reduced parking requirements
for developers, employee transit use programs with major employers, and streetscape
investments to make more transit-friendly, walkable streets. The informants also noted
land regulation changes to encourage more dense development in the streetcar corridor.
The land use planning informant noted that the zoning changes represent a doubling of
potential development capacity in the SLU area. The same informant noted that while
the city has invested in streetscape and other public infrastructure investments in the
area, they do not provide direct financial incentives to encourage development there. This
informant’s sense was that such incentives were not necessary.

Streetcar Challenges
The key informant interviews identified several challenges that these individuals believe
face the streetcar in Seattle. One of these was earlier identified as the transportation
part of the streetcar system. One informant cited the lack of integration of the streetcar
into the larger transportation network, as well as the lack of public investment in traffic
management and signal technology that would allow the streetcar to operate at higher
speeds.
Another informant pointed to the lack of coordination between land use planning and
transportation planning, particularly at the metropolitan level, in Seattle. This informant
believed that the lack of regional coordination made developing an effective regional transit
system much more difficult. He particularly criticized the frustrations he had experienced
in trying to get regional transit agencies to really see transportation and land use planning
integration as being important. This individual suggested that other communities considering
streetcar investments should think more carefully about these regional coordination
issues prior to streetcar implementation. However, the same informant characterized local
transportation and land use policy coordination within the City of Seattle as quite good.

Lessons for Other Communities
In addition to the need for more attention to regional-level land use and transportation
planning coordination noted above, the informants identified several key takeaways from
the Seattle experience that they deemed relevant to other communities. The first of these
was the importance of early outreach to all stakeholders to build public support. The
informants noted the role played by outreach in leading to very high approval rate for the
local improvement district to help fund the streetcar.
The second takeaway is to think about the long-term implications of early decisions about
factors such as alignment location. The informants observed that having tracks adjacent
to the curb poses challenges to bicyclists. Concerns about this issue in Seattle mean that
the First Hill Line will have tracks in the middle of roadway instead.
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The third takeaway cited by the informants was the important role that motivated advocates
played. The informants emphasized that the work toward the SLU was very difficult and
required hard work from people who were absolutely dedicated to seeing it through to
completion, including a large number of important private sector actors. Two informants
noted the role of the Seattle Urban League’s James Kelley as a streetcar supporter who
was able to communicate effectively to communities of color about the potential jobs
benefits from streetcar investment.
Finally, as perhaps the most important takeaway, the informants emphasized the
importance of understanding the local context for streetcar development. They noted that
a boilerplate does not exist for creating a streetcar line that will work everywhere. The
alignment, neighborhood, and stakeholders all are important to shaping the approach that
a particular city should take.

CONCLUSION
Among the five streetcar cities, Seattle ranks third in ridership, third in cost effectiveness,
and second in service productivity. It is also the shortest of the five streetcar lines. Among the
cases, Seattle’s experience is most similar to that of Portland, which served as a principal
inspiration for Seattle’s streetcar investment decision. As was true of Portland, primary
drivers of streetcar investment were redevelopment efforts in a targeted transitioning area
near the downtown that was seen as underdeveloped. As was also true of Portland, the
local private sector, represented by property owners, major employers, and key advocacy
groups, played a major role in pushing for the streetcar’s implementation. These actors
viewed the streetcar in Seattle as a potential development catalyst, which is how they
tended to evaluate the experience they had observed in Portland. By and large, they seem
to feel that it has achieved its development objectives. Whether or not the development
in South Lake Union would have occurred without the streetcar being built is a point on
which there is some disagreement, although most observers tend to agree that the area
had tremendous development potential waiting to be tapped.
From a transit perspective, the SLU streetcar appears to be viewed as an adequate
performer by most observers, despite its shortcomings with respect to speed, length,
and integration or coordination with other local transit services. It is notable that ridership
and productivity measures for the streetcar are either improving or stable at a time when
the bus system is declining on these measures. The presence of major employers who
are actively engaged in promoting the streetcar, including some with a financial stake,
undoubtedly contributes to the ridership it does attract.
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APPENDIX E: PROFILE OF TECO LINE STREETCAR IN
TAMPA, FLORIDA
The fifth and final case-study city is Tampa, Florida. The streetcar line in Tampa is more
than a decade old at the time of this study. Tampa’s streetcar line primarily caters to a
visitor riding market. The streetcar vehicles are vintage trolleys (Figure 147) that operate
on an alignment that connects the Channelside District and other areas located to the
south and east of downtown Tampa to Ybor City, a historic neighborhood that attracts
a number of visitors. Average daily ridership is relatively low on this system compared
with the others studied. Local informants attribute the low ridership to a combination of
the economic downturn in 2008, the service’s schedule, and its alignment, which will be
discussed later.

Figure 147. A Vintage Trolley Operating in Tampa’s Ybor City Neighborhood446

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STREETCAR SERVICE
The streetcar line in Tampa, Florida is called the TECO (Tampa Electric Company) Line.
The 2.7-mile [4.35 kilometer] line cost $32 million to build, and it opened in 2002. The line
is served by three vehicles, which operate on an exclusive right-of-way to provide service
to 11 stops (Figure 148 and Table 66). Three local entities are involved in the ownership,
management, and operation of the TECO Line. Hillsborough Area Regional Transit (HART)
owns the streetcars, and the streetcar division of its operations department operates the
streetcars; the City of Tampa owns the streetcar rails and right of way; and Tampa Historic
Streetcar, Inc. (THS) is the governing board with responsibility for major policy decisions.
HART also operates local bus service in the community (Figure 149).
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Figure 148. Map of Streetcar Line in Tampa, Florida447

Table 66. Physical Characteristics of the Streetcar System in Tampa448
Characteristic

Value

Year Open

2002

Capital Cost (unadjusted dollars)

$32,000,000

Number of Lines

1

Number of Vehicles

3*

Number of Stations

11

Length

2.7 miles
(4.35 km)

Alignment Type

Exclusive

2.7 miles

Mixed Traffic

0

*Note: The maximum number of vehicles operated in service is three, while they have a total inventory
of ten historic streetcars (email communication from Steve Feigenbaum on February 5, 2014).

The local bus routes form a relatively sparse network of largely north-south and east-west
routes. The network is denser in downtown Tampa and the nearby Ybor City area, within
which the streetcar line operates. Figure 150 indicates that several bus routes serve the
areas surrounding the streetcar stops, which suggests that transfers between the two
modes are at least spatially feasible. However, the streetcar line’s operating schedule
constrains the ability of bus transit users to use the streetcar service for trips taken at
certain times of the day, as noted below, which reduces the utility of cross-mode transfers.
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Figure 149. Map of Transit System in Tampa (2012)449
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Figure 150. Map of Streetcar and Bus System in Core of Tampa (2012)450
The TECO Line begins operations at noon from Sunday through Thursday and at 11 a.m.
on Fridays and Saturdays. The line does not operate during morning commute hours, which
thus reduces its utility for certain kinds of trips. Service frequencies are consistent throughout
the day, with 20-minute weekday service and 30-minute weekend service (Table 67). The
service schedule and frequencies reflect the TECO Line’s primary orientation toward the
visitor travel market. The base fare is relatively high at $2.50 per ride, although discounted
passes are available (Table 68). Transfers are free between the streetcar and local buses,
although no data are available on the actual amount of transfer activity.
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Table 67. Service Characteristics of the Streetcar System in Tampa451
Characteristic

Value

Headways
Weekday Peak

20 min

Weekday Off-Peak

20 min

Weekend Average

30 min

Hours of Service
Monday-Thursday

10 hr

Friday

15 hr

Saturday

15 hr

Sunday

8 hr

Table 68. Fare and Transfer Policy for Transit Services in Tampa452
Characteristic

Type

Fare Type

Base Fare

$2.50

*Reduced Fare

$1.25

Day Pass

$5.00

*Reduced Day Pass

$2.50

Pass Type

3-Day Pass
20-Ride Fare Card
Annual Pass
**Family All Day Ticket
Transfer Fee

Bus/Streetcar

Cost ($)

$11.00
$25.00
$200.00
$12.50
--

Notes:
* Seniors 65 years and older and people with disabilities receive fares at a reduced price.
** Valid on Streetcar only for 2 adults and 3 children or 1 adult and 4 children and available only at Streetcar Ticket
Vending Machines.

The TECO Line connects downtown Tampa/Channelside area with Ybor City and other
nearby tourist attractions and parking facilities. John Smatlak observes that “the line
serves the so-called ‘visitors crescent’ that encompasses the Convention Center, Ice
Palace, Garrison Seaport, Florida Aquarium, and the historic Ybor City district. According
to the Tampa Downtown Partnership, more than $800 million in new, privately funded
construction projects are recently completed, under construction, or have been approved
within two blocks of the streetcar line since its inception. Many of these projects feature
the streetcar system in their marketing and advertising.”453 The tourism/visitor orientation
is apparent in the service characteristics discussed earlier, and it can also be seen in the
data on the types of trips the streetcar serves. For example, the bottom panel of Table 69
indicates that more than 90 percent of streetcar trips are taken for social or recreational
purposes. Very limited survey data is available on streetcar users, as they are not a primary
focus of HART’s data gathering operations.
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Table 69. Customer Profile, HART, Tampa454
Gender

Race

HART System (%)

Streetcar (%)

Male

46.7

56.7

Female

53.3

43.3

Total

100.0

100.0

White

28.7

not available

Black

48.5

not available

Hispanic

17.6

not available

1.7

not available

Other

3.5

not available

Total

100.0

Asian

Age

18 or under

24.1

11.8

25 - 34

21.5

29.5

35 - 44

18.3

25.8

45 - 54

20.7

16.4

55 - 64

10.3

12.3

over 65

2.4

3.5

0.8

0.3

100.0

100.0

Full Time

42.0

not available

Part Time

19.0

not available

Not Employed

32.0

not available

7.0

not available

Total

Retired
Total
Income

100.0

Under $5,000

29.7

not available

$5,000 to $9,999

14.9

not available

$10,000 to $19,999

20.8

not available

$20,000 to $29,999

15.4

not available

$30,000 to $39,999

9.7

not available

$40,000 to $49,999

3.9

not available

5.6

not available

$50,000 or more
Total
Access Mode

0.4

18 - 24

Missing
Employment Status

1.9

100.0

Walked

85.0

not available

Bicycled

4.0

not available

Drove

0.5

not available

Was Dropped Off

3.4

not available

Rode with Someone

0.4

not available

Other

6.7

not available

Total

100.0
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HART System (%)
Trip Purpose

Work

270

Streetcar (%)

27.9

4.3

School/College

9.5

-

Social

5.4

37.7

Medical

5.4

-

36.3

-

Recreation

0.7

54.7

Shopping

6.7

-

Other

8.1

3.3

Total

100.0

100.0

Home

Note: Categories reported as defined in source documents.

SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT FOR STREETCAR SERVICE
At the time of the 2010 Census, the city of Tampa, Florida had a population of just under
336,000 people. The total population for the Tampa-St. Petersburg metropolitan area was
just under 2.8 million.455 Streetcar service is confined to Tampa’s downtown/Channelside
area, which is on the eastern side of Tampa Bay, and to the commercial/recreational center
of Ybor City, northeast of downtown Tampa. The city’s median household income was just
over $43,000 per year, while about 21 percent of the population lived below the poverty
line. The city population was more than 26 percent black and about 63 percent white at
the time of the 2010 Census. The Hispanic population counted for about 23 percent of the
city’s total population.
Transportation analysts typically use population as an indicator of trip production potential,
and thus a clearer understanding of the spatial distribution of population within a community
is an important part of any analysis of travel-related phenomena. Figures 151 and 152
display city-scale population and population density for Tampa, both by census block group,
at the time of the 2010 Census. The first exhibit suggests that larger population zones tend
to be located toward the edges of the city of Tampa, while the second exhibit emphasizes
that the higher-density zones tend to be in the core areas of the city. Most of the city’s block
groups have low-to-moderate total populations and low-to-moderate population densities,
which is perhaps not surprising given that most of Tampa’s population growth has come in
recent decades and thus has been shaped by the automobile.
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Figure 151. Population by Block Group in Tampa (2010)456
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Figure 152. Population Density by Block Group in Tampa (2010)457
Figures 153 and 154 depict population and population density at a larger map scale for
the areas in the Tampa core area immediately surrounding the streetcar line. The first of
these maps indicates that the area has population in the low to moderate range except for
a high population block group at the northern end of the line in Ybor City. The population
density map depicts a very different pattern, highlighting the importance of accounting
for block group size in the analysis. Here, the higher population density block groups are
those along the western side of the streetcar line. Ybor City emerges as an area of lower
population densities, as do the block groups at the southern end of the line. All these
population density levels are relatively modest for core urban areas.
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Employment represents potential trip attractors, and thus understanding its spatial
distribution is also important. Figures 155 and 156 depict employment and employment
density, respectively, for the city of Tampa. The first of these maps suggests a spatially
dispersed employment pattern with many outer and edge location block groups appearing
as major employment centers. The second of these maps indicates that some of this
pattern is at least partially an artifact of differences in the physical sizes of the block groups.
In this second map, many areas within the core of the city emerge as areas with relatively
high employment densities. However, most of Tampa’s block groups fall within the low to
moderate employment density categories. Even its highest employment density category
is relatively modest for a core urban area. Within the immediate vicinity of the streetcar,
employment counts are higher in the block groups at the north end of the corridor and
lower toward the middle and southern ends of the line. However, employment densities
are highest in the block groups at the center of the streetcar alignment (Figures 157 and
158). Taking population and employment together, the streetcar appears to serve areas
that, by Tampa standards, are of moderate to high densities, although not the highest
density locations in the city.

Figure 153. Population by Block Group in Core of Tampa (2010)458
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Figure 154. Population Density by Block Group in Core of Tampa (2010)459
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Figure 155. Employment by Block Group in Tampa (2010)460
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Figure 156. Employment Density by Block Group in Tampa (2010)461
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Figure 157. Employment by Block Group in Core of Tampa (2010)462
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Figure 158. Employment Density by Block Group in Core of Tampa (2010)463
Downtown Tampa and Ybor City are characterized by a traditional orthogonal street pattern
(Figure 159). However, the average block size in Ybor City is 2.82 acres [1.14 hectares],
noticeably lower than the average of 4.10 acres [1.66 hectares] in the downtown Tampa/
Channelside area. Streets in downtown Tampa are also wider, have more lanes, and carry
more traffic than those in Ybor City. These differences would seem to render Ybor a more
amenable place for pedestrians. Regardless of these differences, the cumulative density
of population plus employment in both Ybor City and Downtown Tampa is equal to or less
than 7.11 people + jobs per acre [2.88 per hectare]. As in the other cases examined for this
study, this land-use characteristic is below the threshold recommended for cost-effective
light-rail systems.464
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Tampa’s population is predominantly white, but the city also has large black and Hispanic
populations. The spatial distribution of the black population is shown in Figures 160 and
161. The first figure depicts larger black population shares in Tampa’s eastside block
groups and in the areas due north of the downtown core. The second figure indicates that
within the areas immediately surrounding the streetcar line, the black population shares
tend to be in the low to moderate ranges, with the exception of higher black population
shares in the block groups just west of the line’s northern terminus in Ybor City. Generally
speaking, black population shares tend to be higher in the core areas of Tampa.
The spatial distribution of Tampa’s white population is shown in Figures 162 and 163. The
white population tends to cluster in larger numbers in the block groups on the western side
of the city and in the northern areas. Within the immediate vicinity of the streetcar line, white
population shares are fairly high. The Hispanic population is depicted in Figures 164 and
165. Like the black population, the Hispanic population is represented in larger numbers
in the core areas of Tampa. However, it is much more concentrated in Tampa’s western
areas. Within the downtown core areas, Hispanic population shares are typically in the low
to moderate range, although the block groups just east of the streetcar line have higher
Hispanic population shares. Tampa also has a small but growing Asian population. This
population tends to locate in larger numbers in block groups along the water and at the
different ends of the city, and it is represented in smaller numbers in the core inner block
groups (Figures 166 and 167). The block groups at the center of the streetcar alignment tend
to have moderate numbers of Asian residents, although the community is still quite small
compared with the other groups.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix E: Profile of TECO LINE Streetcar in Tampa, Florida

Figure 159. Urban Morphology-Parcel Map for Tampa (2012)465
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Figure 160. Black Population by Block Group in Tampa (2010)466
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Figure 161. Black Population by Block Group in Core of Tampa (2010)467
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Figure 162. White Population by Block Group in Tampa (2010)468
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Figure 163. White Population by Block Group in Core of Tampa (2010)469
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Figure 164. Hispanic Population by Block Group in Tampa (2010)470
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Figure 165. Hispanic Population by Block Group in Core of Tampa (2010)471
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Figure 166. Asian Population by Block Group in Tampa (2010)472

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

287

Appendix E: Profile of TECO LINE Streetcar in Tampa, Florida

288

Figure 167. Asian Population by Block Group in Core of Tampa (2010)473
Median household income and vehicle access are two variables strongly correlated with
transit use, with lower-income households and those households with lower levels of
vehicle access tending to use transit much more often than other households. Figures 168
and 169 depict the spatial pattern of median household income by block group. The income
maps are strikingly similar to those for the white and Asian populations just discussed, with
household incomes tending to be higher in the outer areas than in the immediate core
of the city. Block groups in the approximate center of the city tend to have lower income
levels. However, several block groups with relatively high incomes are in the center of the
streetcar alignment.
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It is not surprising that there is some consistency between the spatial patterns of household
incomes and vehicle access (Figures 170 and 171). Vehicle access is depicted as the
average number of vehicles per housing unit. Vehicle access is highest in the outer areas
and lower in the core areas in Tampa. Within the area served by the streetcar line, vehicle
access tends to be relatively low in most block groups. Related to vehicle access is the
transit commute mode share, which tends to be higher in areas with low levels of vehicle
access, although the mode shares themselves are relatively modest—which is perhaps not
surprising given Tampa’s predominantly auto-oriented development patterns (Figures 172
and 173). Residents in inner city block groups are much more likely to use transit for work
trips than are those living in other areas. The block groups surrounding the streetcar line
tend to have very low transit commute shares, with the exceptions of the block groups in
Ybor City at the north end of the line.
Taken as a whole, the area around the streetcar line possesses some of the socioeconomic
attributes associated with higher transit use, but it is far from the most optimal location in
Tampa, purely from a socioeconomic perspective, for generating large numbers of regular
transit users. This all points to the streetcar’s primary role as part of the city’s tourism and
visitor strategy as opposed to a service focused on attracting traditional transit riders.
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Figure 168. Median Household Income by Block Group in Tampa (2010)474
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Figure 169. Median Household Income by Block Group in Core of Tampa (2010)475

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

Appendix E: Profile of TECO LINE Streetcar in Tampa, Florida

Figure 170. Vehicles per Housing Unit by Block Group in Tampa (2010)476
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Figure 171. Vehicles per Housing Unit by Block Group in Core of Tampa (2010)477
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Figure 172. Transit Commute Share by Block Group in Tampa (2010)478
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Figure 173. Transit Commute Share by Bock Group in Core of Tampa (2010)479
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LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT FOR STREETCAR SERVICE
The TECO Line streetcar is located in a core area of central Tampa that is primarily
commercial, although it is not heavily built up. Figure 174 depicts land uses for parcels
in the area surrounding the streetcar line. The picture portrayed here is of an area with
moderate densities and significant room for potential concentrated redevelopment. Also
shown on the map are special activity centers, including convention centers, hotels,
museums, libraries, and other destinations that cater to visitors. At the northeast end of the
alignment, the Ybor City district itself is a major visitor destination. Many of these special
activity destinations are very close to the line’s various stops.
Figure 175 adds streetcar ridership, by stop, to the image to clearly highlight the very
important role played by these visitor-oriented destinations for the streetcar line’s ridership.
Indeed, the high-ridership stops tend to have special activity centers close by. Also clear
from the map is the very low ridership at most of Tampa’s streetcar stops. Tampa’s streetcar
has the second-lowest ridership among the cases considered in this report. Only Little
Rock has lower ridership levels.
Figure 176 reports the land uses in finer detail, noting in particular the concentration
of commercial activity and locations of major educational centers. Three important
observations can be made from this figure. First, educational centers such as schools,
universities, and college campuses are not well served by the streetcar in Tampa, although
educational centers play important roles in streetcar patronage in other cases in this study.
Second, downtown Tampa, which represents one of the two dominant commercial clusters,
is not served directly by the streetcar. Finally, most of the land adjacent to the streetcar
alignment in the Channelside District, to the North of Ybor City, and in some areas in
downtown Tampa is under the purview of public, quasi-public, and/or institutional agents.
This suggests an important potential role for the public sector to implement land-use,
transportation, and development policies focused on creating conducive environments
for streetcar patronage. The authors turn to a more detailed discussion of ridership and
performance later in the profile.
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Figure 174. Land Uses and Special Activity Centers Around Streetcar Stops in
Tampa (2012)480
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Figure 175. Land Uses, Special Activity Centers, and Streetcar Ridership in
Tampa (2012)481
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Figure 176. Detail of Land Uses in Core of Tampa (2012)482
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON STREETCAR DEVELOPMENT
The first Tampa streetcar system was a wood-fueled, multiple-car system operated by
the Tampa Street Railway Company (TSRC) that began service in 1885 and ran from
downtown Tampa to Ybor City. Less than a decade later, with the invention of the overhead
electricity-powered streetcar system, TSRC merged with a private electric company to
form the Tampa Street Railway and Power Company (TSRPC). Soon other companies
entered the streetcar business. Just two years after the TSRPC merger in 1892, the
Consumers Electric Light and Street Railway Company (CELSRC) surpassed TSRPC
as the leading streetcar company and bought them to form the Tampa Electric Company
(TECO) in 1899.483 The proliferation of streetcar lines during these years led to significant
urban growth outside Tampa’s downtown core.
Throughout the early 20th century, Tampa’s streetcar system boomed. At its high point, the
system consisted of over 53 miles [85.30 kilometers] of track, 11 routes, and 22 hours per
day/7 days per week service.484 The system operated approximately 190 streetcars that
ran over a combined 9,000 miles [14,484 kilometers] per day, one of which was the 420,
the longest Birney streetcar ever built at 45.8 feet [13.96 meters]).485 High ridership levels
continued through World War II. At the end of the war, the streetcar system of Tampa, like
those in other cities, began to feel pressure from other increasingly popular transportation
modes (especially private automobiles), and streetcar ridership began to fall. TECO began
to lose significant amounts of money as riders abandoned the streetcar. Citizens who had
increasingly taken to the automobile soon began complaining that streetcars caused too
much congestion on local streets, which led to local efforts to remove streetcars from local
streets.486 The Tampa streetcar soon retired, halting service in August 1946.
Several decades later in October 1995, the Tampa streetcar re-emerged from its long
hibernation at a town meeting held by the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority
(HART). The purpose of this meeting was to propose plans for a new streetcar system
that would run from downtown Tampa to Ybor City as part of a newly approved, largescale commuter rail system.487 The proposal was presented by a task force that was headed
by Tampa and Ybor City Street Railway Society president Mike English. This group would
later become the non-profit organization Tampa Historic Streetcar (THS), responsible for
managing the streetcar system.488 English believed the streetcar would be popular among
residents on event/game days at the local arena and also with tourists, as the streetcars
were “romantic, and fun, and efficient.”489 The belief that the streetcar would help revitalize
downtown Tampa and draw tourism to Ybor City led to strong backing by the leadership of
HART, Tampa’s major transit agency, and Tampa Mayor Dick Greco. The initial plan was for
an overhead power line system of eight replica streetcars that would cost around $18 million,
with responsibility for finance split into thirds among the city, the private sector, and funds
from federal grant programs.490
Over the next several months, various streetcar plans were placed at the top of the
transportation agenda for the city and HART, with significant attention focused on questions
of finance. In March 1996, HART revealed that it was possible to procure $19 million
of capital funding from the federal, state, and city governments, but officials were still
unsure of sources to pay for the estimated $1 million per year streetcar operating costs.
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Specialized tax districts, corporate sponsorship, donations, and property tax increases
were some of the ideas presented to fill this void. Regarding system design, planners had
proposed a 2.27-mile [3.65 kilometer] line that used 11 stops and featured eight streetcars
that could seat approximately 40 people each.491
A financial breakthrough occurred in June when Tampa’s metropolitan planning organization
(MPO) transferred $14.9 million of funds for some of its own transportation projects, such
as the People Carrier, to be an available source of funding for HART’s proposed streetcar
project. In addition to these newly available funds, the Federal Transit Administration
agreed to provide a $1.4 million grant for streetcar construction, and the City of Tampa
made a promise to contribute $5 million.492
While there was support among these organizations for the streetcar plan, there were
also many critics of the streetcar plans. Some critics focused on the need to fund ongoing
operations costs, while others were upset that money was not being funneled to the
struggling bus service that had been running a deficit for many years.493 The tension
between funding for streetcar versus bus would resurface over the years in Tampa, and it
has also been seen in other cities.
Despite these criticisms, Tampa officials and HART staff pushed on. They met with
Memphis officials, whose city possessed its own streetcar service, for guidance on the
project and its preliminary design in March 1998. By this time, the city had finally drafted
a plan to pay for beginning construction and for covering the streetcar operating costs.
For initial construction, the city decided to issue a $20 million bond, and for the operating
costs, the city proposed a plan of three parts: rider fees and in-car advertising ($300,000
per year), increased property taxes for those owning property near the line ($250,000 per
year), and the sale of naming rights for the system ($1 million), streetcars ($250,000 each),
and stops ($75,000-$125,000 each).494 Officials insisted that all the funds generated from
these activities would be placed in an endowment that should earn enough interest to
cover forecast operating costs.
With the final vote of the City Council only months away, several new controversies
arose.495 The first was over rising construction costs. The estimate for the streetcar
capital cost rose to at least $23 million, causing several council members to reconsider
their support of the project. Secondly, Mayor Greco disclosed that the city’s portion of
the funding, now $5-8 million, was to come from gasoline tax funds, which did not sit
well with many council members who thought the money should be used to fund other
transportation projects. Additional areas of concern included the lack of air conditioning
on streetcars, which would be a potential problem in the city’s warm summers, and their
slow speeds, which meant that the trip from the Convention Center origin to the Ybor
City end would take about 45 minutes (Danielson 1998). Eventually, HART secured $15
million from state and federal grants for construction, $800,000 from company advertising,
and another $1 million from Tampa Electric Co. (TECO) for the system naming rights,
which helped to reduce some of the financial conflicts. The streetcar system was now,
and still is, called the TECO Line Streetcar System or simply TECO Line.
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After Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) promised to dedicate $5 million of its
own funds, and an $8 million appropriation from the MPO was obtained, the Tampa City
Council became more confident in the parties’ abilities to raise the necessary funding for
construction and operations. On June 4, 1998, they agreed to move on with the streetcar
project and use the $5 million in gas tax money.496 The project now seemed to have more
than enough available money to cover the estimated capital/operating costs and to continue.
Although excitement over the streetcar was high, other similar local projects had a different
type of buzz surrounding them.497 In January, Tampa’s low-fare trolley bus that ran from
downtown to Ybor City, much like the new streetcar was to do, was planned for closing.
The original idea was to have all-day bus service, but this was soon turned into a route that
ran only during the typical lunchtime. It was thought that workers and residents downtown
would use the streetcar-inspired bus instead of their automobiles to go for lunch and run
errands. This idea never caught on with Tampa citizens, and ridership was low. This fact
seemed to portend poor ridership for the streetcar, as well.
Around the same time, Tampa’s Harbour Island People Mover, which ran from downtown
to Harbour Island south of Ybor City, shut down after 13 years of operation due to lack
of ridership and an inability to generate revenues that could cover operating costs. The
elevated tram experienced many operating difficulties, which meant that it was quite
expensive to operate. Further, its main service area, the shops and restaurants on Harbour
Island, almost completely shut down, which suppressed ridership demand. The system
was such a failure that the owner “agreed to pay the city $5 million to get out from under
the financial drain of operating the tram.”498 One-fifth of the money was used to demolish
the track, and the rest went to HART to help pay for expanded trolley services and the
ongoing streetcar venture.
These local failures did not deter some people from being optimistic about the streetcar.
City Councilman Rudy Fernandez expressed the exceptional view of the TECO Line when
he said, “It’s a different animal entirely. We’re talking about building a streetcar that people
will ride just for the fun of it. Unfortunately, we can’t say that about a green bus.”499
By the turn of the millennium, development of the streetcar system, which was planned to
open December 1999, was behind schedule because of the large amount of construction
activity in downtown Tampa and the other hurdles commonly found in projects of this
magnitude. This was not an issue for Gomaco Trolley Company, though, which had
started work on the eight replica Birney streetcars priced at $595,000 apiece.500 It also
did not stop the hype building around the streetcar and its perceived ability to generate
downtown economic stimulation. By the time the TECO Line route was finalized, the
city’s transportation department had been flooded with communications from business
people inquiring about the completion date and details of the streetcar operation.501 Other
streetcar supporters believed the streetcar would give Tampa a better identity and make
it a more unique destination.502 The first streetcar arrived from Gomaco in March 2000,
notwithstanding planners again pushing the TECO Line opening date back to sometime in
2001. At year’s end, HART completed a bid agreement with Herzog Contracting Corp. of
$15.5 million for streetcar line construction.503
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The year 2001 did not start off well for HART and the TECO Line. A dispute over a land
purchase between HART and several land owners was taken to court, and it was eventually
ruled that HART was to pay $9.5 million for land it appraised at $5.5 million.504 This cost
increase, which was covered by a clean air grant from Tampa’s MPO2, the addition of a
12th stop, and the inclusion of air-conditioning in the streetcars boosted TECO Line’s price
tag to just over $31 million.505 As a result, the city changed its early predictions of the
necessary yearly ridership necessary to maintain operating costs from around $260,000 up
to $500,000.506 The city’s funding responsibility also increased to approximately $10 million,
almost double its original estimate.
Nevertheless, in late March 2001, construction on the TECO Line began with completion
set for February 2002. Shortly after construction began, the city and HART, yet again, hit
a financial speed bump. The streetcar line design included a track crossing over a CSX
Corp. railroad track, which required an operating agreement between the two entities. The
City of Tampa offered to pay for the new crossing gate that included the new streetcar
rail, and “CSX agreed to design the interlocking tracks for the crossing,” However, CSX
also required crossing insurance of $500 million, or around $1 million a year in premiums.
The city argued that the amount was unfair and that they didn’t have the money for this
expenditure, but CSX stood behind its requirement saying, “It’s industry standard.”507
Just four months after construction began, the St. Petersburg Times reported a total
predicted end cost of up to $53.5 million, $12.7 million of which would be from the city.
Among these costs were a $13.5 million convention center and Marriott Hotel streetcar
terminal, a $7.3 million streetcar maintenance facility at Ybor Station, and nearly $750,000
of track improvements. When asked about the large cost increase (197 percent), City
Council Chairman Charlie Miranda said, “I would have looked at it with a different opinion.
But I can’t go back.”508 Miranda had voted yes on the streetcar project in the original
proposal vote.
As the deadline for completion approached and construction continued, the city and
its local businesses hung on to their optimism about what the streetcar would bring to
the community. Although many businesses in Ybor City were losing money from the
disruptions caused by streetcar construction, shop owners believed the streetcar was just
the thing to help revitalize the area once it was complete.509 Disregarding the variability
of projected ridership levels and the possibility of not generating enough rider revenue,
one of Mayor Greco’s consultants reaffirmed the businesspeople’s assumption that the
streetcar’s purpose was to bring economic stimulus to the area when he said, “I’m looking
at the economic impact and not what the initial ridership is. It’s not a transportation project;
it’s an economic development component of downtown.”510
Several months behind schedule, in August 2002, the first streetcar was tested on the
TECO Line.511 Two months later, the businesspeople’s and the city’s long wait finally came
to an end. Saturday, October 19, 2002 TECO Line began service (RPR 2000-2012). The
final costs for the project ($36.4 million) were nearly $13 million over the original projected
budget.512 This overspending led to an investigation by the Florida Department of Law
2
The Environmental Protection Commission (EPC) did not approve of this. They wanted time to research
whether the streetcar actually impacted air quality and historically discouraged the use of clean air funds for streetcar
projects. The EPC requested the MPO delay use of these funds but was ignored; the MPO approved the grants.
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Enforcement (FDLE) and several audits. This also led to HART Executive Director Sharon
Dent, who was being held responsible for the funds mismanagement, stepping down from
her position when her contract was up for renewal in late 2004.513
Along with the original TECO Line route, HART and the City had planned to eventually
extend the streetcar lines throughout Tampa as a part of a large-scale rail system project.
It was expected that by 2010 an extension of the streetcar line would run from the Tampa
Convention Center to the downtown area just north of where many residents worked. Other
plans included connecting the University of South Florida to downtown via commuter rail
and building another rail line in West Tampa that would eventually connect to the Tampa
International Airport.514 In September 2004 the Tampa City Council attempted to secure
federal funds for the proposed 0.38-mile [0.61 kilometer] streetcar extension that would cost
over $7 million.515 However, the Hillsborough Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO)
voted against the Council’s proposal saying the streetcar extension was not “a top priority”
and that other areas and projects were more deserving of the limited available funding.516
The MPO did give streetcar supporters a second chance, however, when in January 2005,
it allowed supporters to pitch alternative ideas and convincing arguments that the extension
project was worthy of receiving a grant for funding.517 Nevertheless, the proposal of
extending the TECO Line was defeated, with Hillsborough County Commissioner Rhonda
Storms taking a strong and aggressive stance against the streetcar. She even went so far
as to threaten to block HART’s funding for the upcoming year because of its insistence
on developing the extension. She said, “You’re taking a chance on a streetcar system
that goes from no place to nowhere.”518 Ironically, after several weeks of heated debate
among factions who either supported or opposed the streetcar extension, the program that
would be the source of funds for the project was eliminated.519 Still, supporters of streetcar
expansion remained confident that the funding could still be gathered from other sources.
In the meantime, the original TECO Line was having its own problems. First, locals’
perception of the streetcar and its performance was becoming more negative. Many
observers, including Commissioner Storms, believed the route did not access enough key
locations and did not attract enough riders. They believed the streetcar would generate
more ridership if it had initially been planned to go directly through the downtown area,
as opposed to the areas near the downtown where it operated. A Tampa Tribune article
written in 2006 listed some of the other problems that were holding the TECO Line back
from being as successful as other streetcar systems such as Portland’s, which began
service just a year before Tampa’s.520 These problems included a lack of an aggressive
political movement to expand the streetcar, the City and County being “reluctant to invest
local tax dollars,” “difficulty in attracting federal grants,” and failure to meet projections and
meet past promises. Also, operating costs were seen as too high, partially due to having
to pay CSX $400,000 a year in insurance premiums.521
Besides becoming increasingly unpopular among residents who saw the streetcar as
primarily a tourist attraction with no significant ridership, available operating funds began
to dwindle.522 As a result, in June 2005 officials of THS, who were still the business
managers of the streetcar, voted to raise the fares by up to 33 percent, possibly making
it the most expensive streetcar ride in the country.523 Conditions continued to worsen in
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early 2006 when HART warned THS and the City that it may not be able to operate the
line any longer, and the agency encouraged THS to send out bid requests for the job.524
The agency claimed that operating the streetcar was reducing funds that were supposed
to help improve bus services. Tensions began to rise between HART and THS.
By early 2008, Tampa’s streetcar was widely perceived to be doing poorly. The endowment
that was supposed to pay for operating costs with the interest it accrued was being used
up rapidly. The City was looking at having to become responsible for the costs, but as
reported by Tampa Mayor Iorio, it would not be able to do so. If the streetcar failed to run
due to insufficient funding, the City would also have to return upwards of $20 million in
grant funding. Also, property values along the streetcar were declining, which was reducing
the tax money that was supposed to be going toward funding the streetcar. To turn things
around, streetcar officials laid out a plan to raise money by selling more ads and naming
rights, to reduce service by reducing the number of cars operating on weekdays, and to
change the property tax structure along the route. Still, supporters were trying to push
for the downtown streetcar extension, claiming that it would attract more local riders and
significantly increase revenues.525
Just a few months later, in March 2008, the streetcar situation began to look better. It
was then that the group of officials, who oversaw the TECO Line and its development,
finally agreed on a plan to extend the streetcar to Tampa’s downtown area. This plan
was focused on increasing ridership by attracting local residents to use the streetcar for
their daily commutes and not to relegate the line only for tourists and conventioneers.
This was made possible by cost-cutting efforts, a special tax agreement, the transfer of a
grant for a streetcar museum, and the acquisition of other federal grants from the Surface
Transportation Program. The project was expected to cost up to $4.4 million and would
possibly start running by mid-2010.526
On October 9, 2009, ground broke for the TECO line extension, and it opened for service
“under budget and ahead of schedule” on December 19, 2010.527 Many observers believed
the extension finally completed the streetcar line by creating access to downtown. The
TECO Line was now connected to “a larger number of hotels, restaurants, residents, retail,
office and government buildings.”528 Many also thought the extension would bring on more
development, just as they believed that the first phase did. Around early 2012, this belief
seemed confirmed when the University of South Florida opened its Center for Advanced
Learning and Stimulation adjacenet to one of the extension’s new stops, Whiting Station.
In the wake of this development, the extension project was awarded the Tampa Downtown
Partnership’s Urban Excellence Award for encouraging “a more vibrant and connected
environment between the cultural, residential and business destinations in Downtown
Tampa and Ybor City.”529
However, a major looming issue for the Tampa streetcar system was still not completely
resolved, namely the high operating costs and lack of funding to cover them. By mid-2013,
the endowment used to help pay for operating costs was drawn down. This caused THS
to scramble for funds by asking the Hillsborough County Tourist Development Council to
help pay for the streetcar system’s operation. Other options included further cutback in
service, but officials were afraid they would lose the majority of local ridership. Streetcar
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ridership declined by more than seven percent from the previous year, adding to the
line’s ongoing woes.”530

STREETCAR RIDERSHIP AND SERVICE PERFORMANCE
The streetcar in Tampa is one of the weaker performers, from a purely ridership perspective,
among the modern streetcar projects. Its ridership has fallen precipitously in recent years,
even as local bus ridership has increased (Table 70). At one time, the streetcar accounted
for five percent of HART boardings and about two percent of passenger miles, but it now
accounts for about half of these numbers as of 2012. Average trip lengths on the streetcar
have remained fairly constant at about 1.7 miles [2.74 kilometers] which is about one-third
the length of the average bus trip. Streetcar ridership is highest in January and March,
but it is otherwise relatively constant throughout the year (Table 71). There is no obvious
seasonal pattern to bus ridership.

Table 70. Annual Ridership by Mode in Tampa (2003-2012)531
Unlinked Passenger Trips

Unlinked Passenger Miles

Year

Streetcar

Bus

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Total

2003

458,900

9,185,410

9,644,310

842,994

43,832,969

44,675,963

2004

423,156

9,818,574

10,241,730

922,043

49,068,968

49,991,011

2005

422,536

11,041,918

11,464,454

919,513

53,429,245

54,348,758

2006

406,393

11,914,287

12,320,680

838,421

60,035,670

60,874,091

2007

431,701

12,208,985

12,640,686

862,224

61,790,158

62,652,382

2008

439,555

13,054,151

13,493,706

728,890

67,522,796

68,254,686

2009

446,743

13,125,468

13,572,211

776,734

63,651,970

64,428,704

2010

399,637

12,665,359

13,064,996

789,244

60,062,433

60,851,677

2011

358,737

14,562,656

14,921,393

685,934

73,794,563

74,480,497

2012

301,516

14,314,610

14,616,126

523,031

73,017,436

73,540,467

Table 71. Monthly Unlinked Passenger Trips by Mode in Tampa (2012)532
Unlinked Passenger Trips
Month

Streetcar

Bus

Total

January

33,378

1,212,765

1,246,143

February

26,895

1,211,235

1,238,130

March

39,205

1,279,460

1,318,665

April

25,213

1,190,398

1,215,611

May

22,071

1,221,771

1,243,842

June

22,546

1,110,067

1,132,613

July

23,583

1,121,796

1,145,379

August

17,328

1,230,802

1,248,130

September

18,238

1,188,896

1,207,134

October

28,220

1,344,896

1,373,116

November

19,373

1,199,902

1,219,275

December

25,466

1,133,630

1,159,096
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Streetcar service levels have declined over time, but not as precipitously as ridership
has declined (Table 72). Service levels increased after opening and peaked in 2006 and
2007 but have since fallen. Bus service levels increased until around 2010 and have
since fallen. Over the same period, average streetcar speeds (vehicle revenue miles
divided by vehicle revenue hours) increased from about 4.6 miles [7.40 kilometers] per
hour to 5.4 miles [8.69 kilometers] per hour. Average bus speeds have fluctuated near
an average of 12.7 miles [20.44 kilometers] per hour over this same period. Operating
expenses have followed the same general trend as service levels (Table 73).

Table 72. Annual Service Characteristics by Mode in Tampa (2003-2012)533
Vehicle Revenue Miles

Vehicle Revenue Hours

Year

Streetcar

Bus

Total

Streetcar

Bus

Total

2003

80,220

6,219,959

6,300,179

17,329

510,698

528,027

2004

82,931

6,396,699

6,479,630

17,481

514,872

532,353

2005

83,709

6,716,394

6,800,103

17,580

542,002

559,582

2006

86,809

6,875,484

6,962,293

18,016

556,007

574,023

2007

87,147

7,393,632

7,480,779

17,985

588,622

606,607

2008

81,856

7,108,885

7,190,741

16,090

568,232

584,322

2009

74,603

7,421,599

7,496,202

14,564

581,600

596,164

2010

71,395

7,702,879

7,774,274

13,845

604,499

618,344

2011

76,806

7,660,741

7,737,547

14,423

600,914

615,337

2012

67,599

7,477,638

7,545,237

12,561

586,224

598,785

Combining the ridership, service, and operating expense data just presented, the authors
constructed performance measures for cost effectiveness and service productivity (Table 74).
The table indicates that the streetcar has experienced deteriorating performance in both
measures, even as the bus service has become more cost effective and more productive,
particularly in recent years.

Table 73. Annual Operating Expense by Mode in Tampa (2003-2012)534
Streetcar
Year

Unadjusted $

Bus
2012 $

Unadjusted $

Total
2012 $

Unadjusted $

2012 $

2003

$1,844,780

$2,301,965

$30,445,904

$37,991,193

$32,290,684

$40,293,158

2004

$1,626,233

$1,976,618

$38,412,495

$46,668,771

$40,038,728

$48,665,389

2005

$1,773,858

$2,085,396

$42,349,724

$49,787,489

$44,123,582

$51,872,885

2006

$1,716,591

$1,955,006

$46,574,144

$53,042,775

$48,290,735

$54,997,782

2007

$2,402,357

$2,660,787

$49,947,440

$55,320,464

$52,349,797

$57,981,251

2008

$2,078,695

$2,216,729

$50,686,745

$54,052,552

$52,765,440

$56,269,281

2009

$2,383,666

$2,551,027

$58,879,358

$63,013,376

$61,263,024

$65,564,403

2010

$2,542,168

$2,676,752

$58,650,778

$61,755,781

$61,192,946

$64,432,533

2011

$2,209,652

$2,255,439

$57,552,928

$58,745,492

$59,762,580

$61,000,931

2012

$1,775,507

$1,775,507

$54,927,727

$54,927,727

$56,703,234

$56,703,234
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Table 74. Service Performance by Mode in Tampa (2003-2012)

Year

Cost Effectiveness

Service Productivity

(Operating Expense per Passenger Trip, 2012$)

(Passenger Miles per Vehicle Mile)

Streetcar

Bus

Streetcar

Bus

2003

$5.02

$4.14

10.51

7.05

2004

$4.67

$4.76

11.12

7.67

2005

$4.94

$4.51

10.98

7.96

2006

$4.81

$4.45

9.66

8.73

2007

$6.16

$4.53

9.89

8.36

2008

$5.04

$4.14

8.90

9.50

2009

$5.71

$4.80

10.41

8.58

2010

$6.70

$4.88

11.05

7.80

2011

$6.29

$4.03

8.93

9.63

2012

$5.89

$3.84

7.74

9.76

Note: Values calculated from Tables E-5, E-7, and E-8.

Summarizing the modal statistics on the performance of Tampa’s streetcars, the streetcar
has experienced declining ridership and service in recent years, with the decline in
ridership outpacing the drop in service. The result is deteriorating performance in terms
of cost effectiveness and service productivity (Table 75). Average speeds have increased
over time, while average trip lengths are relatively stable. There is not a strong seasonal
pattern to ridership or service, although ridership peaks in January and March (Table 76).
Table 77 reports average weekday boarding counts for each of the 11 streetcar stops in the
Tampa system. There is significant variability, ranging from a low count of nine boardings
at York Street to a high of 450 boardings at Tampa Bay Federal Credit Union (Centro
Ybor). The land-use characteristics surrounding each of these stops help explain in part
their contrasting ridership levels. Tampa Bay Federal Credit Union is the gateway to the
commercial/entertainment district of Ybor City, where a number of restaurants, retail, and
entertainment venues are located and help to make this area one of the main destinations
for tourists and visitors in Tampa. York Street Station, on the other hand, sits between a
cruise terminal and the Ports Authority parking garage. This less developed location sees
activity primarily when passengers are boarding or alighting cruise ships.
Four other streetcar stops report relatively high (for Tampa) average weekday boarding
counts ranging from 326 to 392. In order of magnitude, these are Centennial Park Station,
Dick Greco Plaza, Whiting Station, and The Tampa Tribune Station. These are typically
close to Special Activity Centers and/or the availability of nearby parking facilities and
hotels (Figure 177). The remaining five stops report average weekday boarding counts in
the 100s and below.
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Table 75. Summary of Streetcar Ridership, Service, and Performance by Year in
Tampa (2003-2012)535
Year

Unlinked Passenger
Trips

Passenger
Miles

Vehicle Revenue
Miles

Vehicle Revenue
Hours

2003

458,900

842,994

80,220

17,329

2004

423,156

992,043

82,931

17,481

2005

422,536

919,513

83,709

17,580

2006

406,393

838,421

86,809

18,016

2007

431,701

862,224

87,147

17,985

2008

439,555

728,890

81,856

16,090

2009

446,743

776,734

74,603

14,564

2010

399,637

789,244

71,395

13,845

2011

358,737

685,934

76,806

14,423

2012

301,516

523,031

67,599

12,561

Year

Productivity
(PM/VM)

Cost Effectiveness
(2012$)

Speed
(VRM/VRH)

Average Trip Length
(PM/UPT)

2003

10.51

$5.02

4.63

1.84

2004

11.12

$4.67

4.74

2.18

2005

10.98

$4.94

4.76

2.18

2006

9.66

$4.81

4.82

2.06

2007

9.89

$6.16

4.85

2.00

2008

8.90

$5.04

5.09

1.66

2009

10.41

$5.71

5.12

1.74

2010

11.05

$6.70

5.16

1.97

2011

8.93

$6.29

5.33

1.91

2012

7.74

$5.89

5.38

1.73

Table 76. Summary of Streetcar Ridership and Service by Month in Tampa (2012)536
Month

Unlinked Passenger Trips

Vehicle Revenue Miles

Vehicle Revenue Hours

January

33,378

5,805

1,078

February

26,895

5,305

986

March

39,205

5,757

1,070

April

25,213

5,425

1,008

May

22,071

5,616

1,043

June

22,546

5,590

1,039

July

23,583

5,650

1,049

August

17,328

6,245

1,160

September

18,238

5,494

1,021

October

28,220

5,675

1,054

November

19,373

5,349

994

December

25,466

5,596

1,040
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Table 77. Summary of Streetcar Stop-Level Average Weekday Ridership in Tampa
(2012)537
Station

Line

Boardings

Alightings

Cadrecha Plaza

TECO

35

81

Centennial Avenue

TECO

111

164

Cumberland Avenue

TECO

60

34

Dick Grecho/Transportation Center

TECO

210

113

HSBC Station

TECO

24

15

Port Authority Station

TECO

10

5

Tampa Bay Federal Credit Union

TECO

133

184

Streetcar Society Station

TECO

19

30

Tampe Tribune Station

TECO

111

117

Whiting

TECO

162

128

York Street

TECO

5

4

880

875

Total

Figure 177. Special Activity Centers and Streetcar Ridership in Tampa (2012)538
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A visual assessment of Figure E-31 reveals a close relationship between most streetcar stops
and Special Activity Centers (SAC), whether in the Ybor District or along the Channelside
waterfront adjacent to downtown Tampa. The majority of these SACs are tourism related or
visitor-serving facilities such as the Tampa Convention Center and the hotels adjacent to Dick
Greco Plaza, the Florida Aquarium adjacent to Cumberland Avenue Station, Channelside
Bay Plaza adjacent to The Tampa Tribune Station, and the St. Pete Times Forum adjacent
to HSBC Station, among several others. Equally noticeable is the relationship between the
presence of nearby parking facilities and higher ridership counts at the terminal stations of
Centennial Park Station in Ybor City and Whiting Station in downtown Tampa.
The geographical deployment of Tampa’s streetcar line and its close spatial association
with tourism/visitor oriented SACs suggest a strong vocation for serving visitors more than
local utilitarian transit riders. The intention to serve and perhaps catalyze activity along the
Channelside waterfront is also apparent in its layout as well as in its operating hours. It
is also worth noting the cluster of governmental, educational, and cultural activity centers
on the northern end of the streetcar line near the Whiting Station, which suggests the
potential for future service expansion along the pedestrian mall on Franklin Street.
Figure 178 further reinforces the notion that the streetcar does not serve primarily local
transit riders, as the figure does not reveal a clear pattern between the number of bus route
connections at or close to streetcar stops and the number of boardings. Some stops that
report no bus connectivity report high ridership levels (Tampa Bay Federal Credit Union
Station and Centennial Park Station), while on the other hand some stops that report high
connectivity (e.g., Whiting Station) do not have proportionally higher ridership levels. Some
research on factors associated with light rail and other rail transit station-level boardings
indicates a positive relationship between the level of bus connectivity and station-level
ridership539 because these systems serve large numbers of regular transit users who
value such connections. However, the lack of such a relationship suggests that in Tampa’s
streetcar system, commuters and other regular transit users do not constitute a large share
of the ridership. This hypothesis is borne out by the available data and from insights gleaned
during the key informant interviews, which is discussed in the next section.
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INSIGHTS FROM KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS
In addition to collecting and analyzing quantitative data and documentary evidence,
the authors conducted one-hour semi-structured telephone interviews with several key
informants in the Tampa region who were able to provide their perspective on streetcar
goals, performance, and future prospects in the region. Informants representing a diverse
set of perspectives, including the local business community, local and regional transit
and planning organizations, and economic development organizations, participated in the
interviews. These informants were identified through documents or were suggested by
other interviewees as pertinent informants given the nature of the questions the authors
hoped to address.
The authors sought to use the interviews to complement the insights developed from the
quantitative assessment discussed earlier, and to identify hard-to-quantify phenomena that
might impact people’s perceptions of the streetcar and its performance. Each informant
was provided a set of 12-24 questions in advance of the interviews, including a set of
questions asked of all informants and specific questions asked of that individual, given the
role he or she plays in the community. A set of typical interview questions can be found in
Appendix F.
For Tampa, the authors conducted six semi-structured interviews with seven key informants.
They interviewed two representatives of a downtown business organization during the same
interview. Several key themes emerged from the interviews, including the importance of
funding stability for ongoing streetcar operations, the conflict between the streetcar’s role
as a traditional transit service versus a tourist amenity, the Tampa streetcar’s institutional/
organizational complexity, the importance of institutional and political leadership and
vision-setting, the long-term consequences of early planning decisions about alignments
and vehicles, and the streetcar’s role as an icon of the city. The seven key informants
included multiple individuals whose involvement with streetcar-related issues predates
implementation of the TECO Line service (Table 78). These individuals included a seniorlevel local/regional planner, a senior-level transit planner, a streetcar marketing specialist, an
economic development specialist who also serves with Tampa Historic Streetcar, Inc., two
downtown business community representatives, and a chamber of commerce representative
who is also affiliated with Tampa Historic Streetcar, Inc. Each individual is identified by his or
her role in the community within the narrative that follows.

Table 78. Roster of Key Informants Interviewed for Tampa Study
Informant

Role

1

Local/Regional Planner

2

Transit Planner

3

Marketing Specialist

4

Economic Development Specialist

5

Business Community 1

6

Busincess Community 2

7

Chamber of Commerce
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Streetcar Goals
A number of our informants emphasized that the TECO Line streetcar originated as
the proposed “first leg” of a larger light-rail transit (LRT) system, which thus implied a
strong traditional transit role for the service, but that it soon evolved into a redevelopment
and tourism-focused service of much shorter length. The streetcar’s current alignment
reflects this change in the service’s purpose, as it now serves a largely underdeveloped
waterfront district (Channelside) located between the entertainment/tourist-oriented Ybor
City and Tampa’s Convention Center. In between these major destinations are several
activity centers oriented toward tourism and visitors, including hotels, cruise terminals, an
aquarium, waterfront shopping mall, and a sports arena.
According to one business community informant, however, the shift in purpose from transit
to tourism/development is not yet completely settled, as “…groups (in charge of streetcar
planning/operations/finance) are still trying to identify and concur on the main goals for the
streetcar; they are not clear and the groups don’t understand each other on that aspect;
…even some people are still debating if the streetcar should be transit or a cultural piece
or both.” This conflict has important consequences for decisions about streetcar planning
and operations, given the very different needs of visitors and traditional transit riders.
Despite some uncertainty about the streetcar’s primary purpose, the interviews indicate
that urban redevelopment and tourism have historically driven most of the decisions made
around the streetcar. The economic development informant observed that the notion that
“urban redevelopment follows transit investment” has been one of the guiding principles of
streetcar implementation in Tampa. This idea was based on his understanding of Portland’s
experience with streetcar implementation and the adjacent development activity that some
observers have attributed to the streetcar lines in that city. This informant believes the
Portland experience is replicable in other cities, including Tampa, although he conceded
the lack of significant development results to date in Tampa’s Channelside District. He and
several other informants attribute the lack of significant development activity to the 2008
recession and its aftermath.
A number of informants emphasized the streetcar’s role in serving tourists and in providing
an identity for Tampa. Many informants noted that the streetcar has now become a visible
image, or icon, of the city. One informant spoke happily about the streetcar being featured
during national television coverage of major events such as the Super Bowl, while another
informant spoke about how local residents have embraced the streetcar as a city icon.
Whether or not the idea of creating an icon was in the minds of early streetcar promoters,
its role as one today is widely perceived among the informants. This makes the Tampa
experience similar to that of other cities where the role of streetcar as icon was also
mentioned in interviews for other communities.
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Public Attitudes Toward the Streetcar
According to the informants, the local community largely sees the streetcar as a tourist
amenity and not as a utilitarian transportation service. They might view it as an icon of the
city, but not one that they are likely to use to meet their transportation needs. Among the
observations gained from the informants:
“It is what it is…a fixed guide way system (not flexible) ... a fantasy.”
– Transit Planner
“It is not a transit vehicle; it is more of an amenity.” – Marketing Specialist
“(The streetcar) is a challenge to use for transportation…even some locals use it for
leisure.” – Economic Development Specialist
“It is pretty (or “cute”), but they (local residents) don’t ride it…”
– Marketing Specialist
“(The streetcar goes) … from nowhere to nowhere.”
– Economic Development Specialist
The informants also spoke of the attitudes of local elected officials and key policymakers
toward the streetcar, and of differences in these attitudes:
“(S)ome like it, others do not…they see it as an expensive foster-child.”
– Marketing Specialist
Some informants used the word “stepchild” to refer to the streetcar, which seemed to
reflect the perception that many policymakers see the streetcar as a secondary (at best)
piece of transportation infrastructure that receives less attention and care than other,
more critical transportation services. The economic development specialist attributed
this attitude to HART’s leadership over the years, while others used similar language
when referring to local elected officials, such as members of the City Council and previous
mayors. The informants noted that the attitude of the Tampa mayor is particularly important
among elected officials, given the city’s strong mayor institutional structure. One informant
emphasized a record of no streetcar support by prior mayors, after its early championing
by former Mayor Greco. However, the same informant noted that the current mayor seems
to have taken a real interest in the streetcar. This informant seems more optimistic about
the system’s future, as local policymakers are discussing increased service hours and
decreased headways.
In general, there seems to be a sense among the key informants that the current political
landscape is slightly more supportive of the streetcar now than it had been in the past.
Still, one business community informant noted that some council members remain quite
concerned about the financial costs of the streetcar, with particular concern over the ability
to support its annual operating expenses. This informant noted that “… the city wants to
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keep it (streetcar) going and viable, free or low cost ride.” But this is difficult to achieve
because fares do not cover operating costs (the fare box recovery ratio reported for 2012
was 32 percent), there are large ongoing annual insurance premium expenses required
for the streetcar to cross the CSX railroad tracks, and the trust fund used to help finance
operational expenses is running out of funds. Thus, some uncertainty still exists in terms
of institutional support, particularly among council members and to some degree within
HART’s leadership. However, the informants suggest that there may be a positive shift
in mayoral support, which some informants believe should increase the likelihood of the
streetcar continuing to receive financial support from the city.

Streetcar Finances
As noted earlier, finances are a major issue affecting the streetcar in Tampa. While
federal and city funds were used to construct the system, and regional planning and
transit agencies were somewhat supportive early on in its development, the stability of
the system’s operating funding is in question. Operational funding depends substantially
on a $6 million endowment fund whose interest payments were originally deemed able
to support annual streetcar operations. However, the unexpected recurring annual cost
of approximately $500,000 for insurance premiums required by the CSX freight company
(the streetcar line crosses a freight track) has led to the early depletion of the endowment
fund and sent local policymakers scrambling to find new ways to close the funding gap.
One way they have done so is to reduce the amount of streetcar service.
A number of informants pointed to the important role played by the service’s uncertain
operating funds in leading to decisions about hours of service and headways, which one
informant reported had each been reduced in recent years. The transit planner informant
lamented the effects of these service reductions in increasing the service’s reliance on
tourists and visitors and decreasing its usefulness for serving more utilitarian trips, both of
which he believes have resulted in reduced ridership.
Local decision-making has also undercut the financial sustainability of operating funding
sources for the streetcar. The local/regional planning informant recalled that originally
streetcar promoters had intended for the residential and commercial developments along
the streetcar line to contribute financially toward streetcar operations through a benefits
assessment taxing district. During a council hearing about the proposal, a local resident
complained about the proposal to tax residents, so an amendment was quickly made that
exempted residential developments from the district. The informant believes that this has
been a serious problem, especially given the significant residential development in the area.
Owners of large public lands have also not been reliable funding partners. The marketing
specialist informant noted that the Port Authority is the largest landowner in the Channelside
District and is exempted from the property assessment. Originally, the Port Authority made
payments to help support streetcar operations in lieu of the property tax assessments, but
the informant noted that they have reduced their annual contribution significantly in recent
years and now seem very resistant to providing any future financial support.
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All of the aforementioned financial issues have created a situation of uncertainty in streetcar
operations, and they have led to budget-saving and ridership-reducing service cuts, which
most informants view as seriously detrimental to most long-term streetcar goals. Nevertheless,
some informants seemed optimistic that solutions to these issues could be found and that the
City of Tampa might assume a more central role in financing the streetcar. These informants
noted the impracticality of ceasing to operate the service (due to the requirement for the City
to repay federal capital grant funds), the more positive attitude of the current mayor toward
the service, and the presence of inter-governmental agreements that place greater financial
responsibility on the City in times of financial distress.

Institutional Complexity and Perceived Leadership Vacuum
Three organizations are involved in streetcar planning, marketing, operations, and financing
in Tampa: Tampa Historic Streetcar, Inc. (THS), Hillsborough Area Regional Transit (HART),
and the City of Tampa. The three organizations have an inter-governmental agreement to
plan and operate the streetcar through which THS is the governing body responsible for
planning and marketing decisions, HART is sub-contracted by THS to operate the service,
and the City owns the tracks and power infrastructure for the streetcar. The agreement
requires HART to contribute to operating expenses and the City to contribute to capital
expenses. THS is the governing body and consists of a board with seven members and
four alternates. The City of Tampa appoints four members and one alternate, and HART
appoints three members and three alternates.
According to the informants, the present relationship among the three institutions and
their representatives is good, but the level of political engagement and financial support
for the streetcar has varied across administrations at the city level and from one director to
another at HART. One of the informants characterized the streetcar as being treated like
a step-child by HART, whose leadership has focused more time and attention on its bus
services. Other informants pointed to the general lack of attention or support from local
elected officials for many years. Some informants pointed to a lack of real leadership, or
even stewardship, of the streetcar. The business community informants shared this view
and expressed a frustration that their business organization is “…the only cheerleader”
defending the “albatross” (streetcar).
On the other hand, a Chamber of Commerce informant commented on the openness
of HART representatives as well as City Council members to listen to suggestions on
streetcar issues from the community on matters related to planning, pricing, scheduling,
and the like. He also noted that THS, HART, and his local business organization are
“trying to engage and cooperate more…(and) open to suggestions to boost ridership and
exposure (marketing) to the local and larger City community.” Yet the same informant,
who also participates in the streetcar’s governing body, notices no clear visioning and no
clear leadership on the streetcar: “…all groups want (the streetcar) to succeed, but how
much investment each group gives and how much time they dedicate to the streetcar is
not clear.”
This perception of no leadership in Tampa is somewhat echoed in a comment made by the
transit planner informant that HART has not supported the streetcar as it did before and that
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the streetcar would benefit from “… a more powerful entity than THS to be able to oversee
and intercede with others on behalf of the streetcar.” Related to THS’s performance as the
streetcar’s governing body, the business community informants noted a high turn-over rate
of members on the THS board, suggesting that valuable institutional knowledge is difficult
to maintain and update under such circumstances and that sub-optimal management of
the streetcar in Tampa might have been a result.
The key themes that emerge regarding streetcar organizational arrangements and
relationships point to a gap in leadership and visioning to the detriment of streetcar
performance. If there is no clear purpose, or goals, and no single entity ultimately
responsible for streetcar affairs, it is difficult to make decisions and strategic maneuvers
focused on optimizing the limited financial resources available for planning, operating, and
marketing Tampa’s streetcar. Further, it’s even more difficult to improve its performance as
a tourism amenity, development tool, and/or transit service. It is also more difficult to hold
anyone accountable when goals are not achieved.

Other Transit Issues
More than one informant, and in particular the marketing specialist informant and the transit
planning informant, expressed concerns about the performance of the legacy vehicles
currently operated on Tampa’s streetcar line. These vehicles were selected in Tampa, as
in many cities, to evoke a sense of nostalgia, but this has come at a serious unexpected
cost. Maintenance and replacement of antique parts are difficult and expensive to obtain,
which adds to the service’s financial difficulties. The breakdown of legacy vehicles has
also decreased the service reliability and it has negatively affected its ridership and
performance. Hence, it was not surprising to hear from several informants that serious
consideration is being given now to acquiring modern vehicles to replace the legacy
vehicles if the resources can be found to do so.

Non-Transit Issues
One recurring theme among multiple informant interviews is the emergence of the streetcar
as an icon of the City of Tampa and particularly for the Ybor City area. The informants noted
that the streetcar is featured frequently in news reports and marketing material prepared
for a diversity of purposes. Some informants perceive this as a positive consequence that
contributes to the city image, and that has a beneficial effect on Tampa’s culture. Another
informant noted that such publicity is “free marketing” that should help and encourage
streetcar use.
Many informants believe that streetcar implementation in Tampa played a role in
encouraging residential and commercial development in the Channelside District and
has benefited businesses in Ybor City. Yet they also recognize that its influence is partial
and complementary to other development factors such as a developer’s overall economic
assessment, building regulations, and local zoning. Special subsides or incentives for
promoting development were not used in Tampa, although one of the informants noted that
at least one hotel in the area served by the streetcar did indeed expect the streetcar to be
present as a condition for development. Other informants also pointed to their perceptions
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that the streetcar had been a positive amenity in attracting hotel, restaurant, residential,
and other developments to the area.

Streetcar Challenges and Possible Solutions
Several recurring themes emerge from the interviews as related to challenges for Tampa’s
streetcar functioning whether as a development tool, a tourist attraction, and/or as a transit
service. The need for stable operational funding sources is the most important concern
for all informants, while some informants also place a priority on receiving additional
capital funds for network extensions and other physical improvements required to make
the service more relevant to utilitarian transit riders. The funding issues directly impact
other challenges noted by all informants. They related the service’s limited hours and late
morning starts, its long headways, and its relatively high fare, as diminishing operating
funds have led to service cuts and fare increases that then reduce ridership. The ongoing
decline in ridership noted by all informants and confirmed in the quantitative trends and
tables that form part of this study is likely associated in significant part to these issues. Other
transportation challenges for the streetcar cited by the informants include the presence of
inexpensive, plentiful parking near the streetcar, the alignment’s lack of connection to
major downtown activity centers, and the combined high fare and long travel times that
make taxi services competitive for groups of travelers serving the Convention Center to
Ybor City travel market that the streetcar’s alignment directly serves.
The informants also emphasized the role of the economic recession, which had a significant
negative impact on Tampa’s tourism affecting the cruise industry, the number of conventions
in Tampa, and commercial activity along the Channelside District. Given Tampa’s touristoriented service characteristics (i.e., alignment, operating hours, and headways), it is also
expected that ridership would decline together with diminished tourism activities. This
pattern suggests a greater vulnerability for tourism-oriented streetcar systems to larger
scale economic conditions as compared with streetcar systems that cater to a more
diversified ridership market.
Lastly, but not the least of challenges facing the streetcar, is the obstacle to residential/
commercial real-estate development represented by the last economic recession, whose
effects are still being felt in Tampa. The streetcar alignment was devised to help implement
a land-use vision that has yet to be fulfilled in the Channelside District. Some informants
noted that employment and residential densities are still relatively low compared with other
streetcar cities, and commercial spaces are characterized as mostly vacant.
All informants recognize these challenges to the success of Tampa’s streetcar as a tourism
amenity, development tool, and/or transit service. It appears that most informants share a
common diagnostic despite the variety of perspectives, experiences, and expertise they
represent. This suggests the possibility that an ongoing conversation around the streetcar
has been occurring in the community, and that the tri-partite institutional arrangement
creates the space for identifying and sharing the challenges as well as potential solutions,
which are discussed below.
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The key informants for this case study largely agree on the key challenges facing Tampa’s
streetcar, and interestingly, there is also widely shared agreement on the solutions to
these problems. Of course, agreeing on solutions does not necessarily imply agreement
on the form these solutions might take or their likelihood of implementation.
The most important solution to Tampa’s challenges is to identify a stable long-term source
for operating funds. This would facilitate improvements in service hours and headways
that would make the service more attractive to potential riders, and it might also allow
fares to be reduced. While there is widespread agreement on the need to increase the
quality of service, there is some disagreement on the need to reduce fares. While most
informants perceive that the current fare is too high and may deter potential riders, the
transit informants point to the importance of the service’s relatively high (32 percent) fare
box recovery ratio as an indicator of the efficiency of its operation. The desire to lower a
fare that is considered too high and the assertion that a high fare box recovery is a good
thing are obviously contradictory positions, as lowering the fare will inevitably lower the
ratio. Some conflict is inevitable among different sets of actors with their very different
perspectives on what the most important attributes of the service should be. In the short
to medium term, a shift from legacy to modern streetcar vehicles should improve the
streetcar’s performance and reliability. This recommendation, made by the transit planner
informant, was also echoed by most other informants.
The informants also pointed to longer-term capital improvements that would increase the
utility of the streetcar for a wider array of trips. The transit planner informant suggested
a double-track along the current alignment as a means of more fully utilizing the current
vehicle fleet and reducing headways. On a much more ambitious scale, several informants
pointed to the idea of extending the streetcar line due north into Tampa’s downtown. The
extension would bring more employment and other destinations within the area served
by the streetcar, and it would also allow the streetcar to link to a transit center where
transfers could be made between the streetcar and the extensive local bus system. Such
an extension would increase the streetcar’s utility as a transit investment, as opposed to
a predominantly tourism one. But such an extension would require significant additional
capital investments.
Though ample and cheap automobile parking was mentioned as a challenge for streetcar
ridership, only a few informants had considered implementing “progressive” parking
policies such reducing parking requirements, increasing parking fees downtown, and/or
implementing parking meters prior to implementing streetcar service improvements. This
cautious positioning regarding parking policy may reflect the predominant role of private
automobile transportation in the Tampa community and perhaps a significant cultural
obstacle in creating an ideal landscape for the streetcar’s resurgence. But in the more
successful streetcar cities, most notably Portland, parking policy decisions are used to
encourage more use of streetcar and other transit modes, and they appear to be having
the intended positive effect on transit use. Whether such a strategy is feasible in Tampa
is open to debate, but as long as the automobile remains a more convenient alternative
to the streetcar or other transit modes, the ridership on the streetcar and other transit
services will remain quite low.
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One of the most transformative proposals to improve Tampa’s streetcar performance
came from the local/regional planner informant who suggested: 1) re-branding and
re-purposing the streetcar as part of a longer, region-serving light-rail transit service (the
tracks already conform to light-rail technology); and 2) redefining the streetcar institutional
arrangements so that a single and more powerful entity than THS takes leadership,
visioning responsibilities, and planning roles. The informant believed that both kinds of
shifts would be necessary for the streetcar to succeed as a transit service.
Over the longer term, the business community representatives emphasized the need to
encourage new development along the line and repurpose large land holdings of the Port
Authority that are currently used as parking lots in the Channelside District. The Port
Authority is one of the largest landlords in the streetcar’s service area, and its parcels
are currently underdeveloped. There is potential for higher intensity transit-oriented
development that could benefit synergistically with the existing streetcar system. Various
informants, including the economic development specialist informant and local/regional
planner informant, attest to an incipient resurgence of interest by developers in the
Channelside area. If the regional economy continues to recuperate, the transformation of
this area might become a reality that was envisioned in the planning efforts of the existing
streetcar. But this is clearly a longer-term proposition, which may or may not materialize.
The variety and number of recommendations identified from the informants’ interviews
reflect the complex situation that Tampa’s streetcar is currently experiencing and the need
to approach it within a multidisciplinary and multi-objective policy framework. While the
informants disagree on the details, all agree on the necessity that something big must
happen in Tampa to make the streetcar more viable. As one of the business community
informants noted, the streetcar must “go big, or go home,” a statement that underscores
the perception that major changes are needed now.

Advice to Other Cities
What advice would our Tampa informants give to other communities considering the
implementation of a streetcar?
The business community informants emphasized the need for clarity of purpose early in
the planning process. The community must decide whether it is a tourism amenity, a transit
service, a development tool, or a combination of these. The community must have a clear
vision and goals with respect to this purpose, as this is key to making effective decisions
about planning, operations, and other aspects of streetcar service.
The transit planner informant and the business community informants emphasized the
need to study and understand demand before embarking on these costly transportation
investments. This observation is also linked to alignment selection, as these informants
observed that the “…route should serve where demand is… building it (the streetcar) doesn’t
create ridership.” This statement stood in stark contrast with the view of the economic
development specialist that “urban redevelopment (and hence potential ridership) follows
transit investment.” These two distinct perspectives by two distinct sets of stakeholders
reflect diverse visions for the system as a development tool or as a transit service. This is
a salient theme in Tampa’s case, and it may be intimately related to its particular evolution.
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The business community informants also advise viewing any streetcar as a transportation
investment and making decisions to encourage its use as transportation. For example,
they suggest that a city should make a streetcar alignment long enough to reach the
origins and destinations necessary for a stable ridership level. As of now, one of these
informants thinks the alignment in Tampa is much too short to be functional, as it doesn’t
reach key attractors beyond the tourism destinations.
Certainly the fact that the streetcar’s planning, alignment, and operations focus primarily
on tourists and visitors makes it more vulnerable to economic shifts (i.e., recession).
Purposing a streetcar investment solely as a tourism amenity could be a higher-risk public
investment when compared with designing it to serve a more diverse market of potential
riders. Of course, designing it to be useful to more riders would necessitate a lengthier
system that would undoubtedly have higher capital and operating costs than a shorter,
tourist-focused system.
The transit planner informant stresses the importance of “front-end planning” and the need
to be realistic in representing the possible consequences of streetcar development. This
informant noted the inclination to “satisfy the Feds,” suggesting that local actors often tailor
their proposals, and the resulting cost and rider forecasts, to meet their perception of what the
federal grant officials are looking for in the proposal as opposed to being realistic given local
realities. This observation echoes recent critical literature on transportation infrastructure
investments and mega-projects that point to recurrent underperformance in terms of forecast
ridership and significant cost overruns compared with the final planning projections. This
literature points to intentional data manipulation and distortion of rationality and technical
reports in the procurement process for governmental funds that present biased or distorted
data to secure competitive funds for otherwise non-qualifying projects.541
This informant also noted the need for communities to better manage parking in areas
served by the streetcar. It is necessary to devise and implement parking policies focused
on creating incentives for using the streetcar and other transit modes instead of relying on
the automobile.
Finally, the interviewees emphasized the importance of fixing financial responsibilities
early in the planning process, “…who is going to pay for it long-term,” and the need for the
local community to have a “connection” to the streetcar.

CONCLUSIONS
This investigation points to a streetcar system in Tampa that exhibits declining performance
and multiple ongoing challenges. Both endogenous and exogenous factors seem to
have played a role in the TECO line’s evolution and performance, to date, and significant
consensus exists among a diverse set of stakeholders on what caused its present
challenges. These actors have identified a number of possible strategies to address these
challenges, some of which seem more feasible in the near term than do others.
But the fundamental question of purpose remains. Is the streetcar in Tampa primarily
a transportation investment, a tourism service, a development tool, or something else?
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To date, it has functioned primarily as a tourism service and secondarily a development
tool, but many of the informants believe that the streetcar must serve as a transportation
investment in the years ahead. This requires a significant change in the physical and
operational characteristics of the service, and it will necessitate significant additional
financial investments. It will also require a great deal of advocacy and of leadership in
a community where the informants would suggest that this has been in relatively limited
supply. Nevertheless, many informants remain hopeful for the streetcar’s future.
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APPENDIX F: INTERVIEW MATERIALS
The authors conducted a total of 21 interviews with 23 informants. The interviewees included
individuals representing a diverse set of perspectives on streetcar implementation and
operation in each city. Each interview took place by telephone. The research team provided
the interviewees a consent form and set of questions prior to the interview. The basic
interview questions asked of most respondents are included below. In some instances,
additional case-specific questions were asked of informants occupying particular roles in
the community being studied. The interview consent form follows the question list.

Background Questions (asked of all informants)
1. What is your professional background and current position?
2. To what extent does your position require you to be engaged in decisions affecting
planning, operation, marketing of the streetcar in your community?
3. What activities have you participated in that relate to planning, operation, marketing
of the streetcar in your community?

Goals and Objectives (asked of all informants)
1. From your perspective, what is/was the primary goal(s) of streetcar implementation in
your community? Is the streetcar primarily a transit investment, an urban development
tool, or something else?
2. How would you assess the streetcar’s performance in attaining its goals? Why?
3. What do you regard as the most successful aspects of streetcar implementation?
The least successful? Why?
4. If you identified a weakness of the streetcar, can anything be done to address this
deficiency? Is this feasible?
5. If you identified a strength of the streetcar, has this strength been leveraged to encourage
more streetcar use, urban redevelopment activity, etc? How so? To what end?

Stakeholders and the Public (asked of all informants)
1. How closely did you interact with key stakeholders in the planning and decisionmaking process that led to implementation of the streetcar?
2. Who were these stakeholders? From your perspective, what were their objectives
related to streetcar implementation?
3. Were there any conflicts about goals and/or objectives among the key participants?
If so, how were they resolved?
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4. Were there any concerns raised about streetcar implementation by you or other
participants prior to implementation? What were they? Why? Have they proven to
be valid? Invalid?
5. How would you characterize the public’s attitude toward the streetcar prior to
implementation? To the streetcar today? If the attitude has changed, how and why
do you suspect it has changed?

Funding, Planning, Operations (asked of transit planning informants)
1. To what extent are you involved in planning decisions about transit service in your
community? What kinds of decisions?
2. Are you aware of any changes made to transit service due to the streetcar? What
kinds? Why?
3. How would you assess the results of these changes, if any?
4. How was the streetcar system capital investment funded?
5. How are streetcar operations funded?
6. Are there any plans for service expansion for the streetcar? What kinds? When?
How funded?
7. Which entity actually: makes planning decisions about the streetcar? Makes operating decisions about the streetcar? Operates the streetcar service?
8. How closely integrated are streetcar and bus services in the community? What
kinds of strategies are in place to integrate the modes? How effective are these
strategies?

Transit Performance (asked of transit planning informants and other close
observers)
1. How closely have you monitored the streetcar’s performance since implementation?
2. How would you assess its performance as a transit service? Explain.
3. Would you characterize the streetcar as a stronger or weaker performer than local
bus service in the same travel corridors? Why?
4. If a strong performer, what is it about the streetcar that leads to strong performance?
5. If a weak performer, why? Is this remediable?
6. Who rides the streetcar in your community (rider market)? What kinds of trips?
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What kinds of destinations?
7. Do streetcar riders use other transit services as well?

Non-Transit Dimensions (asked of all informants)
1. Are you aware of any land-use (zoning) changes considered/coordinated during the
planning and design phases of the streetcar system? What kinds? Results?
2. Are you aware of any development incentives made to encourage development
around streetcar stops or near the line? What kinds? Results?
3. Were streetscapes or urban improvement projects planned and executed in unison
with the streetcar system? Why? Results?

Other contacts (asked of all informants)
1. Are there other individuals in your community you work closely with on streetcar
issues? Who? In what ways?
2. Do you recommend that we try to speak with any of these individuals?

Final Takeaway (asked of all informants)
1. If someone from a community considering building a streetcar were to approach
you for your overall assessment of the pros and cons of streetcar implementation
based on your city’s experience, what would you tell them?
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADA
APTA
CATA
CBD
CCDC
CELSRC
CL
CSRC
FDOT
FTA
FTIS
GIS
HART
LID
LRT
MATA
MAX
MPO
MSRC
NS
NTD
OHSU
PM
PSI
PSU
RH
RKM
RM
SAC
SLU
TCRP
TEA-21
TECO
THS
TRB
Tri-Met
TSRC

Americans with Disabilities Act
American Public Transportation Association
Central Arkansas Transit Authority (Little Rock)
Central Business District
Center City Development Corporation (Memphis)
Consumers Electric Light and Street Railway Company
(Tampa)
Central Loop Streetcar Line (Portland)
Citizens’ Street Railway Company (Memphis)
Florida Department of Transportation
Federal Transit Administration
Florida Transit Information System
Geographic Information System
Hillsborough Area Regional Transit (Tampa)
Local Improvement District
Light Rail Transit
Memphis Area Transit Authority (Memphis)
Metropolitan Area Express (Portland)
Metropolitan Planning Organization
Memphis Street Railway Company (Memphis)
North-South Streetcar Line (Portland)
National Transit Database
Oregon Health Sciences University (Portland)
Passenger Miles
Portland Streetcar, Inc. (Portland)
Portland State University (Portland)
Revenue Hours
Revenue Kilometers
Revenue Miles
Special Activity Center
South Lake Union (Seattle)
Transit Cooperative Research Program
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century
Tampa Electric Company (Tampa)
Tampa Historic Streetcar, Inc. (Tampa)
Transportation Research Board
Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon
(Portland)
Tampa Street Railway Company (Tampa)
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TSRPC
UMTA
USDOT

Tampa Street Railway and Power Company (Tampa)
Urban Mass Transportation Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation
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